18 august 2008
By Chang Noi
Some months ago, Chang Noi was invited to a dinner with a speech by a leading technocrat and former minister of finance. The event was attended by businessmen, senior officials, and politicians. By chance, Chang Noi was seated beside the brother of another leading technocrat and former minister of finance. Throughout the meal and the speech, he talked of various spirit mediums who could offer insight on political events and the future of the realm. He handed over business cards of some of them. He offered to be personal escort to a meeting with one medium of exceptional power.
For many people, the last two years have seen an epic battle over the fate of the nation. On one side are forces associated with the “third hand that can not be seen”. On the other are forces associated with “London.” This is not to say that any such battle has been taking place in reality, but that is how things have appeared in the popular imagination, and not only for the “man in the street” but also for the man in the conservative suit with the Lions Club lapel badge. This tale is not about reality, but about belief, or about how to talk about things that are unmentionable.
The tale starts over two centuries ago at the foundation of Bangkok. There was a sacrificial event at the erection of the city pillar. Such ceremonies draw on old beliefs about the spiritual force vested in the earth. The sacrifice is required to placate these spirits so they offer their protection to the realm. Unhappily, a green snake slid into the hole along with the offerings.
This has been the cause of difficulty for the realm and ruling elites ever since, requiring propitiation of those gods who have the power to combat this sort of misfortune. Two gods were selected for this role. The first is the “flower Brahma.” In Hindu mythology, while Vishnu was lying asleep on a serpent, a lotus flower sprouted from his navel. Brahma was incarnated in this lotus, seated in a position of deep meditation, and went on to recreate the world. In India, the idea of a “flower Brahma” seems unknown. But in the Thai adaptation, the phrase means a meditating Brahma of special power – enough power to recreate the world.
The second god is Vishnu, or Narai in the Thai tradition. During the churning of the sea of milk to create the life force for the world, he stands at the very centre, imperiously directing the whole event with his four arms. As with the “flower Brahma,” this is an image connected to the power of creation.
On 21 March 2006, the statue of Brahma known as the Erawan shrine was smashed by hammer blows. Of course the statue was originally the guardian spirit for a hotel. Such shrines draw on the same beliefs that underlie the city pillar. Probably because the shrine was located at an intersection that became a centre of the city, the statue unofficially took on a role of protecting much more than just a hotel. The attack came at a time of extreme political tension. The controversial 2006 election was two weeks ahead. Mobs were on the streets. According to this interpretation, the incident was not the work of a deranged vandal, but a deliberate attack on one of the key spiritual forces behind the camp of the invisible hand. Thus, the attacker was immediately killed, and the incident was never properly explained in public.
Now fast forward two years to early 2008. At the magnificent sanctuary of Phanom Rung, there is a famous lintel which depicts not only Vishnu reclining on a serpent and contemplating the recreation of the world, but also the moment of Brahma’s incarnation in a lotus sprouting from Vishnu’s navel. Possibly this lintel was what attracted some military men who reportedly visited Phanom Rung and carried out ceremonies to improve the fortunes of the elites and the realm.
But some time after their visit, there was a counter-attack, again at a time of gathering political tension, only a week before the court decision that dissolved Thai Rak Thai. Some people entered the Phanom Rung complex at night, moved and broke an elaborate bull-and-lingam, defaced the mouths of eleven naga snakes, damaged two lions, and broke the hands on two guardian spirits. In this interpretation, this vandalism was an attempt to undo the earlier propitiation of Vishnu and Brahma, and marshal the spiritual forces on the side of “London.” This again explains why the whole event seems to have been hushed up.
The explanation continues like this. The Buriram faction were not early supporters of Thaksin. In fact it was one of the last to fall into line, just before the 2005 election. And yet in 2006, its faction leader became Thaksin’s chief lieutenant. That was not (according to this story) because of his political skills but his spiritual contacts. Buriram is a Khmer-speaking area. In the Thai imagination, the Khmer world is a source of great spiritual power, especially associated with Angkor. Partly that power is associated with Siva, who is so prominent at Angkor. The bull-lingam that featured in the Phanom Rung desecration is a representation of Siva. The snakes are his protectors. By rumor, the faction leader provided a statue of Kali, a powerful representation of Siva’s wife, in one of “London’s” household shrines. In the Thai view, the Khmer are also associated with the darker kinds of spiritual practice. That explains the violence at Phanom Rung.
Finally, how did Samak rise to the premiership. According to this interpretation, Samak is a devotee of the flower Brahma. Shortly before the election he was allegedly seen attending one of the major shrines to this image for an intense ceremony.
If you follow this tale, it explains why politics have been so tense, why “London” has fallen low, why the Buriram faction has risen, and why Samak has become prime minister.
(http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/gods.htm)
Saturday, August 30, 2008
Judgement Day: The Sequel
4 august 2008
By Chang Noi
It was a sequel with a difference. When Thaksin attended the court in August 2001 on the asset concealment case, he got out of his car and walked the last stretch through cheering crowds, waving and pressing the flesh like a presidential candidate. This was a man without fear. The judgement was muddy, opaque, and bizarre. The judges split 8-7 in his favour. One later complained of being “unsuccessfully lobbied” over the case. Another hinted at foul play. The logic and rationale of the verdict left legal experts scratching their heads. This seemed to be a drama about the law’s subjection to power and money.
Scroll forward seven years, almost to the day. In place of the festive mood, the defendants were cloaked in gloom. In place of the muddy verdict, this one was crystal clear. This seemed to be a drama about law triumphant.
The verdict and the sentence are remarkable. Most comment has focused on these. But the event was much more elaborate. The judges seem to have realized this was a historic moment, and milked it for all the drama it could deliver.
That is not surprising. Ever since April 2006 when the king called on the judges (“If you don’t help to make democracy move forward, it will be the country’s downfall”), the judiciary has been in the spotlight as never before. For some, this has been a blessing. They talk of a judicial revolution, and the coming of the rule of law. They predict a new era of Thai politics. Others have been a lot more skeptical. They point out that bringing the judiciary into politics will end up politicizing the judiciary; that the new constitution gives quite extraordinary power to a handful of senior judges; that judgements afflicted by political bias are laying down precedents that will be regretted in the future; that the recent firestorm of legal decisions is undermining parliament and executive; and that in truth what is going on is more like a witch hunt than a judicial revolution. They scoff, “When I see the same standards applied to everyone, then I’ll believe it.”
Both sides are probably rushing to judgement long before it is due. History tells us that it takes some time to establish the traditions, the mind set, the institutions in which a rule of law starts to come into play, so the enthusiasts need to calm down a bit. But history also tells us that the steps towards a rule of law are taken at times of crisis and conflict. Some have forgotten how recently in the US the judiciary was activated to counter ways in which the executive under Nixon was running riot. Some have forgotten how recently in the UK the Poulson case disrupted the widespread corruption in local government contracting. The rule of law does not grow steadily, like grass.
The judges last Thursday seemed very conscious of this debate, and very conscious of the precedent set seven years earlier in a trial on essentially the same issue. The judgement started out with a passage that is more like a manifesto than a preamble to a criminal verdict. It ran like this:
“Before reading the judgement, the bench wishes to point out to the three defendants and those attending to hear the judgement that, as is well-known, at present some segments of the population are divided into camps. This is clearly a political problem, and the conflict that has arisen in thinking and action is violent, with no quarter given. This is a matter that people involved must cooperate to overcome in the future. The role of the courts of law is to be neutral. They have a duty to scrutinize cases under democracy. Let everyone rest assured that the courts scrutinize cases according to their authority and according to the law. They furnish justice to all parties according to the constitution without bias, and without susceptibility to current sentiment.”
Then, instead of moving directly to the verdict and sentence, the judges picked their way through the evidence and through the defence arguments almost line by line, detailing the chicanery, exposing the lies, and pulling apart the cover-up. As a performance it was relentless.
After the verdict and the sentence, it was not over. The judges had another message to deliver. At the tail-end of the judgement, they appended a homily about money, power, and social responsibility:
“All three defendants are people of high social and economic status. In particular, at the time the crime was committed of giving false information in order to evade the payment of tax, the second defendant was the wife of someone who held office at the level of the country’s executive. All three defendants, besides having a general duty to conduct themselves as good and proper citizens, should also behave as good examples befitting their social and economic status. Yet instead they conspired to evade tax, an action which is a violation of the law, and an injustice to society and the tax system, even though the amount of tax that the first defendant had to pay was insignificant compared to the wealth of the second defendant and family at the time. If the first defendant had paid tax according to the law like any citizen it would not have affected the status of the second defendant in any way. Thus the crime of all three is serious.”
The preamble of the judgement made the case for law as something fair, independent, and free of political bias.
The detailed core of the judgement made the case for law as a rational, forensic instrument capable of separating truth from falsehood.
The final homily made the case for law as an instrument of social justice in the face of the inequalities of wealth and power.
This was not just a judgement in Pojaman’s tax case, but a manifesto on behalf of the law.
( http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/verdict.htm )
By Chang Noi
It was a sequel with a difference. When Thaksin attended the court in August 2001 on the asset concealment case, he got out of his car and walked the last stretch through cheering crowds, waving and pressing the flesh like a presidential candidate. This was a man without fear. The judgement was muddy, opaque, and bizarre. The judges split 8-7 in his favour. One later complained of being “unsuccessfully lobbied” over the case. Another hinted at foul play. The logic and rationale of the verdict left legal experts scratching their heads. This seemed to be a drama about the law’s subjection to power and money.
Scroll forward seven years, almost to the day. In place of the festive mood, the defendants were cloaked in gloom. In place of the muddy verdict, this one was crystal clear. This seemed to be a drama about law triumphant.
The verdict and the sentence are remarkable. Most comment has focused on these. But the event was much more elaborate. The judges seem to have realized this was a historic moment, and milked it for all the drama it could deliver.
That is not surprising. Ever since April 2006 when the king called on the judges (“If you don’t help to make democracy move forward, it will be the country’s downfall”), the judiciary has been in the spotlight as never before. For some, this has been a blessing. They talk of a judicial revolution, and the coming of the rule of law. They predict a new era of Thai politics. Others have been a lot more skeptical. They point out that bringing the judiciary into politics will end up politicizing the judiciary; that the new constitution gives quite extraordinary power to a handful of senior judges; that judgements afflicted by political bias are laying down precedents that will be regretted in the future; that the recent firestorm of legal decisions is undermining parliament and executive; and that in truth what is going on is more like a witch hunt than a judicial revolution. They scoff, “When I see the same standards applied to everyone, then I’ll believe it.”
Both sides are probably rushing to judgement long before it is due. History tells us that it takes some time to establish the traditions, the mind set, the institutions in which a rule of law starts to come into play, so the enthusiasts need to calm down a bit. But history also tells us that the steps towards a rule of law are taken at times of crisis and conflict. Some have forgotten how recently in the US the judiciary was activated to counter ways in which the executive under Nixon was running riot. Some have forgotten how recently in the UK the Poulson case disrupted the widespread corruption in local government contracting. The rule of law does not grow steadily, like grass.
The judges last Thursday seemed very conscious of this debate, and very conscious of the precedent set seven years earlier in a trial on essentially the same issue. The judgement started out with a passage that is more like a manifesto than a preamble to a criminal verdict. It ran like this:
“Before reading the judgement, the bench wishes to point out to the three defendants and those attending to hear the judgement that, as is well-known, at present some segments of the population are divided into camps. This is clearly a political problem, and the conflict that has arisen in thinking and action is violent, with no quarter given. This is a matter that people involved must cooperate to overcome in the future. The role of the courts of law is to be neutral. They have a duty to scrutinize cases under democracy. Let everyone rest assured that the courts scrutinize cases according to their authority and according to the law. They furnish justice to all parties according to the constitution without bias, and without susceptibility to current sentiment.”
Then, instead of moving directly to the verdict and sentence, the judges picked their way through the evidence and through the defence arguments almost line by line, detailing the chicanery, exposing the lies, and pulling apart the cover-up. As a performance it was relentless.
After the verdict and the sentence, it was not over. The judges had another message to deliver. At the tail-end of the judgement, they appended a homily about money, power, and social responsibility:
“All three defendants are people of high social and economic status. In particular, at the time the crime was committed of giving false information in order to evade the payment of tax, the second defendant was the wife of someone who held office at the level of the country’s executive. All three defendants, besides having a general duty to conduct themselves as good and proper citizens, should also behave as good examples befitting their social and economic status. Yet instead they conspired to evade tax, an action which is a violation of the law, and an injustice to society and the tax system, even though the amount of tax that the first defendant had to pay was insignificant compared to the wealth of the second defendant and family at the time. If the first defendant had paid tax according to the law like any citizen it would not have affected the status of the second defendant in any way. Thus the crime of all three is serious.”
The preamble of the judgement made the case for law as something fair, independent, and free of political bias.
The detailed core of the judgement made the case for law as a rational, forensic instrument capable of separating truth from falsehood.
The final homily made the case for law as an instrument of social justice in the face of the inequalities of wealth and power.
This was not just a judgement in Pojaman’s tax case, but a manifesto on behalf of the law.
( http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/verdict.htm )
Monday, August 18, 2008
Singapore's insensitive miscalculation
Opinion by Thitinan Pongsudhirak ; 12 July 2008
The Singaporean government cannot feign ignorance and provide implicit recognition of Thaksin Shinawatra without serious consequences for bilateral relations between Thailand and the island state.
[The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University]
Singapore's recent misstep in unwittingly allowing deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to use the island republic as a staging ground for media interviews on CNN and in the Asian Wall Street Journal that chastised the performance of the caretaker government of General Surayud Chulanont indicates a mind-boggling miscalculation.
Having become entangled in Thailand's political drama following the Shinawatra family's scandalous sale of Shin Corp to Singapore's government-linked Temasek Holdings early last year, Singapore's elite should have stayed on the sidelines and waited out the resolution of Thailand's deep-seated and ongoing confrontation and conflict.
But Singapore's leaders did not, and have not. They keep shooting themselves in the foot. They never got Thailand right. In view of their latest diplomatic blunder, perhaps they never will.
That Singapore's elite has persistently coddled Mr Thaksin prior to, and in the aftermath of, the military coup on Sept 19, 2006, is understandable.
Mr Thaksin's ties with Singapore's ruling Lee family run deep. The former premier was one of the first Lee Kuan Yew fellows back in 1994. The Singaporeans annually pick out up-and-coming young politicians from the region and treat them to red-carpet packages on the island in an effort to win over future regional leaders. In Mr Thaksin, the Singapore government picked a winner.
In addition, Mr Thaksin's and the Lees' common Hakka Chinese background further deepened their relationship. Like the Lees' one-party dominance of Singapore's democratic system, Mr Thaksin's authoritarian, decisive leadership style, and virtual monopoly in Thai politics during his nearly six-year rule also helped to solidify ties.
It was thus somewhat unsurprising that when it bought Shin Corp and allowed Mr Thaksin to cash out for 73.3 billion baht, Temasek was headed by none other than Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's wife, Madam Ho Ching.
During Thailand's prolonged political crisis and street protests against Mr Thaksin, the Singaporean government never flinched in the face of adverse Thai criticism of its role and connection to Temasek, as its embassy in Bangkok laid low in a vain attempt to ride out the storm.
Even after the Sept 19 coup, Prime Minister Lee stated unequivocally in an October speech to the Asian-European Editors Forum that the Thai putsch was a setback for the country's democracy. PM Lee justified his view of Mr Thaksin's electoral prowess, and completely missed the essence of the Thai crisis revolving around Mr Thaksin's erosion of legitimacy due to a long trail of constitutional violations, corruption, and abuses of power.
Unlike Singapore, winning elections in Thailand without accountability and effective checks-and-balances provided by institutions mandated under the constitution and by individuals from the media and NGOs, is not sufficient to retain a democratic mandate.
Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew followed up on his son's remark with the insistence that the Temasek-Shin Corp transaction was completely above board. Both father and son did what Mr Thaksin would have done by insisting on technical legality with a blind eye to legitimacy considerations and ethical and moral implications.
To be sure, the Thaksin visit would likely have transpired smoothly without the CNN and Asian Wall Street Journal interviews, despite Deputy Prime Minister S Jayakumar's odd unofficial reception of someone who had no official status. Kishore Mahbubani, an erudite diplomat who now heads the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, consequently criticised Mr Thaksin for putting Singapore in a tight spot with his media comments. It was the first public rebuke of Mr Thaksin from a member of the Singapore elite.
The Surayud government's measured response by withdrawing an invitation to Singapore's foreign minister to speak at a bilateral civil service exchange programme, and its cancellation of an informal summit meeting between the two countries, are moves in the right direction.
With these concrete diplomatic signals, the Singaporean government can no longer feign ignorance and provide implicit recognition of Mr Thaksin without serious consequences for the bilateral relationship.
To be fair, the primary responsibility for this debacle lies with the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, ultimately, with the Council for National Security and the Surayud government.
With Thaksin loyalists still in command, the Foreign Ministry has dragged its feet throughout the post-coup period in going after Mr Thaksin's passport status. Despite vocal calls from the anti-Thaksin coalition, the ministry took more than three months to revoke Mr Thaksin's diplomatic privileges. Rumours and anecdotal evidence of Thai embassy resources being used to facilitate Mr Thaksin's movements in London, China, Hong Kong, and Singapore have been rife.
Both the CNS and the Surayud government should clarify Mr Thaksin's status once and for all. This would enable foreign governments around the world to treat Mr Thaksin properly. To its credit, the Chinese government walked a balanced line by letting Mr Thaksin stay in China for weeks but not giving him any high-level recognition.
However, other foreign governments should not have to make this calculation on their own. They have the right to know how they should receive Mr Thaksin. The onus is thus on the CNS and the Surayud government. Mr Thaksin's murky status is yet another indication of the weak and indecisive post-coup management.
(http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories.php?id=116105)
Friday, August 15, 2008
A post-Thaksin Thailand
Wednesday August 13,2008
Analysis by Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Now that Mr Thaksin is eliminated from the scene, the way forward appears clear. But it is vital that his opponents retain the positive legacy he has left.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
Analysis by Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Now that Mr Thaksin is eliminated from the scene, the way forward appears clear. But it is vital that his opponents retain the positive legacy he has left.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.
----------------------------------
As Thailand's judicial noose has tightened all around him, former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has thrown in the towel.
He has failed to return to Bangkok to appear at the Supreme Court hearings on his alleged abuse of office involving the auction of a prime land plot on Ratchadaphisek Road in Bangkok in 2003. At issue in the aftermath of his escape from the law are whether the unfolding and unprecedented judicial assertiveness will be able to settle Thailand's protracted political polarisation and stalemate and whether Mr Thaksin's opponents will be able and willing to incorporate his legacy into post-Thaksin Thailand.
On the Ratchadaphisek land scandal, Mr Thaksin allegedly used his position as prime minister to aid his wife Khunying Potjaman, who won the bid at one third the price of the appraised value. Facing the spectre of jail time because the Supreme Court's ruling will be final, Mr Thaksin and his wife, the latter already having been convicted and given a three-year jail sentence by the Criminal Court for tax evasion amounting to 546 million baht, have called it quits.
They skipped Bangkok after attending the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics in favour of London, where he has issued a defiant hand-written note citing political persecution and judicial double standards. With his political road now at a dead end, Mr Thaksin's departure from the Thai scene bears far-reaching repercussions.
First and foremost, he and his wife will face insurmountable legal entanglements. Having jumped bail in her recent tax fraud conviction, Khunying Potjaman is now a fugitive, unable to return indefinitely without facing immediate arrest. Mr Thaksin is likely to face the same fate because the court cases will continue in his absence. The Supreme Court has issued arrest warrants on the couple for their absence from the hearings on the Ratchadaphisek land case.
Apart from the land scandal, other cases at work stem from Mr Thaksin's accountability while in power during 2001-06, including the Thai ExIm Bank's dodgy loans to Burma's military government to purchase Shinawatra-owned satellite services, the legalisation of underground lottery, the irregular procurement of rubber saplings for farmers, changes to the excise tax regime to benefit Shinawatra-owned telecom firms, among others.
Convictions in any or all of these cases would render Mr Thaksin a fugitive on the run. The United Kingdom's lenient extradition law, however, is likely to allow the couple to remain there as Mr Thaksin's defence will presumably be based on the grounds of politically motivated legal prosecution and the lack of personal safety and fair trial. His roughly $2 billion that have been frozen by the post-coup authorities will likely be held up indefinitely, if not confiscated subsequently. It is virtually impossible for him to return to high power given these legal cases and the powerful forces who have opposed him since his overthrow in September 2006. He would be lucky, as he himself recognised in his hand-written statement, to end up on Thai soil again.
Second, Mr Thaksin's departure will further weaken his grip over the ruling People Power Party, whose factions are likely to run amok. As the PPP is facing a vote fraud investigation that could result in its dissolution, the chances of its factions bolting or shifting their allegiances away from Mr Thaksin will increase with his legal trouble and absence.
On the other hand, Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej is likely to gain significant leverage over some of the PPP camps in view of Mr Thaksin's second demise. Mr Samak is now the only present leader of both the PPP and the coalition government. He is likely to be more assertive in an effort to prolong his rule and prepare for the consequences of the Constitutional Court's dissolution decision late this year or early next. Mr Samak has grown into his own prime minister, contrary to expectations. Few have underestimated him more than Mr Thaksin.
Third, the post-Thaksin weakening of the PPP means that we are unlikely to see a dominant political party, such as the once-invincible Thai Rak Thai which was dissolved in May 2007, in Thai politics in the foreseeable future. The executive branch will be relatively weak and ineffective, party politics more fractious and unruly, coalition government unstable and unable to last a full term. The legislature will be equally divisive and unwieldy.
These were the drawbacks of Thai electoral politics that the 1997 constitution was designed to prevent. Dubbed at the time as the “people's charter”, it culminated with Mr Thaksin's rise and rule. His second demise thus spells the final death knell of the 1997 charter.
The Democrat Party, the main parliamentary opposition throughout the Thaksin years and through the coup and the PPP's election victory last December, has been handed one golden opportunity after another but has failed to capitalise by coming up with an appealing policy platform. As a result, Thai party politics may well revert to the pre-Thaksin era as in the 1980s and 1990s.
Finally, Thailand will now undergo a litmus test to see how much of the Thaksin overhang has affected Thai politics. If this protracted political crisis emanates from Mr Thaksin and his rule, from his money, corruption and abuses of power, then his departure and the weakening of the political party system should allow for a semblance of normality, a reconciliation of sorts.
Many will watch to see if his myriad opponents, particularly the People's Alliance for Democracy, in Bangkok and other urban centres will tone down their rhetoric or even disband. It would not be surprising if the PAD becomes even more assertive and forceful. Indeed, this crisis and confrontation have become much more than about Mr Thaksin. His opponents may not just want to get rid of him but may also want to stake their own vested interests and claims on power and the pie.
For post-Thaksin Thailand to move forward effectively in the early 21st century, the forces that have put down the Thaksin challenge must be willing to adopt some of his populist agenda, which did win hearts and minds. Thailand has been brought virtually to a standstill because of the ongoing political polarisation. Now that Mr Thaksin is eliminated from the scene, the way forward appears clear.
Mr Thaksin's economic and bureaucratic reforms, income redistribution schemes, and policy innovations that boosted Thailand's competitiveness in the global economy should be retained as much as the corruption, cronyism and abuses of power should be dealt with. It is imperative for the conservative alliance behind his political decapitation to accept that not all of what Mr Thaksin stood for was wrong. Unless his opponents come to terms with what is positive about his legacy, Thailand's crisis is likely to persist.
(http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories/topstories.php?id=129552)
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
สมัชชาคนจนค้าน พ.ร.บ.จัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ
10 ส.ค. 51 – สมัชชาคนจนออกแถลงการณ์เรียกร้อง ให้ยกเลิกการเสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ. การจัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ พ.ศ. .. และให้กระทรวงที่เกี่ยวข้องเร่งเจรจาและแก้ไขปัญหาสมัชชาคนจนโดยเร่งด่วน
แถลงการณ์สมัชชาคนจน
เรื่อง คัดค้าน พ.ร.บ. จัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ
และเร่งให้รัฐบาลแก้ไขปัญหาสมัชชาคนจน
สมัชชาคนจน เป็นกลุ่มองค์กรชาวบ้านที่รวมตัวกันเพื่อเรียกร้องให้รัฐบาลแก้ไขปัญหาที่เกิดจากการดำเนินโครงการของรัฐทั้งที่เป็นประเภทนโยบาย กิจกรรมโครงการต่าง ๆ ที่มีผลกระทบต่อพี่น้องประชาชน ประกอบด้วยเครือข่าย ทั้งหมด 7เครือข่าย คือ 1. เครือข่ายที่ดิน 2. เครือข่ายป่าไม้ 3. เครือข่ายเขื่อน 4. เครือข่ายผู้ป่วยจากการทำงาน 5. เครือข่ายประมงพื้นบ้าน 6. เครือข่ายสลัม 7. เครือข่ายเกษตรกรรมทางเลือก
ที่ผ่านมา สมัชชาคนจนได้มีข้อเรียกร้องในการแก้ไขปัญหาต่อรัฐบาลตั้งแต่ปี 2538 เป็นต้นมา แต่การแก้ไขไม่สามารถบรรลุวัตถุประสงค์ การชุมนุมเรียกร้องทั้งในพื้นที่ที่เกิดปัญหา และมาเรียกร้องถึงทำเนียบรัฐบาล รวมไปถึงการชุมนุมที่ยาวนานปี 2539 นานถึง 99 วัน เพื่อให้มีการแก้ไขปัญหาของสมัชชาคนจน ของกลุ่มผู้ได้รับเดือดร้อนจากปัญหาต่าง ๆ การชุมนุมของพี่น้องคนจนที่ผ่านมาได้ปฏิบัติตามกฎหมายรัฐธรรมนูญ และสิทธิอันพึงมี ที่นานาอารยประเทศปฏิบัติกัน เมื่อมีสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนในนามพรรคพลังประชาชน ได้เสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ.จัดระเบียบการชุมนุม ซึ่งมีเนื้อหาขัดกับรัฐธรรมนูญ เพราะการชุมนุม เป็นสิทธิอันพึงมีของประชาชนที่จะเสนอให้มีการแก้ไขในรูปแบบต่างได้
ดังนั้นสมัชชาคนจน ได้พิจารณาแล้วเห็นว่าการที่รัฐบาลโดยการนำเสนอของ นายจุมพฏ บุญใหญ่ ส.ส.พรรคพลังประชาชนเตรียมเสนอ “ร่างพระราชบัญญัติจัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ พ.ศ. ...” เข้าสู่การพิจารณาของสภาผู้แทนราษฎร เพื่อตราเป็นกฎหมายบังคับใช้กับสาธารณะชนทั่วไป พวกเรา “สมัชชาคนจน” เห็นว่าร่างกฎหมายฉบับนี้ เป็นการดำเนินการนำเสนอกฎหมายที่ขัดต่อการแสดงสิทธิอันชอบธรรมของกลุ่มต่าง ๆ ที่จะดำเนินการไม่ได้ และจะถูกดำเนินคดี ทั้งผู้ชุมนุมและผู้สนับสนุน ซึ่งเป็นไปไม่ได้ที่จะขออนุญาตการชุมนุม แล้วจะได้รับอนุญาต เพราะที่ผ่านมา การชุมนุมก็ถูกละเมิดจากเจ้าหน้าที่ภาครัฐอยู่แล้ว เช่น การสกัดไม่มีการชุมนุม การตรวจค้น พยายามตั้งข้อหาต่าง ๆ แต่ในร่างกฎหมายดังกล่าว ได้กล่าวโทษที่มีความผิดรุนแรงไว้ จึงไม่สอดคล้องกับรัฐธรรมนูญ ที่ให้สิทธิชุมนุมได้
ปัจจุบันนับตั้งแต่รัฐบาลภายใต้การนำของนายสมัคร สุนทรเวช ได้บริหารประเทศมาครบ 6 เดือนแล้ว แต่การแก้ไขปัญหาสมัชชาคนจนไม่มีความคืบหน้าแต่อย่างใด แม้ได้รับการประสานให้มีการเจรจาในโครงการที่อยู่ภายใต้กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์ ประกอบด้วย โครงการเขื่อนแก่งเสือเต้น จ.แพร่ เขื่อนโป่งขุนเพชร จ.ชัยภูมิ เขื่อนหัวนา เขื่อนราศีไศล จ.ศรีสะเกษ เขื่อนท่าแซะ จ.ชุมพร เขื่อนสิรินธร จ.อุบลราชธานี และกรณีประมงพื้นบ้านภาคใต้ 14 จังหวัด ซึ่งจะมีการเจรจาเบื้องต้นในวันที่ 18 สิงหาคม 2551 นี้เท่านั้น
ส่วนกรณีอื่น ๆ ยังไม่ได้การติดต่อให้มีการเจรจาเพื่อแก้ไขปัญหาประกอบด้วย
1. ปัญหาที่ดินและที่ราชพัสดุ ในความรับผิดชอบของ กระทรวงมหาดไทย และกรมธนารักษ์
2. ปัญหาป่าไม้ ประเภทพื้นที่อยู่ในป่าอนุรักษ์ ในความดูแลของกระทรวงทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและสิ่งแวดล้อม และกระทรวงมหาดไทย
3. ปัญหาผู้ป่วยจากการทำงาน ในความผิดชอบของ และกระทรวงสาธารณสุขและกระทรวงแรงงาน
4. ปัญหาเขื่อนผลิตไฟฟ้า เช่น เขื่อนปากมูล ในความรับผิดชอบของกระทรวงพลังงาน และการไฟฟ้าฝ่ายผลิตแห่งประเทศไทย
ปัญหาเหล่านี้เป็นปัญหาของคนจนในระดับรากหญ้า แต่ไม่ได้รับการแก้ไข ซึ่งมีมากกว่า 100 กรณี ทำให้เกิดปัญหาต่อความมั่นคงในการดำรงอยู่ของประชาชนอย่างปกติสุข ดังนั้นจึงเห็นว่ารัฐบาลและหน่วยงานที่รับผิดชอบต้องดำเนินการแก้ไขโดยเร่งด่วน
จากการประชุมพ่อครัวใหญ่ สมัชชาคนจน ระหว่างวันที่ 9-10 สิงหาคม 2551ที่กรุงเทพฯ มีมติร่วมกัน ที่จะเรียกร้องต่อรัฐบาล ในการเสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ.จัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ พ.ศ. ... และปัญหาการแก้ไขสมัชชาคนจนดังนี้
1.ให้ยกเลิกการเสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ. การจัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ พ.ศ. ..
2.ให้กระทรวงที่เกี่ยวข้องเร่งเจรจาและแก้ไขปัญหาสมัชชาคนจนโดยเร่งด่วน
ด้วยจิตคาราวะ
สมัชชาคนจน
( http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/home/13150 )
แถลงการณ์สมัชชาคนจน
เรื่อง คัดค้าน พ.ร.บ. จัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ
และเร่งให้รัฐบาลแก้ไขปัญหาสมัชชาคนจน
สมัชชาคนจน เป็นกลุ่มองค์กรชาวบ้านที่รวมตัวกันเพื่อเรียกร้องให้รัฐบาลแก้ไขปัญหาที่เกิดจากการดำเนินโครงการของรัฐทั้งที่เป็นประเภทนโยบาย กิจกรรมโครงการต่าง ๆ ที่มีผลกระทบต่อพี่น้องประชาชน ประกอบด้วยเครือข่าย ทั้งหมด 7เครือข่าย คือ 1. เครือข่ายที่ดิน 2. เครือข่ายป่าไม้ 3. เครือข่ายเขื่อน 4. เครือข่ายผู้ป่วยจากการทำงาน 5. เครือข่ายประมงพื้นบ้าน 6. เครือข่ายสลัม 7. เครือข่ายเกษตรกรรมทางเลือก
ที่ผ่านมา สมัชชาคนจนได้มีข้อเรียกร้องในการแก้ไขปัญหาต่อรัฐบาลตั้งแต่ปี 2538 เป็นต้นมา แต่การแก้ไขไม่สามารถบรรลุวัตถุประสงค์ การชุมนุมเรียกร้องทั้งในพื้นที่ที่เกิดปัญหา และมาเรียกร้องถึงทำเนียบรัฐบาล รวมไปถึงการชุมนุมที่ยาวนานปี 2539 นานถึง 99 วัน เพื่อให้มีการแก้ไขปัญหาของสมัชชาคนจน ของกลุ่มผู้ได้รับเดือดร้อนจากปัญหาต่าง ๆ การชุมนุมของพี่น้องคนจนที่ผ่านมาได้ปฏิบัติตามกฎหมายรัฐธรรมนูญ และสิทธิอันพึงมี ที่นานาอารยประเทศปฏิบัติกัน เมื่อมีสมาชิกสภาผู้แทนในนามพรรคพลังประชาชน ได้เสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ.จัดระเบียบการชุมนุม ซึ่งมีเนื้อหาขัดกับรัฐธรรมนูญ เพราะการชุมนุม เป็นสิทธิอันพึงมีของประชาชนที่จะเสนอให้มีการแก้ไขในรูปแบบต่างได้
ดังนั้นสมัชชาคนจน ได้พิจารณาแล้วเห็นว่าการที่รัฐบาลโดยการนำเสนอของ นายจุมพฏ บุญใหญ่ ส.ส.พรรคพลังประชาชนเตรียมเสนอ “ร่างพระราชบัญญัติจัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ พ.ศ. ...” เข้าสู่การพิจารณาของสภาผู้แทนราษฎร เพื่อตราเป็นกฎหมายบังคับใช้กับสาธารณะชนทั่วไป พวกเรา “สมัชชาคนจน” เห็นว่าร่างกฎหมายฉบับนี้ เป็นการดำเนินการนำเสนอกฎหมายที่ขัดต่อการแสดงสิทธิอันชอบธรรมของกลุ่มต่าง ๆ ที่จะดำเนินการไม่ได้ และจะถูกดำเนินคดี ทั้งผู้ชุมนุมและผู้สนับสนุน ซึ่งเป็นไปไม่ได้ที่จะขออนุญาตการชุมนุม แล้วจะได้รับอนุญาต เพราะที่ผ่านมา การชุมนุมก็ถูกละเมิดจากเจ้าหน้าที่ภาครัฐอยู่แล้ว เช่น การสกัดไม่มีการชุมนุม การตรวจค้น พยายามตั้งข้อหาต่าง ๆ แต่ในร่างกฎหมายดังกล่าว ได้กล่าวโทษที่มีความผิดรุนแรงไว้ จึงไม่สอดคล้องกับรัฐธรรมนูญ ที่ให้สิทธิชุมนุมได้
ปัจจุบันนับตั้งแต่รัฐบาลภายใต้การนำของนายสมัคร สุนทรเวช ได้บริหารประเทศมาครบ 6 เดือนแล้ว แต่การแก้ไขปัญหาสมัชชาคนจนไม่มีความคืบหน้าแต่อย่างใด แม้ได้รับการประสานให้มีการเจรจาในโครงการที่อยู่ภายใต้กระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์ ประกอบด้วย โครงการเขื่อนแก่งเสือเต้น จ.แพร่ เขื่อนโป่งขุนเพชร จ.ชัยภูมิ เขื่อนหัวนา เขื่อนราศีไศล จ.ศรีสะเกษ เขื่อนท่าแซะ จ.ชุมพร เขื่อนสิรินธร จ.อุบลราชธานี และกรณีประมงพื้นบ้านภาคใต้ 14 จังหวัด ซึ่งจะมีการเจรจาเบื้องต้นในวันที่ 18 สิงหาคม 2551 นี้เท่านั้น
ส่วนกรณีอื่น ๆ ยังไม่ได้การติดต่อให้มีการเจรจาเพื่อแก้ไขปัญหาประกอบด้วย
1. ปัญหาที่ดินและที่ราชพัสดุ ในความรับผิดชอบของ กระทรวงมหาดไทย และกรมธนารักษ์
2. ปัญหาป่าไม้ ประเภทพื้นที่อยู่ในป่าอนุรักษ์ ในความดูแลของกระทรวงทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและสิ่งแวดล้อม และกระทรวงมหาดไทย
3. ปัญหาผู้ป่วยจากการทำงาน ในความผิดชอบของ และกระทรวงสาธารณสุขและกระทรวงแรงงาน
4. ปัญหาเขื่อนผลิตไฟฟ้า เช่น เขื่อนปากมูล ในความรับผิดชอบของกระทรวงพลังงาน และการไฟฟ้าฝ่ายผลิตแห่งประเทศไทย
ปัญหาเหล่านี้เป็นปัญหาของคนจนในระดับรากหญ้า แต่ไม่ได้รับการแก้ไข ซึ่งมีมากกว่า 100 กรณี ทำให้เกิดปัญหาต่อความมั่นคงในการดำรงอยู่ของประชาชนอย่างปกติสุข ดังนั้นจึงเห็นว่ารัฐบาลและหน่วยงานที่รับผิดชอบต้องดำเนินการแก้ไขโดยเร่งด่วน
จากการประชุมพ่อครัวใหญ่ สมัชชาคนจน ระหว่างวันที่ 9-10 สิงหาคม 2551ที่กรุงเทพฯ มีมติร่วมกัน ที่จะเรียกร้องต่อรัฐบาล ในการเสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ.จัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ พ.ศ. ... และปัญหาการแก้ไขสมัชชาคนจนดังนี้
1.ให้ยกเลิกการเสนอ ร่าง พ.ร.บ. การจัดระเบียบการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะ พ.ศ. ..
2.ให้กระทรวงที่เกี่ยวข้องเร่งเจรจาและแก้ไขปัญหาสมัชชาคนจนโดยเร่งด่วน
ด้วยจิตคาราวะ
สมัชชาคนจน
( http://www.prachatai.com/05web/th/home/13150 )
ไทยควรมี พ.ร.บ.การชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะหรือไม่
โดย พรสันต์ เลี้ยงบุญเลิศชัย อาจารย์ประจำคณะนิติศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาอัสสัมชัญ
เสรีภาพในการชุมนุม หรือที่ต่างประเทศเรียกกันว่า freedom of association หรือ freedom of assembly ถือเป็นสิ่งที่ถูกหยิบยกขึ้นมาอย่างกล่าวอ้างอยู่บ่อยครั้ง เพื่อให้กลุ่มของตนเองดำเนินการชุมนุมต่อไปได้ ทำให้เสรีภาพในการชุมนุม กลายเป็นเสรีภาพศักดิ์สิทธิ์ขึ้นมาในทันทีที่มีการกล่าวอ้างว่า "เสรีภาพในการชุมนุมนั้น ได้รับการรับรองและคุ้มครองโดยรัฐธรรมนูญอันถือเป็นกฎหมายสูงสุดของประเทศ"
อย่างไรก็ดี ยังมีผู้อื่นซึ่งได้รับผลกระทบต่อการใช้เสรีภาพอันศักดิ์สิทธิ์ข้างต้นนั้น นั่นคือ ประชาชนทั่วไปที่ไม่อาจใช้ถนนในการสัญจรเฉกเช่นตนเองเคยใช้อยู่เป็นนิจ
กล่าวอีกนัยหนึ่งคือ ฝ่ายผู้ได้รับความเดือดร้อนจากการชุมนุมดังกล่าวก็ย่อมกล่าวอ้างได้ว่า ตนเองมี "เสรีภาพในการเดินทาง" อันเป็นเสรีภาพหนึ่งที่รัฐธรรมนูญรับรองและคุ้มครองให้เช่นเดียวกัน จุดนี้จึงเป็นการหนีไม่พ้นถึงความขัดแย้งกันของกลุ่มบุคคลทั้งสองฝ่าย
นอกจากนี้ความขัดแย้งในการชุมนุม อาจเกิดจากกลุ่มสนับสนุนและกลุ่มต่อต้านที่มาประจันหน้ากัน ซึ่งเราก็ได้เห็นกันมาแล้วในเหตุการณ์ที่เกิดขึ้นเมื่อวันที่ 13, 24 กรกฎาคม และในหลายจังหวัด ระหว่างกลุ่มที่ต่อต้านพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย กับกลุ่มพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย บนเหตุผลที่ว่า การชุมนุมของฝ่ายพันธมิตร สร้างความวุ่นวายการชุมนุมปราศจากความชอบธรรม อีกทั้งเป็นการพยายามล้มล้างระบอบประชาธิปไตย
หากจะถามว่า ในต่างประเทศเคยประสบพบเจอกับปัญหาในเรื่องกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุม 2 ฝ่าย หรือหลายฝ่าย ปะทะกันหรือปัญหาที่บุคคลที่ได้รับความเดือดร้อนจากการชุมนุมเหมือนกับที่เกิดขึ้นในประเทศไทย ณ ขณะนี้หรือไม่นั้น
ขอตอบว่า ก็ย่อมต้องมี โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งแล้วในอารยประเทศที่มีประวัติศาสตร์ในเรื่องของการเรียกร้องระบอบการปกครองแบบประชาธิปไตยมาอย่างยาวนาน เช่น ประเทศเยอรมนี อังกฤษ สหรัฐอเมริกา ฯลฯ ก็เจอกับปัญหาข้างต้นมาแล้วทั้งสิ้น
ท้ายที่สุด ประเทศเหล่านั้นจึงเกิดแนวความคิดในการตราตัวบทกฎหมายว่าด้วยเรื่องของการชุมนุมขึ้นมาเพื่อแก้ไขปัญหาต่างๆ ไม่ว่าจะเป็น ปัญหาการอ้างหรือยืนยันต่อบุคคลอื่นซึ่งรวมถึงเจ้าหน้าที่รัฐว่า ตนได้ดำเนินกิจการอันได้รับการรับรองและคุ้มครองโดยรัฐธรรมนูญก็ดี หรือปัญหาการบริหารจัดการของเจ้าพนักงานของรัฐต่อกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุมทางการเมือง
รวมถึงการป้องกันการเผชิญหน้ากันของผู้ชุมนุมหลายกลุ่มอันจะนำไปสู่การปะทะกันของกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุมนั่นเอง
ก่อนอื่นพวกเราจำต้องพึงตระหนักไว้ก่อนว่า สิทธิและเสรีภาพในทางกฎหมายรัฐธรรมนูญอาจแบ่งแยกออกได้เป็น 2 ประเภทหลักๆ ด้วยกันคือ
1.สิทธิและเสรีภาพภาพแบบสัมบูรณ์ หรือ absolute rights or liberties
2.สิทธิและเสรีภาพแบบสัมพัทธ์ หรือ relative rights or liberties
ซึ่งสิทธิและเสรีภาพประเภทแรกคือ สิทธิและเสรีภาพที่รัฐมิอาจจำกัดได้อันมีอยู่แค่อย่างเดียวนั่นก็คือเสรีภาพในการนับถือศาสนา
ส่วนสิทธิและเสรีภาพอีกประเภทหนึ่งหรือสิทธิและเสรีภาพแบบสัมพัทธ์นั้น เป็นสิทธิและเสรีภาพที่เปิดโอกาสให้รัฐสามารถจำกัดหรือควบคุมการใช้ได้หากปรากฏซึ่งความจำเป็นเพื่อคุ้มครองประโยชน์สาธารณะ เช่น เพื่อคุ้มครองประโยชน์ของประชาชนในการที่จะใช้ทางสาธารณะ หรือเพื่อป้องกันการนำไปสู่เหตุการณ์อันวุ่นวายหรือเกิดจลาจลขึ้นในประเทศ เป็นต้น
แต่ทั้งนี้จำต้องมีการออกกฎหมายมาเป็นกิจจะลักษณะ และโดยส่วนมากแล้วกฎหมายดังกล่าวต้องเป็นกฎหมายที่ผ่านความเห็นชอบจากรัฐสภา ซึ่งโดยมากก็จะออกมาในรูปของพระราชบัญญัติหรือรัฐบัญญัติแล้วแต่กรณี เพราะถือได้ว่ากฎหมายดังกล่าวส่งผลกระทบต่อประชาชนโดยตรง
จากหลักการข้างต้นแล้ว การชุมนุมจึงถูกจัดอยู่ในเสรีภาพแบบสัมพัทธ์ซึ่งส่งผลให้รัฐสามารถตรากฎหมายขึ้นมาเพื่อจำกัดสิทธิได้นั่นเอง
ซึ่งแม้แต่ในรัฐธรรมนูญไทยเองก็ได้บัญญัติไว้ชัดในมาตรา 63 วรรค 2 ว่าเสรีภาพในการชุมนุมสามารถถูกจำกัดได้
ตามที่ได้กล่าวมาแล้วว่า ในต่างประเทศนั้นก็เคยได้เจอกับปัญหาของการชุมนุมกันอย่างมากมายจนกระทั่งมีการผลักดันตัวกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมขึ้นมา
เช่น ในประเทศเยอรมนีนั้น มีรัฐบัญญัติว่าด้วยการชุมนุม ซึ่งกฎหมายนี้ได้มีการกำหนดกฎเกณฑ์ต่างๆ ในการชุมนุมไม่ว่าจะเป็นในเรื่องของสถานที่ชุมนุมว่า จะชุมนุมที่ใด หากเป็นการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะก็จำต้องมีการแจ้งหรือบอกกล่าวล่วงหน้าโดยแกนนำหรือผู้ควบคุมการชุมนุมก่อนที่จะมีการชุมนุมดังกล่าว
หากดำเนินการชุมนุมไปโดยไม่มีการแจ้งล่วงหน้าก็จะถือว่าการชุมนั้นไม่ชอบด้วยกฎหมาย ซึ่งก็หมายถึงว่า รัฐธรรมนูญก็จะไม่รับรองและคุ้มครองการชุมนุมดังกล่าว
อีกทั้งหากปรากฏว่า การชุมนุมนั้นๆ ก่อให้เกิดความเดือดร้อนในเรื่องของการใช้เส้นทางการจราจรหรืออาจนำไปสู่การจลาจล หรือมีผลให้ทรัพย์สินของรัฐเสียหาย การนี้รัฐสามารถดำเนินการสลายการชุมนุมได้
หลักการดังกล่าวสอดคล้องต้องกันกับกฎหมายและหลักกฎหมายของประเทศอังกฤษ ไอร์แลนด์เหนือ ออสเตรเลีย ฟิลิปปินส์ เอสโตเนีย มอนเตเนโกร โครเอเชีย และสหรัฐอเมริกา
กล่าวคือ กฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมเหล่านั้นก็จะมีการกำหนดกฎเกณฑ์ที่เหมือนๆ กับที่กล่าวไปแล้วในรัฐบัญญัติของประเทศเยอรมนี จะผิดแผกแตกต่างกันก็แต่ในรายละเอียดปลีกย่อยเท่านั้น
เช่น ในเรื่องของระยะเวลาในการแจ้งหรือบอกกล่าวล่วงหน้าสำหรับการชุมนุมซึ่งอาจจะเป็น 2 วัน หรือ 3 วัน เป็นต้น
หรือจะเป็นรูปแบบในการบอกกล่าวล่วงหน้าที่จะต้องทำเป็นหนังสือตามแบบที่ตัวกฎหมายกำหนดว่า ต้องระบุข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับชุมนุมอย่างไรบ้าง
แต่หลักๆ ก็จะเหมือนกันแทบทั้งสิ้นว่า หากการชุมนุมดังกล่าวเป็นการชุมนุมในทางสาธารณะต้องมีการแจ้งล่วงหน้า อันหมายถึงว่า หากเป็นการชุมนุมในที่ส่วนบุคคลนั้น กฎหมายมิได้บัญญัติให้ต้องมีการแจ้งล่วงหน้าทางรัฐก็อาจจะดำเนินการสลายการชุมนุมหากปรากฏว่า ต้องด้วยเงื่อนไขที่กฎหมายกำหนด ซึ่งส่วนใหญ่ก็คือการชุมนุมดังกล่าวมีผลต่อการใช้เส้นทางสาธารณะของผู้อื่นหรือการชุมนุมนำไปสู่การจลาจลในประเทศ
อย่างไรก็ดี หากเจ้าหน้าที่เข้าดำเนินการสลายการชุมนุมด้วยวิธีการเกินกว่าเหตุ ผู้ชุมนุมก็อาจนำเรื่องไปร้องขอต่อศาลเพื่อให้ศาลได้เข้ามาตรวจสอบหรือเยียวยาการกระทำการของรัฐดังกล่าวได้
ผู้เขียนเห็นว่า จึงเป็นเรื่องดีที่ว่าในปัจจุบันประเทศไทยจะได้ดำเนินการออกกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมขึ้นมาอย่างชัดเจนเสียที ทั้งนี้ ก็เพื่อตัดปัญหาการยกตัวบทของรัฐธรรมนูญมาอ้างยันกันไปยันกันมาว่า ตนเองนั้นต่างก็มีสิทธิและเสรีภาพที่ได้รับการรับรองจากกฎหมายสูงสุดซึ่งใครก็จะมาแตะต้องไม่ได้ให้หมดไป
นอกจากนี้ยังเห็นว่าหากเรามีตัวบทกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมที่ชัดเจนก็จะเป็นการดี เพราะภายใต้กฎหมายนี้จะมีการระบุหรือกำหนดถึงกฎเกณฑ์และกติกาในการชุมนุมออกมาอย่างชัดเจนอันส่งผลไปยังความสะดวกของทั้งสองฝ่าย ไม่ว่าจะเป็นฝ่ายผู้ดำเนินการชุมนุมก็ดี และในส่วนของภาครัฐที่จะได้ดำเนินการรับมือกับการการชุมนุมที่มีทีท่าว่าจะเกิดขึ้นมากขึ้นเรื่อยๆ ในระบอบการปกครองแบบประชาธิปไตย
และที่สำคัญก็คือจะได้เป็นกลไกในการป้องกันการปะทะกันระหว่างกลุ่มของผู้ชุมนุมด้วยกันเองอย่างที่เกิดขึ้นที่จังหวัดเชียงใหม่ บุรีรัมย์ อุดรธานี ฯลฯ ที่ผ่านมา เนื่องจากว่ากฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมนั้นได้มีการจัดระบบระเบียบไม่ว่าจะเป็นในเรื่องของแกนนำหรือผู้นำในการชุมนุมที่จะต้องควบคุมกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุมให้เป็นไปตามกฎหมายที่บัญญัติไว้ในตัวกฎหมาย หรือจะเป็นสถานที่ของการชุมนุมเองก็ดี ซึ่งก็หมายความว่าจะต้องมีการจัดสถานที่การชุมนุมที่เป็นสัดเป็นส่วน
ในระหว่างที่เรายังไม่มีตัวบทกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมข้างต้นเหมือนกับต่างประเทศเขา ผู้เขียนอยากให้ผู้ชุมนุมทุกฝ่ายได้ตระหนักถึงประโยชน์ของประเทศชาติเป็นหลัก ควรที่จะต้องรู้ขอบเขตของตนเอง ว่าการชุมนุมขนาดไหน แบบไหนจะได้รับการคุ้มครองตามรัฐธรรมนูญ
กล่าวอีกนัยหนึ่งคือเราต้องตระหนักในหลัก "สิทธิในเสรีภาพ" ของผู้อื่นด้วย หากทุกคนคิดได้อย่างนี้เหตุการณ์โกลาหลต่างๆ ก็จะไม่เกิดขึ้น
( http://www.pub-law.net/publaw/View.asp?publawIDs=1251)
เสรีภาพในการชุมนุม หรือที่ต่างประเทศเรียกกันว่า freedom of association หรือ freedom of assembly ถือเป็นสิ่งที่ถูกหยิบยกขึ้นมาอย่างกล่าวอ้างอยู่บ่อยครั้ง เพื่อให้กลุ่มของตนเองดำเนินการชุมนุมต่อไปได้ ทำให้เสรีภาพในการชุมนุม กลายเป็นเสรีภาพศักดิ์สิทธิ์ขึ้นมาในทันทีที่มีการกล่าวอ้างว่า "เสรีภาพในการชุมนุมนั้น ได้รับการรับรองและคุ้มครองโดยรัฐธรรมนูญอันถือเป็นกฎหมายสูงสุดของประเทศ"
อย่างไรก็ดี ยังมีผู้อื่นซึ่งได้รับผลกระทบต่อการใช้เสรีภาพอันศักดิ์สิทธิ์ข้างต้นนั้น นั่นคือ ประชาชนทั่วไปที่ไม่อาจใช้ถนนในการสัญจรเฉกเช่นตนเองเคยใช้อยู่เป็นนิจ
กล่าวอีกนัยหนึ่งคือ ฝ่ายผู้ได้รับความเดือดร้อนจากการชุมนุมดังกล่าวก็ย่อมกล่าวอ้างได้ว่า ตนเองมี "เสรีภาพในการเดินทาง" อันเป็นเสรีภาพหนึ่งที่รัฐธรรมนูญรับรองและคุ้มครองให้เช่นเดียวกัน จุดนี้จึงเป็นการหนีไม่พ้นถึงความขัดแย้งกันของกลุ่มบุคคลทั้งสองฝ่าย
นอกจากนี้ความขัดแย้งในการชุมนุม อาจเกิดจากกลุ่มสนับสนุนและกลุ่มต่อต้านที่มาประจันหน้ากัน ซึ่งเราก็ได้เห็นกันมาแล้วในเหตุการณ์ที่เกิดขึ้นเมื่อวันที่ 13, 24 กรกฎาคม และในหลายจังหวัด ระหว่างกลุ่มที่ต่อต้านพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย กับกลุ่มพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย บนเหตุผลที่ว่า การชุมนุมของฝ่ายพันธมิตร สร้างความวุ่นวายการชุมนุมปราศจากความชอบธรรม อีกทั้งเป็นการพยายามล้มล้างระบอบประชาธิปไตย
หากจะถามว่า ในต่างประเทศเคยประสบพบเจอกับปัญหาในเรื่องกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุม 2 ฝ่าย หรือหลายฝ่าย ปะทะกันหรือปัญหาที่บุคคลที่ได้รับความเดือดร้อนจากการชุมนุมเหมือนกับที่เกิดขึ้นในประเทศไทย ณ ขณะนี้หรือไม่นั้น
ขอตอบว่า ก็ย่อมต้องมี โดยเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งแล้วในอารยประเทศที่มีประวัติศาสตร์ในเรื่องของการเรียกร้องระบอบการปกครองแบบประชาธิปไตยมาอย่างยาวนาน เช่น ประเทศเยอรมนี อังกฤษ สหรัฐอเมริกา ฯลฯ ก็เจอกับปัญหาข้างต้นมาแล้วทั้งสิ้น
ท้ายที่สุด ประเทศเหล่านั้นจึงเกิดแนวความคิดในการตราตัวบทกฎหมายว่าด้วยเรื่องของการชุมนุมขึ้นมาเพื่อแก้ไขปัญหาต่างๆ ไม่ว่าจะเป็น ปัญหาการอ้างหรือยืนยันต่อบุคคลอื่นซึ่งรวมถึงเจ้าหน้าที่รัฐว่า ตนได้ดำเนินกิจการอันได้รับการรับรองและคุ้มครองโดยรัฐธรรมนูญก็ดี หรือปัญหาการบริหารจัดการของเจ้าพนักงานของรัฐต่อกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุมทางการเมือง
รวมถึงการป้องกันการเผชิญหน้ากันของผู้ชุมนุมหลายกลุ่มอันจะนำไปสู่การปะทะกันของกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุมนั่นเอง
ก่อนอื่นพวกเราจำต้องพึงตระหนักไว้ก่อนว่า สิทธิและเสรีภาพในทางกฎหมายรัฐธรรมนูญอาจแบ่งแยกออกได้เป็น 2 ประเภทหลักๆ ด้วยกันคือ
1.สิทธิและเสรีภาพภาพแบบสัมบูรณ์ หรือ absolute rights or liberties
2.สิทธิและเสรีภาพแบบสัมพัทธ์ หรือ relative rights or liberties
ซึ่งสิทธิและเสรีภาพประเภทแรกคือ สิทธิและเสรีภาพที่รัฐมิอาจจำกัดได้อันมีอยู่แค่อย่างเดียวนั่นก็คือเสรีภาพในการนับถือศาสนา
ส่วนสิทธิและเสรีภาพอีกประเภทหนึ่งหรือสิทธิและเสรีภาพแบบสัมพัทธ์นั้น เป็นสิทธิและเสรีภาพที่เปิดโอกาสให้รัฐสามารถจำกัดหรือควบคุมการใช้ได้หากปรากฏซึ่งความจำเป็นเพื่อคุ้มครองประโยชน์สาธารณะ เช่น เพื่อคุ้มครองประโยชน์ของประชาชนในการที่จะใช้ทางสาธารณะ หรือเพื่อป้องกันการนำไปสู่เหตุการณ์อันวุ่นวายหรือเกิดจลาจลขึ้นในประเทศ เป็นต้น
แต่ทั้งนี้จำต้องมีการออกกฎหมายมาเป็นกิจจะลักษณะ และโดยส่วนมากแล้วกฎหมายดังกล่าวต้องเป็นกฎหมายที่ผ่านความเห็นชอบจากรัฐสภา ซึ่งโดยมากก็จะออกมาในรูปของพระราชบัญญัติหรือรัฐบัญญัติแล้วแต่กรณี เพราะถือได้ว่ากฎหมายดังกล่าวส่งผลกระทบต่อประชาชนโดยตรง
จากหลักการข้างต้นแล้ว การชุมนุมจึงถูกจัดอยู่ในเสรีภาพแบบสัมพัทธ์ซึ่งส่งผลให้รัฐสามารถตรากฎหมายขึ้นมาเพื่อจำกัดสิทธิได้นั่นเอง
ซึ่งแม้แต่ในรัฐธรรมนูญไทยเองก็ได้บัญญัติไว้ชัดในมาตรา 63 วรรค 2 ว่าเสรีภาพในการชุมนุมสามารถถูกจำกัดได้
ตามที่ได้กล่าวมาแล้วว่า ในต่างประเทศนั้นก็เคยได้เจอกับปัญหาของการชุมนุมกันอย่างมากมายจนกระทั่งมีการผลักดันตัวกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมขึ้นมา
เช่น ในประเทศเยอรมนีนั้น มีรัฐบัญญัติว่าด้วยการชุมนุม ซึ่งกฎหมายนี้ได้มีการกำหนดกฎเกณฑ์ต่างๆ ในการชุมนุมไม่ว่าจะเป็นในเรื่องของสถานที่ชุมนุมว่า จะชุมนุมที่ใด หากเป็นการชุมนุมในที่สาธารณะก็จำต้องมีการแจ้งหรือบอกกล่าวล่วงหน้าโดยแกนนำหรือผู้ควบคุมการชุมนุมก่อนที่จะมีการชุมนุมดังกล่าว
หากดำเนินการชุมนุมไปโดยไม่มีการแจ้งล่วงหน้าก็จะถือว่าการชุมนั้นไม่ชอบด้วยกฎหมาย ซึ่งก็หมายถึงว่า รัฐธรรมนูญก็จะไม่รับรองและคุ้มครองการชุมนุมดังกล่าว
อีกทั้งหากปรากฏว่า การชุมนุมนั้นๆ ก่อให้เกิดความเดือดร้อนในเรื่องของการใช้เส้นทางการจราจรหรืออาจนำไปสู่การจลาจล หรือมีผลให้ทรัพย์สินของรัฐเสียหาย การนี้รัฐสามารถดำเนินการสลายการชุมนุมได้
หลักการดังกล่าวสอดคล้องต้องกันกับกฎหมายและหลักกฎหมายของประเทศอังกฤษ ไอร์แลนด์เหนือ ออสเตรเลีย ฟิลิปปินส์ เอสโตเนีย มอนเตเนโกร โครเอเชีย และสหรัฐอเมริกา
กล่าวคือ กฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมเหล่านั้นก็จะมีการกำหนดกฎเกณฑ์ที่เหมือนๆ กับที่กล่าวไปแล้วในรัฐบัญญัติของประเทศเยอรมนี จะผิดแผกแตกต่างกันก็แต่ในรายละเอียดปลีกย่อยเท่านั้น
เช่น ในเรื่องของระยะเวลาในการแจ้งหรือบอกกล่าวล่วงหน้าสำหรับการชุมนุมซึ่งอาจจะเป็น 2 วัน หรือ 3 วัน เป็นต้น
หรือจะเป็นรูปแบบในการบอกกล่าวล่วงหน้าที่จะต้องทำเป็นหนังสือตามแบบที่ตัวกฎหมายกำหนดว่า ต้องระบุข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับชุมนุมอย่างไรบ้าง
แต่หลักๆ ก็จะเหมือนกันแทบทั้งสิ้นว่า หากการชุมนุมดังกล่าวเป็นการชุมนุมในทางสาธารณะต้องมีการแจ้งล่วงหน้า อันหมายถึงว่า หากเป็นการชุมนุมในที่ส่วนบุคคลนั้น กฎหมายมิได้บัญญัติให้ต้องมีการแจ้งล่วงหน้าทางรัฐก็อาจจะดำเนินการสลายการชุมนุมหากปรากฏว่า ต้องด้วยเงื่อนไขที่กฎหมายกำหนด ซึ่งส่วนใหญ่ก็คือการชุมนุมดังกล่าวมีผลต่อการใช้เส้นทางสาธารณะของผู้อื่นหรือการชุมนุมนำไปสู่การจลาจลในประเทศ
อย่างไรก็ดี หากเจ้าหน้าที่เข้าดำเนินการสลายการชุมนุมด้วยวิธีการเกินกว่าเหตุ ผู้ชุมนุมก็อาจนำเรื่องไปร้องขอต่อศาลเพื่อให้ศาลได้เข้ามาตรวจสอบหรือเยียวยาการกระทำการของรัฐดังกล่าวได้
ผู้เขียนเห็นว่า จึงเป็นเรื่องดีที่ว่าในปัจจุบันประเทศไทยจะได้ดำเนินการออกกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมขึ้นมาอย่างชัดเจนเสียที ทั้งนี้ ก็เพื่อตัดปัญหาการยกตัวบทของรัฐธรรมนูญมาอ้างยันกันไปยันกันมาว่า ตนเองนั้นต่างก็มีสิทธิและเสรีภาพที่ได้รับการรับรองจากกฎหมายสูงสุดซึ่งใครก็จะมาแตะต้องไม่ได้ให้หมดไป
นอกจากนี้ยังเห็นว่าหากเรามีตัวบทกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมที่ชัดเจนก็จะเป็นการดี เพราะภายใต้กฎหมายนี้จะมีการระบุหรือกำหนดถึงกฎเกณฑ์และกติกาในการชุมนุมออกมาอย่างชัดเจนอันส่งผลไปยังความสะดวกของทั้งสองฝ่าย ไม่ว่าจะเป็นฝ่ายผู้ดำเนินการชุมนุมก็ดี และในส่วนของภาครัฐที่จะได้ดำเนินการรับมือกับการการชุมนุมที่มีทีท่าว่าจะเกิดขึ้นมากขึ้นเรื่อยๆ ในระบอบการปกครองแบบประชาธิปไตย
และที่สำคัญก็คือจะได้เป็นกลไกในการป้องกันการปะทะกันระหว่างกลุ่มของผู้ชุมนุมด้วยกันเองอย่างที่เกิดขึ้นที่จังหวัดเชียงใหม่ บุรีรัมย์ อุดรธานี ฯลฯ ที่ผ่านมา เนื่องจากว่ากฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมนั้นได้มีการจัดระบบระเบียบไม่ว่าจะเป็นในเรื่องของแกนนำหรือผู้นำในการชุมนุมที่จะต้องควบคุมกลุ่มผู้ชุมนุมให้เป็นไปตามกฎหมายที่บัญญัติไว้ในตัวกฎหมาย หรือจะเป็นสถานที่ของการชุมนุมเองก็ดี ซึ่งก็หมายความว่าจะต้องมีการจัดสถานที่การชุมนุมที่เป็นสัดเป็นส่วน
ในระหว่างที่เรายังไม่มีตัวบทกฎหมายว่าด้วยการชุมนุมข้างต้นเหมือนกับต่างประเทศเขา ผู้เขียนอยากให้ผู้ชุมนุมทุกฝ่ายได้ตระหนักถึงประโยชน์ของประเทศชาติเป็นหลัก ควรที่จะต้องรู้ขอบเขตของตนเอง ว่าการชุมนุมขนาดไหน แบบไหนจะได้รับการคุ้มครองตามรัฐธรรมนูญ
กล่าวอีกนัยหนึ่งคือเราต้องตระหนักในหลัก "สิทธิในเสรีภาพ" ของผู้อื่นด้วย หากทุกคนคิดได้อย่างนี้เหตุการณ์โกลาหลต่างๆ ก็จะไม่เกิดขึ้น
( http://www.pub-law.net/publaw/View.asp?publawIDs=1251)
การเมืองสองกระแส
โดย ชัยอนันต์ สมุทวณิช 10 สิงหาคม 2551 14:52 น.
แม้จะมีการพูดถึง “การเมืองใหม่” ก็ตาม แต่การที่จะเปลี่ยนแปลงลักษณะของรัฐสภาไทยให้มีตัวแทนจากกลุ่มอาชีพเข้ามาร่วมในสัดส่วนที่มากกว่าจำนวนผู้แทนที่มาจากการเลือกตั้งโดยตรงนั้น อาจเกิดขึ้นได้ยาก การแก้ปัญหาการซื้อเสียงจึงน่าจะเป็นทางเลือกที่ควรมีการพิจารณาอย่างจริงจัง ลำพังการทำงานของ กกต.อย่างเดียวคงไม่เพียงพอ แต่จะต้องระดมสรรพกำลังจากหลายๆ ฝ่าย เช่น การให้การศึกษาแก่ประชาชนและการควบคุมดูแลการเลือกตั้งอย่างเป็นระบบอีกด้วย
อย่างไรก็ดี แม้ “การเมืองใหม่” ในแง่ของการเปลี่ยนแปลงโครงสร้างทางการเมืองจะเกิดขึ้นได้ยาก แต่ “การเมืองใหม่” ในแง่วัฒนธรรม และจิตสำนึกทางการเมืองก็ได้เกิดขึ้นแล้ว และจะเป็นปัจจัยสำคัญที่ก่อให้เกิดการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมืองในเชิงคุณภาพได้
มีนักวิชาการหลายคนเห็นว่า วัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองไทยเป็นวัฒนธรรมแบบไพร่ฟ้า คือ เป็นผู้ถูกปกครองที่คอยเชื่อฟังรัฐบาลมากกว่าที่จะเข้ามีส่วนร่วมทางการเมืองอย่างแข็งขัน ความตื่นตัวและความกระตือรือร้นทางการเมืองนั้น เกิดขึ้นได้ในสังคมที่มีการเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองที่ต่อเนื่อง มีกลไกที่ทำงานทางการให้การศึกษาแก่ประชาชน โดยเฉพาะพรรคการเมือง
ในต่างประเทศ โดยปกติประชาชนก็ไม่ได้มีความตื่นตัวทางการเมืองมากนัก แต่เนื่องจากการปกครองในระบอบประชาธิปไตยมีการเลือกตั้งทั้งในระดับชาติ มลรัฐ และท้องถิ่น จึงมีกิจกรรมทางการเมืองเกิดขึ้นเป็นประจำ แต่ในประเทศไทยเรา กิจกรรมการเลือกตั้งมีก่อนที่ประชาชนจะมีจิตสำนึก และวัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองแบบประชาธิปไตย การเลือกตั้งจึงมีการซื้อสิทธิขายเสียงได้อย่างกว้างขวาง
การชุมนุมของพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย ก่อให้เกิดการเรียนรู้ทางการเมืองแบบเข้มข้นในระยะสั้น แต่มีความต่อเนื่อง ในสถานการณ์ปกติ การเรียนรู้ทางการเมืองเกิดขึ้นอย่างค่อยเป็นค่อยไป เช่น ภายในครอบครัว จากโรงเรียน และจากสื่อมวลชน เป็นต้น การเรียนรู้ทางการเมืองในสถานการณ์ปกตินั้น ไม่ได้เป็นไปแบบ “รวมหมู่” ความรู้สึกร่วมกันจึงไม่มี
วิธีการจัดการชุมนุมของพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย มีความสอดคล้องกับลักษณะของคนไทย คือถ้าจะมีการเรียนรู้ก็ต้องสนุกและเพลิดเพลิน มีการผสมผสานสอดแทรกรายการดนตรี รายการสนทนา รายการข่าว และการพูดบนเวทีของผู้มีความรู้-ประสบการณ์ที่หลากหลาย มีการถ่ายทอดวิทยุและโทรทัศน์ และผู้ชุมนุมมีส่วนร่วมตลอดเวลา นอกจากนั้น ยังได้มีการพัฒนาความรู้สึกร่วมด้วยการสร้างสัญลักษณ์หลายอย่าง เช่น เสื้อยืด ผ้าพันคอ เพลง แม้แต่เหรียญที่ระลึก
บทเรียนจากการชุมนุมครั้งนี้ก็คือ การให้ความรู้ในทางการเมือง หรือทางอื่นๆ นั้น จะต้องมีการผสมผสานสื่อต่างๆ มีความสนุกเร้าใจ และให้ผู้เรียนรู้ได้มีส่วนร่วม น่าเสียดายที่ครูสอนสังคมศึกษาในระดับโรงเรียน และอาจารย์มหาวิทยาลัยไม่ได้ใช้โอกาสนี้พานักเรียน และนักศึกษาเข้าไปร่วมสังเกตการณ์
แกนนำพันธมิตรฯ 5 คนมีลักษณะคล้ายๆ โมเสสผู้สามารถนำฝูงชนเดินรอนแรมในทะเลทรายเป็นเวลาหลายปี เพื่อหาแผ่นดินที่ปรารถนา สำหรับแกนนำทั้ง 5 คนก็เช่นกัน พวกเขามีความสามารถสูงในการนำฝูงชนซึ่งนับวันก็เกิดศรัทธา ความรักใคร่จากผู้เข้าร่วมชุมนุม
สิ่งสำคัญที่ผูกมัดประชาชนไว้ก็คือ พวกเขาไม่ต้องการมีฝักฝ่ายในแง่ของการสังกัดพรรคการเมือง พวกเขาปฏิเสธการเมือง แต่การเคลื่อนไหวกลับมีพลังทางการเมืองสูง ดังนั้น เคล็ดลับของพลังนี้ก็คือ การไม่ยกระดับการเคลื่อนไหวขึ้นไปสู่การเมืองที่เป็นฝักฝ่าย และไม่จัดตั้งเป็นพรรคการเมือง จะว่าไปแล้ว พันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย ก็คือ ทางเลือกอีกทางเลือกหนึ่งที่ประชาชนมีความตื่นตัว มีความสนใจ และเข้าร่วมกิจกรรมทางการเมือง โดยมีความเป็นเอกเทศอยู่นอกระบบการเมืองที่เป็นทางการเมือง เป็นลู่ที่วิ่งคู่ขนานไปกับการเมืองที่เป็นทางการเมือง
ผมเคยตั้งข้อสังเกตมานานแล้วว่า การที่ประชาชนจำนวนมาก และโดยเฉพาะผู้มีความรู้ ไม่ต้องการขายเสียง มีความสนใจ ตื่นตัวทางการเมือง แต่ไม่รวมเข้าไปเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของพรรคการเมืองตามสมมติฐานของประชาธิปไตยแบบตะวันตกนั้น ทำให้เกิด “การเมืองสองกระแส” คือ “การเมืองที่เป็นทางการ” กับ “การเมืองที่เป็นธรรมชาติ” หรือ “การเมืองที่ไม่เป็นทางการ” อยู่นอกระบบการเมือง ความคิดที่ว่า ความต้องการของประชาชนจะรวมกันเป็นกลุ่มเป็นก้อน โดยกลุ่มผลประโยชน์ และกลุ่มอิทธิพล และไหลเข้าสู่สถาบันทางการเมือง คือ พรรคการเมืองจึงไม่เกิดขึ้น
แล้วเราจะทำอย่างไรกับสภาวการณ์เช่นนี้ จะปล่อยให้การเมืองที่เป็นทางการดำเนินควบคู่ไปกับการเมืองที่ไม่เป็นทางการกระนั้นหรือ จะมี “สายพาน” ที่เชื่อมโยงการเมืองสองกระแสนี้ได้อย่างไร ความคิดที่จะเปลี่ยนวิธีการเลือกตั้ง เพื่อเปิดโอกาสให้การเมืองอีกกระแสหนึ่งได้เข้าไปสู่กระบวนการทางการเมืองที่เป็นทางการ จึงเกิดขึ้น
แต่ผมก็ไม่แน่ใจว่าผู้นำ และประชาชนที่เคลื่อนไหวอยู่จะพอใจกับการเข้าไปสู่การเมืองแบบทางการเมือง การอยู่นอกวิถีการเมืองแบบทางการ และคอยทำหน้าที่ถ่วงดุลตรวจสอบนักการเมือง จึงน่าจะเป็นบทบาทที่ดี และเหมาะสมมากกว่าบทบาทที่เข้าไปอยู่ในระบบการเมืองที่เป็นทางการเมืองโดยตรง เพราะหากเข้าไปก็ยังจะเป็นส่วนข้างน้อยอยู่
สิ่งที่เกิดขึ้น และจะทำให้การเมืองไทยเปลี่ยนไป คือ จิตสำนึกใหม่ที่พันธมิตรฯ มีส่วนสำคัญในการสร้างขึ้น
( http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9510000094229 )
แม้จะมีการพูดถึง “การเมืองใหม่” ก็ตาม แต่การที่จะเปลี่ยนแปลงลักษณะของรัฐสภาไทยให้มีตัวแทนจากกลุ่มอาชีพเข้ามาร่วมในสัดส่วนที่มากกว่าจำนวนผู้แทนที่มาจากการเลือกตั้งโดยตรงนั้น อาจเกิดขึ้นได้ยาก การแก้ปัญหาการซื้อเสียงจึงน่าจะเป็นทางเลือกที่ควรมีการพิจารณาอย่างจริงจัง ลำพังการทำงานของ กกต.อย่างเดียวคงไม่เพียงพอ แต่จะต้องระดมสรรพกำลังจากหลายๆ ฝ่าย เช่น การให้การศึกษาแก่ประชาชนและการควบคุมดูแลการเลือกตั้งอย่างเป็นระบบอีกด้วย
อย่างไรก็ดี แม้ “การเมืองใหม่” ในแง่ของการเปลี่ยนแปลงโครงสร้างทางการเมืองจะเกิดขึ้นได้ยาก แต่ “การเมืองใหม่” ในแง่วัฒนธรรม และจิตสำนึกทางการเมืองก็ได้เกิดขึ้นแล้ว และจะเป็นปัจจัยสำคัญที่ก่อให้เกิดการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมืองในเชิงคุณภาพได้
มีนักวิชาการหลายคนเห็นว่า วัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองไทยเป็นวัฒนธรรมแบบไพร่ฟ้า คือ เป็นผู้ถูกปกครองที่คอยเชื่อฟังรัฐบาลมากกว่าที่จะเข้ามีส่วนร่วมทางการเมืองอย่างแข็งขัน ความตื่นตัวและความกระตือรือร้นทางการเมืองนั้น เกิดขึ้นได้ในสังคมที่มีการเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองที่ต่อเนื่อง มีกลไกที่ทำงานทางการให้การศึกษาแก่ประชาชน โดยเฉพาะพรรคการเมือง
ในต่างประเทศ โดยปกติประชาชนก็ไม่ได้มีความตื่นตัวทางการเมืองมากนัก แต่เนื่องจากการปกครองในระบอบประชาธิปไตยมีการเลือกตั้งทั้งในระดับชาติ มลรัฐ และท้องถิ่น จึงมีกิจกรรมทางการเมืองเกิดขึ้นเป็นประจำ แต่ในประเทศไทยเรา กิจกรรมการเลือกตั้งมีก่อนที่ประชาชนจะมีจิตสำนึก และวัฒนธรรมทางการเมืองแบบประชาธิปไตย การเลือกตั้งจึงมีการซื้อสิทธิขายเสียงได้อย่างกว้างขวาง
การชุมนุมของพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย ก่อให้เกิดการเรียนรู้ทางการเมืองแบบเข้มข้นในระยะสั้น แต่มีความต่อเนื่อง ในสถานการณ์ปกติ การเรียนรู้ทางการเมืองเกิดขึ้นอย่างค่อยเป็นค่อยไป เช่น ภายในครอบครัว จากโรงเรียน และจากสื่อมวลชน เป็นต้น การเรียนรู้ทางการเมืองในสถานการณ์ปกตินั้น ไม่ได้เป็นไปแบบ “รวมหมู่” ความรู้สึกร่วมกันจึงไม่มี
วิธีการจัดการชุมนุมของพันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย มีความสอดคล้องกับลักษณะของคนไทย คือถ้าจะมีการเรียนรู้ก็ต้องสนุกและเพลิดเพลิน มีการผสมผสานสอดแทรกรายการดนตรี รายการสนทนา รายการข่าว และการพูดบนเวทีของผู้มีความรู้-ประสบการณ์ที่หลากหลาย มีการถ่ายทอดวิทยุและโทรทัศน์ และผู้ชุมนุมมีส่วนร่วมตลอดเวลา นอกจากนั้น ยังได้มีการพัฒนาความรู้สึกร่วมด้วยการสร้างสัญลักษณ์หลายอย่าง เช่น เสื้อยืด ผ้าพันคอ เพลง แม้แต่เหรียญที่ระลึก
บทเรียนจากการชุมนุมครั้งนี้ก็คือ การให้ความรู้ในทางการเมือง หรือทางอื่นๆ นั้น จะต้องมีการผสมผสานสื่อต่างๆ มีความสนุกเร้าใจ และให้ผู้เรียนรู้ได้มีส่วนร่วม น่าเสียดายที่ครูสอนสังคมศึกษาในระดับโรงเรียน และอาจารย์มหาวิทยาลัยไม่ได้ใช้โอกาสนี้พานักเรียน และนักศึกษาเข้าไปร่วมสังเกตการณ์
แกนนำพันธมิตรฯ 5 คนมีลักษณะคล้ายๆ โมเสสผู้สามารถนำฝูงชนเดินรอนแรมในทะเลทรายเป็นเวลาหลายปี เพื่อหาแผ่นดินที่ปรารถนา สำหรับแกนนำทั้ง 5 คนก็เช่นกัน พวกเขามีความสามารถสูงในการนำฝูงชนซึ่งนับวันก็เกิดศรัทธา ความรักใคร่จากผู้เข้าร่วมชุมนุม
สิ่งสำคัญที่ผูกมัดประชาชนไว้ก็คือ พวกเขาไม่ต้องการมีฝักฝ่ายในแง่ของการสังกัดพรรคการเมือง พวกเขาปฏิเสธการเมือง แต่การเคลื่อนไหวกลับมีพลังทางการเมืองสูง ดังนั้น เคล็ดลับของพลังนี้ก็คือ การไม่ยกระดับการเคลื่อนไหวขึ้นไปสู่การเมืองที่เป็นฝักฝ่าย และไม่จัดตั้งเป็นพรรคการเมือง จะว่าไปแล้ว พันธมิตรประชาชนเพื่อประชาธิปไตย ก็คือ ทางเลือกอีกทางเลือกหนึ่งที่ประชาชนมีความตื่นตัว มีความสนใจ และเข้าร่วมกิจกรรมทางการเมือง โดยมีความเป็นเอกเทศอยู่นอกระบบการเมืองที่เป็นทางการเมือง เป็นลู่ที่วิ่งคู่ขนานไปกับการเมืองที่เป็นทางการเมือง
ผมเคยตั้งข้อสังเกตมานานแล้วว่า การที่ประชาชนจำนวนมาก และโดยเฉพาะผู้มีความรู้ ไม่ต้องการขายเสียง มีความสนใจ ตื่นตัวทางการเมือง แต่ไม่รวมเข้าไปเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของพรรคการเมืองตามสมมติฐานของประชาธิปไตยแบบตะวันตกนั้น ทำให้เกิด “การเมืองสองกระแส” คือ “การเมืองที่เป็นทางการ” กับ “การเมืองที่เป็นธรรมชาติ” หรือ “การเมืองที่ไม่เป็นทางการ” อยู่นอกระบบการเมือง ความคิดที่ว่า ความต้องการของประชาชนจะรวมกันเป็นกลุ่มเป็นก้อน โดยกลุ่มผลประโยชน์ และกลุ่มอิทธิพล และไหลเข้าสู่สถาบันทางการเมือง คือ พรรคการเมืองจึงไม่เกิดขึ้น
แล้วเราจะทำอย่างไรกับสภาวการณ์เช่นนี้ จะปล่อยให้การเมืองที่เป็นทางการดำเนินควบคู่ไปกับการเมืองที่ไม่เป็นทางการกระนั้นหรือ จะมี “สายพาน” ที่เชื่อมโยงการเมืองสองกระแสนี้ได้อย่างไร ความคิดที่จะเปลี่ยนวิธีการเลือกตั้ง เพื่อเปิดโอกาสให้การเมืองอีกกระแสหนึ่งได้เข้าไปสู่กระบวนการทางการเมืองที่เป็นทางการ จึงเกิดขึ้น
แต่ผมก็ไม่แน่ใจว่าผู้นำ และประชาชนที่เคลื่อนไหวอยู่จะพอใจกับการเข้าไปสู่การเมืองแบบทางการเมือง การอยู่นอกวิถีการเมืองแบบทางการ และคอยทำหน้าที่ถ่วงดุลตรวจสอบนักการเมือง จึงน่าจะเป็นบทบาทที่ดี และเหมาะสมมากกว่าบทบาทที่เข้าไปอยู่ในระบบการเมืองที่เป็นทางการเมืองโดยตรง เพราะหากเข้าไปก็ยังจะเป็นส่วนข้างน้อยอยู่
สิ่งที่เกิดขึ้น และจะทำให้การเมืองไทยเปลี่ยนไป คือ จิตสำนึกใหม่ที่พันธมิตรฯ มีส่วนสำคัญในการสร้างขึ้น
( http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9510000094229 )
Former Thai PM flees to the UK
Page last updated at 15:35 GMT, Monday, 11 August 2008 16:35 UK
Former Thai PM flees to the UK
Ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has said he will not return to Thailand from the UK.
In a statement released to the Thai media, Mr Thaksin said he and his wife would remain in the UK, "where democracy is more important".
Mr Thaksin is on bail over corruption charges but failed to make a scheduled Bangkok court appearance on Monday.
Thailand's Supreme Court has now issued an arrest warrant for the billionaire, who owns Manchester City football club.
Mr Thaksin says the charges are politically motivated and an attempt to remove him from politics.
'Political enemies'
The former leader had been due to return to the Thai capital on Sunday after a court allowed him to attend the Olympic Games opening in Beijing.
He and his wife - who is on bail pending an appeal after she was jailed for three years for tax fraud - were to appear before the Supreme Court in a case involving the allegedly unlawful purchase of land.
Instead Mr Thaksin issued a statement announcing his decision not to return home.
"What happened to me and my family and my close relations resulted from efforts to get rid of me from politics," he said in the hand-written statement.
"These are my political enemies. They don't care about the rule of law, facts or internationally recognised due process."
Mr Thaksin apologised to the Thai people for his decision to live in the UK, where his daughter is attending university and where he owns several properties, as well as the Manchester City football club.
"If I am fortunate enough, I will return and die on Thai soil, just like other Thais," he said.
Observers have said that the former prime minister may attempt to claim political asylum in the UK, but there was no reference to this in the statement.
Thailand's Supreme Court reacted swiftly.
"The court sees that the defendants have broken their bail terms. Therefore, it issues an arrest warrant and orders their bail bonds to be seized," a statement said.
Wrangling
The court had agreed to try several cases against Thaksin Shinawatra for allegedly abusing his power while in office.
Mr Thaksin was the first Thai prime minister to serve a full five-year term.
He was extremely popular in rural areas but far less so amongst the Bangkok elite. In September 2006 the military removed him from power, accusing him of corruption.
Military-backed investigators began probing allegations against him. But then Mr Thaksin's allies won power in the first post-coup polls.
The former leader returned to Thailand in February. He said he had no plans to return to politics but his opponents did not appear to believe him.
Political wrangling between the two sides intensified and anti-government street protests resumed in the Thai capital. Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej was accused of acting as a proxy for Mr Thaksin and faced calls to step down.
In the meantime the courts - newly empowered by the military-backed constitution - continued to pursue various cases against Mr Thaksin and his family.
Last month, in an unexpected move, the former prime minister's wife was jailed for tax fraud.
The ruling will both have shocked Mr Thaksin and served as a powerful indication of what could lie in store for him at the hands of the courts, analysts say, hence his decision to remain in the UK.
CASES AGAINST THAKSIN FAMILY
Case one: Abuse of power related to purchase of state land by his wife. Who: Thaksin and his wife. Status: Trial underway
Case two: Abuse of power linked to government lottery scheme. Who: Thaksin and several former Cabinet ministers. Status: Case accepted by Supreme Court
Case three: Abuse of power related to state loan to Burma alleged to have benefited family business. Who: Thaksin. Status: Case accepted by Supreme Court
Case four: Concealing assets. Who: Thaksin, wife and two others. Status: Awaiting court decision on proceeding to trial
Case five: Tax evasion. Who: Members of Thaksin's family. Status: Pojaman Shinawatra and her brother jailed for three years, her secretary for two years
Several other claims also lodged
( http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7553028.stm )
Former Thai PM flees to the UK
Ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has said he will not return to Thailand from the UK.
In a statement released to the Thai media, Mr Thaksin said he and his wife would remain in the UK, "where democracy is more important".
Mr Thaksin is on bail over corruption charges but failed to make a scheduled Bangkok court appearance on Monday.
Thailand's Supreme Court has now issued an arrest warrant for the billionaire, who owns Manchester City football club.
Mr Thaksin says the charges are politically motivated and an attempt to remove him from politics.
'Political enemies'
The former leader had been due to return to the Thai capital on Sunday after a court allowed him to attend the Olympic Games opening in Beijing.
He and his wife - who is on bail pending an appeal after she was jailed for three years for tax fraud - were to appear before the Supreme Court in a case involving the allegedly unlawful purchase of land.
Instead Mr Thaksin issued a statement announcing his decision not to return home.
"What happened to me and my family and my close relations resulted from efforts to get rid of me from politics," he said in the hand-written statement.
"These are my political enemies. They don't care about the rule of law, facts or internationally recognised due process."
Mr Thaksin apologised to the Thai people for his decision to live in the UK, where his daughter is attending university and where he owns several properties, as well as the Manchester City football club.
"If I am fortunate enough, I will return and die on Thai soil, just like other Thais," he said.
Observers have said that the former prime minister may attempt to claim political asylum in the UK, but there was no reference to this in the statement.
Thailand's Supreme Court reacted swiftly.
"The court sees that the defendants have broken their bail terms. Therefore, it issues an arrest warrant and orders their bail bonds to be seized," a statement said.
Wrangling
The court had agreed to try several cases against Thaksin Shinawatra for allegedly abusing his power while in office.
Mr Thaksin was the first Thai prime minister to serve a full five-year term.
He was extremely popular in rural areas but far less so amongst the Bangkok elite. In September 2006 the military removed him from power, accusing him of corruption.
Military-backed investigators began probing allegations against him. But then Mr Thaksin's allies won power in the first post-coup polls.
The former leader returned to Thailand in February. He said he had no plans to return to politics but his opponents did not appear to believe him.
Political wrangling between the two sides intensified and anti-government street protests resumed in the Thai capital. Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej was accused of acting as a proxy for Mr Thaksin and faced calls to step down.
In the meantime the courts - newly empowered by the military-backed constitution - continued to pursue various cases against Mr Thaksin and his family.
Last month, in an unexpected move, the former prime minister's wife was jailed for tax fraud.
The ruling will both have shocked Mr Thaksin and served as a powerful indication of what could lie in store for him at the hands of the courts, analysts say, hence his decision to remain in the UK.
CASES AGAINST THAKSIN FAMILY
Case one: Abuse of power related to purchase of state land by his wife. Who: Thaksin and his wife. Status: Trial underway
Case two: Abuse of power linked to government lottery scheme. Who: Thaksin and several former Cabinet ministers. Status: Case accepted by Supreme Court
Case three: Abuse of power related to state loan to Burma alleged to have benefited family business. Who: Thaksin. Status: Case accepted by Supreme Court
Case four: Concealing assets. Who: Thaksin, wife and two others. Status: Awaiting court decision on proceeding to trial
Case five: Tax evasion. Who: Members of Thaksin's family. Status: Pojaman Shinawatra and her brother jailed for three years, her secretary for two years
Several other claims also lodged
( http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7553028.stm )
Monday, August 11, 2008
When elephants fight, the law books get trampled underfoot
23 june 2008
By Chang Noi
Two years ago, the rule of law and judicial process were pushed forward as solutions to a crisis created by the clash of three great powers—established authority, electoral legitimacy, and business wealth. As the crisis has deepened over recent months, it looks very uncertain whether law and justice will prevail. Indeed, much more likely, they will be pounded and emasculated even further. We need to rewrite the proverb: when elephants fight, the law books get trampled underfoot.
Under a rule of law, law codes have moral authority in their own right, and judicial officers have authority and independence as interpreters and enforcers of those codes. This idea has never taken root in Thailand.
It was not part of the traditional political culture, where law was simply a handmaid of power. Those with authority based on official position or informal might had the right to sit in judgement and hand out rewards and punishments as acts of will. The old law codes were little more than collections of old judgements by such powerful figures. Unsurprisingly, these collections were full of inconsistencies because the judgements were made by different arbiters, in different eras, and under different circumstances. It’s doubtful whether the codes were much used in practice to guide future judgements. They were historical records, rather than codes for everyday consultation. Each new judgement was a new act of political will, another exercise of political authority.
As such, old Siam did not really differ from its neighbours. But elsewhere, colonial rulers put a lot of effort into establishing judicial systems as a key part of their control. For better or worse, much of these structures survived decolonization. Siam’s experience was rather different.
In the Fifth Reign, the Siamese elite imported many elements of the colonial system including a central bureaucracy, standing army, codified laws, and new judicial practice. But there was a crucial debate over the legal system.
Prince Ratchaburi backed a British-style system based on common law and juries. Arguably it was more in line with Siamese tradition of case law evident in the old codes. But King Chulalongkorn overruled his brilliant son. The king’s priority was to create a legal system which foreign powers would trust, so the foreigners would stop insisting on having their own courts that infringed Siamese sovereignty. For this reason, Thailand ended up with a Roman-law style system based on written law codes and interpretation by professional judges.
The king was right. This system helped to persuade the foreigners to surrender extraterritoriality. But it willed Thailand a legal system that never really took root. The initial law codes were first drafted in European languages by panels of international advisers, and only later and with difficulty translated into Thai. Though subsequent revisions made the codes clearer and more domesticated, the practice of law has remained a strange technical art rather than an integral strand of the social and political culture. Rulings tend to follow the letter of the law rather than the spirit. Legal education is narrowly technical. Lawyers and judges are not educated about the social context. While senior judges count among the elite of society, the legal profession as a whole has very questionable social status.
Today, law is still the will of the powerful, rather than being an independent force with its own moral authority. Opinion surveys show that ordinary people have relatively little faith in the judicial process. They expect money and influence to prevail. In today’s politics, lawsuits have become one of the many techniques of political competition. Where once you hurled firecracker-bombs into rivals’ house compounds or handed out anonymous pamphlets with lurid allegations, now you lob defamation suits and legal complaints by the truckload. In the press and public discussion of these matters, the issue is not who is right, but who has the power to win.
Since April 2006, the role of law and judicial process in politics has dramatically changed through a series of historic decisions. An election nullified. Members of the Election Commission jailed. The country’s largest-ever political party dissolved. The defamation cases against Supinya thrown out. The Shinawatra family assets frozen. Among politicians, generals, police chiefs, leading bureaucrats, prominent media figures, and judicial practitioners themselves, it is hard to find anyone who has not sued or been sued many times. In public debate, the only people now who can make themselves heard, other than astrologers, are professors from the law faculties in various universities. Law is now very much part of the game of power.
And what a game. After the September 2006 coup, the generals forsook the traditional methods for dealing with their targeted enemy, and instead left that job to law and judicial process. Though it started slowly, the Assets Examination Committee (AEC) has finally launched a judicial assault with a staggering volume of paperwork.
The Thaksin camp has responded with equal aggression. It has tried to junk the constitution so the whole work of the AEC can simply be invalidated. It has shifted key people in the police, judiciary, and related institutions. It has placed roadblocks along the line of judicial process so that cases which the AEC hand in at the front door of the relevant authority are soon tossed out the back. It has made creative use of delay. It has sprayed its opponents with harassing counter-suits.
This is not about law. There is a camp arguing that the AEC has no legitimacy because it arose from an illegitimate coup. There is another camp arguing that the Thaksin camp has no legitimacy because it flaunts law with money. Both arguments are painfully irrelevant. This is not about law or legitimacy but about power.
At present, the probable outcome of Thailand’s judicialization will not be giving law a bigger role in politics, but giving politics a bigger role in the practice of law.
( http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/trampled.htm)
By Chang Noi
Two years ago, the rule of law and judicial process were pushed forward as solutions to a crisis created by the clash of three great powers—established authority, electoral legitimacy, and business wealth. As the crisis has deepened over recent months, it looks very uncertain whether law and justice will prevail. Indeed, much more likely, they will be pounded and emasculated even further. We need to rewrite the proverb: when elephants fight, the law books get trampled underfoot.
Under a rule of law, law codes have moral authority in their own right, and judicial officers have authority and independence as interpreters and enforcers of those codes. This idea has never taken root in Thailand.
It was not part of the traditional political culture, where law was simply a handmaid of power. Those with authority based on official position or informal might had the right to sit in judgement and hand out rewards and punishments as acts of will. The old law codes were little more than collections of old judgements by such powerful figures. Unsurprisingly, these collections were full of inconsistencies because the judgements were made by different arbiters, in different eras, and under different circumstances. It’s doubtful whether the codes were much used in practice to guide future judgements. They were historical records, rather than codes for everyday consultation. Each new judgement was a new act of political will, another exercise of political authority.
As such, old Siam did not really differ from its neighbours. But elsewhere, colonial rulers put a lot of effort into establishing judicial systems as a key part of their control. For better or worse, much of these structures survived decolonization. Siam’s experience was rather different.
In the Fifth Reign, the Siamese elite imported many elements of the colonial system including a central bureaucracy, standing army, codified laws, and new judicial practice. But there was a crucial debate over the legal system.
Prince Ratchaburi backed a British-style system based on common law and juries. Arguably it was more in line with Siamese tradition of case law evident in the old codes. But King Chulalongkorn overruled his brilliant son. The king’s priority was to create a legal system which foreign powers would trust, so the foreigners would stop insisting on having their own courts that infringed Siamese sovereignty. For this reason, Thailand ended up with a Roman-law style system based on written law codes and interpretation by professional judges.
The king was right. This system helped to persuade the foreigners to surrender extraterritoriality. But it willed Thailand a legal system that never really took root. The initial law codes were first drafted in European languages by panels of international advisers, and only later and with difficulty translated into Thai. Though subsequent revisions made the codes clearer and more domesticated, the practice of law has remained a strange technical art rather than an integral strand of the social and political culture. Rulings tend to follow the letter of the law rather than the spirit. Legal education is narrowly technical. Lawyers and judges are not educated about the social context. While senior judges count among the elite of society, the legal profession as a whole has very questionable social status.
Today, law is still the will of the powerful, rather than being an independent force with its own moral authority. Opinion surveys show that ordinary people have relatively little faith in the judicial process. They expect money and influence to prevail. In today’s politics, lawsuits have become one of the many techniques of political competition. Where once you hurled firecracker-bombs into rivals’ house compounds or handed out anonymous pamphlets with lurid allegations, now you lob defamation suits and legal complaints by the truckload. In the press and public discussion of these matters, the issue is not who is right, but who has the power to win.
Since April 2006, the role of law and judicial process in politics has dramatically changed through a series of historic decisions. An election nullified. Members of the Election Commission jailed. The country’s largest-ever political party dissolved. The defamation cases against Supinya thrown out. The Shinawatra family assets frozen. Among politicians, generals, police chiefs, leading bureaucrats, prominent media figures, and judicial practitioners themselves, it is hard to find anyone who has not sued or been sued many times. In public debate, the only people now who can make themselves heard, other than astrologers, are professors from the law faculties in various universities. Law is now very much part of the game of power.
And what a game. After the September 2006 coup, the generals forsook the traditional methods for dealing with their targeted enemy, and instead left that job to law and judicial process. Though it started slowly, the Assets Examination Committee (AEC) has finally launched a judicial assault with a staggering volume of paperwork.
The Thaksin camp has responded with equal aggression. It has tried to junk the constitution so the whole work of the AEC can simply be invalidated. It has shifted key people in the police, judiciary, and related institutions. It has placed roadblocks along the line of judicial process so that cases which the AEC hand in at the front door of the relevant authority are soon tossed out the back. It has made creative use of delay. It has sprayed its opponents with harassing counter-suits.
This is not about law. There is a camp arguing that the AEC has no legitimacy because it arose from an illegitimate coup. There is another camp arguing that the Thaksin camp has no legitimacy because it flaunts law with money. Both arguments are painfully irrelevant. This is not about law or legitimacy but about power.
At present, the probable outcome of Thailand’s judicialization will not be giving law a bigger role in politics, but giving politics a bigger role in the practice of law.
( http://www.geocities.com/changnoi2/trampled.htm)
The mysteries of the law
7 july 2008
By Chang Noi
The role of money in Thailand’s judicial system is a subject that has been little studied. One exception was a large national survey of corruption, conducted about a decade ago, which had a short section about court cases. This survey found that in around one third of cases, money changed hands. The pattern of who paid what to whom was very varied. At one extreme, there were agents or fixers who were paid a lump sum which they then distributed around to various people involved in the case to get the desired result. The respondents to the survey who admitted making these payments reported that they were generally happy with the result. In short, money seemed to work.
One other aspect of this survey was interesting. The corporate bodies of the judicial service and legal profession applied some pressure to ensure the results were not splashed in the public media. That’s not a big surprise. The judicial system relies for its legitimacy on a belief that the system delivers results which are just. The foundations of the judicial system in Thailand are not so strong, so those involved need to protect their image.
This judicial process has now been dragged into the political spotlight. In the last few days, all but one of the main political stories carried by the press have been partly about a court proceedings. On the day of writing, the main political page in two English and one Thai dailies mention a total of fifteen different court suits. This would not have been the case a year ago. It probably is not the case in any other country of the world.
This glare of political floodlighting is putting the judicial process under considerable strain. It’s difficult to operate when it’s not clear whether your task is to deliver justice or solve a political crisis. Any high-profile case now has three stages: a preamble of prediction by political journalists; the hearing and judgement itself; and a long post-mortem debate by warring teams of legal academics. Keen reporters no longer loiter around the houses of parliamentary faction heads, but huddle on the steps of the court houses.
The media glare brings matters to light. But the political world has a murkiness that can defy any amount of wattage. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in The Case of the Little Sweetener, the two million baht bribe encased in a confectionery box bound with duct tape, apparently delivered by Thaksin’s legal team to officers of the court trying the Ratchada land deal case.
You might think that a lawyer caught red-handed delivering money to a court trying a major case against the lawyer’s client ought to be a pretty straightforward matter to interpret. Nothing could be farther from the truth. From the start, this incident has been enveloped in mystery and murk.
To begin with, what could the money be for? In the defamation suits which have become part of the daily process of political competition, the starting price is half a billion baht. For the plaintiffs in the Ratchada suit, the value of the result is quite simply so large it is beyond computation. By comparison, two million is mere confetti. Was this a partial payment of some kind—either part of a series, or part of a wider distribution? It has been suggested that this was payment for some minor information concerning the case. When “gifts” are distributed to offices on a regular basis, often they are placed in a plain envelope or some similarly innocuous container.
Then there was the mystery and murk about what really happened and who was involved. In the first reports of the incidents, newspapers did not dare mention names. The culprits were only “the legal team of a certain ex-politician.” Only when the Supreme Court applied its procedure for contempt were the names of the lawyers and their client revealed. Even then, only one of the lawyers was paraded in full public view. The other one with a nice surname was shielded from the public gaze, and whisked into jail without the press apparently getting a single photo.
Next there was the mystery and murk about the likely consequences of this incident. The first lawyer initially seemed quite unconcerned about being caught in such a flagrant act. He sat through the contempt proceedings in apparently supreme confidence that he would escape retribution. The judgement, sending him to jail for six months, was a massive shock from which he took several days to recover. Even then, the second lawyer wriggled a bit, as if he still might get away. And a senior policeman seemed intent on squashing any assumption that there would be a strong case against the lawyers’ client. Why should he have done that? These mysteries hints at powerful forces working in the background.
The political career of Thaksin Shinawatra has many parallels with that of Alberto Fujimori who ruled Peru from 1990 to 2000. Both were outsiders to an old political establishment. Both became hugely popular populists. Both had utter contempt for parliament, law, and a free press. Both fell spectacularly. But there is one big difference between the two. Fujimori’s sidekick kept accounts of all his political pay-offs. After he fell these became available for analysis.
Fujimori paid off three groups: politicians, the media, and the judiciary. The politicians were the cheapest (per head) and easiest. The media took the largest amount of money and management time because Fujimori understood his fate was in the hands of public opinion. The judiciary fell in the middle. Unlike the parliamentarians and media-owners, most were not paid on a regular basis. Often judges could be intimidated in other ways, such as boosting or damaging their career prospects and public reputation. The money, estimated as averaging $250,000 per month, was targeted in large amounts at a few influential judges, and at a few important court cases.
( geocities.com/changnoi2/mysteries.htm )
By Chang Noi
The role of money in Thailand’s judicial system is a subject that has been little studied. One exception was a large national survey of corruption, conducted about a decade ago, which had a short section about court cases. This survey found that in around one third of cases, money changed hands. The pattern of who paid what to whom was very varied. At one extreme, there were agents or fixers who were paid a lump sum which they then distributed around to various people involved in the case to get the desired result. The respondents to the survey who admitted making these payments reported that they were generally happy with the result. In short, money seemed to work.
One other aspect of this survey was interesting. The corporate bodies of the judicial service and legal profession applied some pressure to ensure the results were not splashed in the public media. That’s not a big surprise. The judicial system relies for its legitimacy on a belief that the system delivers results which are just. The foundations of the judicial system in Thailand are not so strong, so those involved need to protect their image.
This judicial process has now been dragged into the political spotlight. In the last few days, all but one of the main political stories carried by the press have been partly about a court proceedings. On the day of writing, the main political page in two English and one Thai dailies mention a total of fifteen different court suits. This would not have been the case a year ago. It probably is not the case in any other country of the world.
This glare of political floodlighting is putting the judicial process under considerable strain. It’s difficult to operate when it’s not clear whether your task is to deliver justice or solve a political crisis. Any high-profile case now has three stages: a preamble of prediction by political journalists; the hearing and judgement itself; and a long post-mortem debate by warring teams of legal academics. Keen reporters no longer loiter around the houses of parliamentary faction heads, but huddle on the steps of the court houses.
The media glare brings matters to light. But the political world has a murkiness that can defy any amount of wattage. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in The Case of the Little Sweetener, the two million baht bribe encased in a confectionery box bound with duct tape, apparently delivered by Thaksin’s legal team to officers of the court trying the Ratchada land deal case.
You might think that a lawyer caught red-handed delivering money to a court trying a major case against the lawyer’s client ought to be a pretty straightforward matter to interpret. Nothing could be farther from the truth. From the start, this incident has been enveloped in mystery and murk.
To begin with, what could the money be for? In the defamation suits which have become part of the daily process of political competition, the starting price is half a billion baht. For the plaintiffs in the Ratchada suit, the value of the result is quite simply so large it is beyond computation. By comparison, two million is mere confetti. Was this a partial payment of some kind—either part of a series, or part of a wider distribution? It has been suggested that this was payment for some minor information concerning the case. When “gifts” are distributed to offices on a regular basis, often they are placed in a plain envelope or some similarly innocuous container.
Then there was the mystery and murk about what really happened and who was involved. In the first reports of the incidents, newspapers did not dare mention names. The culprits were only “the legal team of a certain ex-politician.” Only when the Supreme Court applied its procedure for contempt were the names of the lawyers and their client revealed. Even then, only one of the lawyers was paraded in full public view. The other one with a nice surname was shielded from the public gaze, and whisked into jail without the press apparently getting a single photo.
Next there was the mystery and murk about the likely consequences of this incident. The first lawyer initially seemed quite unconcerned about being caught in such a flagrant act. He sat through the contempt proceedings in apparently supreme confidence that he would escape retribution. The judgement, sending him to jail for six months, was a massive shock from which he took several days to recover. Even then, the second lawyer wriggled a bit, as if he still might get away. And a senior policeman seemed intent on squashing any assumption that there would be a strong case against the lawyers’ client. Why should he have done that? These mysteries hints at powerful forces working in the background.
The political career of Thaksin Shinawatra has many parallels with that of Alberto Fujimori who ruled Peru from 1990 to 2000. Both were outsiders to an old political establishment. Both became hugely popular populists. Both had utter contempt for parliament, law, and a free press. Both fell spectacularly. But there is one big difference between the two. Fujimori’s sidekick kept accounts of all his political pay-offs. After he fell these became available for analysis.
Fujimori paid off three groups: politicians, the media, and the judiciary. The politicians were the cheapest (per head) and easiest. The media took the largest amount of money and management time because Fujimori understood his fate was in the hands of public opinion. The judiciary fell in the middle. Unlike the parliamentarians and media-owners, most were not paid on a regular basis. Often judges could be intimidated in other ways, such as boosting or damaging their career prospects and public reputation. The money, estimated as averaging $250,000 per month, was targeted in large amounts at a few influential judges, and at a few important court cases.
( geocities.com/changnoi2/mysteries.htm )
PAD: bulldog on a leash or another nail in democracy’s coffin?
21 july 2008
By Chang Noi
Since it was formed in February 2006, and especially since it was revived in May this year, the People’s Alliance for Democracy, has become a very distinctive force in the political landscape. Formally, PAD is simply an alliance of five orators. But as a political phenomenon, PAD is also what they are saying, how they are saying it, what visual messages they convey, and who is supporting them.
The movement’s main stated aim is to overthrow the current government. Normally any movement which professed this aim would be labeled dangerous, even revolutionary, and be strongly handled by the authorities. Strangely that is not happening. Probably that is because we know its true aim is to obstruct Thaksin’s overt return to politics.
The movement’s longer-term aim is to undermine the central principles of electoral democracy, namely the sovereignty of the people, and the selection of a parliament by the system of one-man, one-vote. The PAD leaders claim that the electorate cannot be trusted with the franchise because the mass of rural people are uneducated and corrupt. They want the elected portion of the lower house reduced to a minority (perhaps 30 per cent), and the remainder filled partly by “retired officials and important people” and partly by ordinary people and workers, selected by appointment. Since the logic of the PAD’s proposal is to disenfranchise the rural poor, this new system is likely to favour the rich, the urban, and the higher educated.
In addition, PAD wants the military to have a permanent role of political oversight. The military would be removed from political control (by making the defence ministry independent of the cabinet), and granted a right to intervene in politics to check corruption and to protect the monarchy and national sovereignty.
The PAD seems against the freedom of expression, and in favour of the use of abuse and intimidation to limit the freedom of expression. This conclusion is based on the way that PAD orators treat academics, actors or other public figures that have disagreed with PAD views. This tactic seems to have been quite successful. Some critics have apologized. The press has been generally rather uncritical of the PAD’s views and activities.
The PAD makes use of military and martial symbolism. Some of the leaders like to wear brown shirts and black shirts that resemble military and para-military uniforms. The headbands worn by leaders and followers recall the outfits of traditional warriors, samurai, and jungle fighters. The oversized neckscarf comes from the scouts, village scouts, and jungle fighters. It is not Chamlong’s rural-ascetic look but this barracks-chic that distinguishes the movement. Among the supporters, yellow flags, headbands, T-shirts, and caps combine to give the impression of commonality and conformity which is the role of uniforms.
PAD promotes a visceral nationalism reminiscent of the early Phibun era. The nation is a body that is being physically ripped by its enemies (internal and external), causing pain to the citizens, who must rise up in the nation’s defence.
The PAD’s agitational practice suggests a high degree of organization, strong financing, access to technology, and skill with sophisticated techniques. The equipment for staging and broadcasting the PAD’s message requires high capital cost and running expenses. The crowds are well organized and provisioned. The programming shows strategic planning to sustain support and interest with relatively little novelty. The PAD seems skilled in the techniques and rituals of litigation. In short, this is not a few people gathered at a street corner with a soap box.
Analyzing the PAD’s audience on the streets and in front of television screens is difficult. There are only stray interviews, plus pictures. Perhaps the single word that emerges from this impressionistic data is “respectable.” The crowds are generally smartly dressed. The age-profile is quite high, though there are also many families in attendance (and the TV audience may be significantly younger). Head-counting from press photos shows a slight preponderance of women over men. From the few on-site interviews available, the crowds include retirees, public servants, small business people, and senior executives from modern firms. There seem to be relatively few manual workers.
The PAD is clearly well-connected to other institutions. One of its leaders is a Democrat MP. Other Democrats have spoken from its stages. So too have academics from some of Bangkok’s major universities. A serving general has taken the PAD stage in his full uniform. Other military figures, including General Saprang Kalyanamitr, have been seen back-stage and are open in their support.
The PAD seems to be protected, perhaps by friends in important places, but also by virtue of its widespread urban support. No other Bangkok protest has suffered so little harassment. When the prime minister angrily threatened to clear PAD off the streets, the security forces refused to cooperate and the prime minister had to back down. When PAD set up a permanent blockade of roads, the police stood aside and public-opinion surveys were surprisingly lenient over the disruption to traffic. When the protest moved to Government House, the police resistance looked like a token showing designed to fail. This apparent immunity gives weight to PAD’s message.
The PAD is flirting with the old agent provocateur’s technique of placing its own crudely armed gangs in places where they will be attacked by enemies. This creates violent incidents, apparently initiated by their opponents, though in truth a result of the inherent violence of the PAD itself.
In short, PAD is an anti-democratic movement, supported by high investment and shadowy protection, that exploits the fears of the privileged and a deliberately anti-rational nationalism, and flirts with militarism and violence.
Is PAD a bulldog, let out on a leash for a specific purpose, that will be chained up when the threat from thieves has passed? Or is it another step in the destruction of democracy begun by Thaksin, continued by the coup-makers, and now plunging ahead on the momentum?
( geocities.com/changnoi2/padmeaning.htm )
By Chang Noi
Since it was formed in February 2006, and especially since it was revived in May this year, the People’s Alliance for Democracy, has become a very distinctive force in the political landscape. Formally, PAD is simply an alliance of five orators. But as a political phenomenon, PAD is also what they are saying, how they are saying it, what visual messages they convey, and who is supporting them.
The movement’s main stated aim is to overthrow the current government. Normally any movement which professed this aim would be labeled dangerous, even revolutionary, and be strongly handled by the authorities. Strangely that is not happening. Probably that is because we know its true aim is to obstruct Thaksin’s overt return to politics.
The movement’s longer-term aim is to undermine the central principles of electoral democracy, namely the sovereignty of the people, and the selection of a parliament by the system of one-man, one-vote. The PAD leaders claim that the electorate cannot be trusted with the franchise because the mass of rural people are uneducated and corrupt. They want the elected portion of the lower house reduced to a minority (perhaps 30 per cent), and the remainder filled partly by “retired officials and important people” and partly by ordinary people and workers, selected by appointment. Since the logic of the PAD’s proposal is to disenfranchise the rural poor, this new system is likely to favour the rich, the urban, and the higher educated.
In addition, PAD wants the military to have a permanent role of political oversight. The military would be removed from political control (by making the defence ministry independent of the cabinet), and granted a right to intervene in politics to check corruption and to protect the monarchy and national sovereignty.
The PAD seems against the freedom of expression, and in favour of the use of abuse and intimidation to limit the freedom of expression. This conclusion is based on the way that PAD orators treat academics, actors or other public figures that have disagreed with PAD views. This tactic seems to have been quite successful. Some critics have apologized. The press has been generally rather uncritical of the PAD’s views and activities.
The PAD makes use of military and martial symbolism. Some of the leaders like to wear brown shirts and black shirts that resemble military and para-military uniforms. The headbands worn by leaders and followers recall the outfits of traditional warriors, samurai, and jungle fighters. The oversized neckscarf comes from the scouts, village scouts, and jungle fighters. It is not Chamlong’s rural-ascetic look but this barracks-chic that distinguishes the movement. Among the supporters, yellow flags, headbands, T-shirts, and caps combine to give the impression of commonality and conformity which is the role of uniforms.
PAD promotes a visceral nationalism reminiscent of the early Phibun era. The nation is a body that is being physically ripped by its enemies (internal and external), causing pain to the citizens, who must rise up in the nation’s defence.
The PAD’s agitational practice suggests a high degree of organization, strong financing, access to technology, and skill with sophisticated techniques. The equipment for staging and broadcasting the PAD’s message requires high capital cost and running expenses. The crowds are well organized and provisioned. The programming shows strategic planning to sustain support and interest with relatively little novelty. The PAD seems skilled in the techniques and rituals of litigation. In short, this is not a few people gathered at a street corner with a soap box.
Analyzing the PAD’s audience on the streets and in front of television screens is difficult. There are only stray interviews, plus pictures. Perhaps the single word that emerges from this impressionistic data is “respectable.” The crowds are generally smartly dressed. The age-profile is quite high, though there are also many families in attendance (and the TV audience may be significantly younger). Head-counting from press photos shows a slight preponderance of women over men. From the few on-site interviews available, the crowds include retirees, public servants, small business people, and senior executives from modern firms. There seem to be relatively few manual workers.
The PAD is clearly well-connected to other institutions. One of its leaders is a Democrat MP. Other Democrats have spoken from its stages. So too have academics from some of Bangkok’s major universities. A serving general has taken the PAD stage in his full uniform. Other military figures, including General Saprang Kalyanamitr, have been seen back-stage and are open in their support.
The PAD seems to be protected, perhaps by friends in important places, but also by virtue of its widespread urban support. No other Bangkok protest has suffered so little harassment. When the prime minister angrily threatened to clear PAD off the streets, the security forces refused to cooperate and the prime minister had to back down. When PAD set up a permanent blockade of roads, the police stood aside and public-opinion surveys were surprisingly lenient over the disruption to traffic. When the protest moved to Government House, the police resistance looked like a token showing designed to fail. This apparent immunity gives weight to PAD’s message.
The PAD is flirting with the old agent provocateur’s technique of placing its own crudely armed gangs in places where they will be attacked by enemies. This creates violent incidents, apparently initiated by their opponents, though in truth a result of the inherent violence of the PAD itself.
In short, PAD is an anti-democratic movement, supported by high investment and shadowy protection, that exploits the fears of the privileged and a deliberately anti-rational nationalism, and flirts with militarism and violence.
Is PAD a bulldog, let out on a leash for a specific purpose, that will be chained up when the threat from thieves has passed? Or is it another step in the destruction of democracy begun by Thaksin, continued by the coup-makers, and now plunging ahead on the momentum?
( geocities.com/changnoi2/padmeaning.htm )
Monday, August 4, 2008
anti-Thaksin movement
anti-Thaksin movement
The 2006 anti-Thaksin movement in Thailand: an analysis.
In March 2005, after a landslide election victory, Thailand's billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra seemed invincible. His Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) gained 19 million votes (more than 60% of the votes cast), substantially improving on the result achieved in 2001. Social and political activists were dejected, even intimidated, by this result. By March 2006, the situation had changed completely. A massive and sustained protest movement occurred, with rallies of 50,000-100,000 people on a weekly and sometimes daily basis over a period of three months. The movement on the streets opened up political space for debate and criticism that would have been unthinkable only a few months previously and forced Thaksin to dissolve parliament and call snap elections on 2 April 2006. Six months later, a military coup d'etat ended the career of one of Thailand's most successful premiers. How can we explain this rather sudden and deep crisis of the Thaksin regime?
At first glance, the crisis appears to have developed as a struggle between different sections of Thailand's elite. Intra-elite conflict was obviously one key element in Thaksin's downfall. This is epitomised, first, by media mogul and former Thaksin supporter, Sondhi Limthongkul, whose open-air talk shows at Lumpini Park at the end of 2005 sparked the initial movement. More importantly, the crisis represented a conflict between Thaksin and what McCargo (2005) has coined the "network monarchy." The coup itself was orchestrated by members of this network and the ground for it was prepared for by direct interventions by the king and Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda (see Hewison, 2008). However, we argue that intra-elite conflict is an insufficient explanation for the dynamics or the social base of the protest movement, unless the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators are simply seen as royalist followers of protest leaders Sondhi Limthongkul and Chamlong Srimuang. (1)
It has become common to define the anti-Thaksin protests as a middle-class movement. This term is used loosely and lumped together with "the urban elite," implying that Thaksin was supported by the poor in the countryside and opposed by the relatively rich in the city. This is the basic line followed by newspapers such as The Nation and the Bangkok Post and is also argued by Kasian (2006: 32) and Pasuk and Baker (2008). Songpol Kaopatumtip (2006: 1), an editor of the Bangkok Post wrote of "the urban elite and like-minded activists those who were on the streets demanding Mr Thaksin's resignation"; while The Economist (8-14 April 2006: 14) projected a "spectacle of an urban elite overthrowing an elected leader."
Reflecting these popular views, Kasian (2005: 132) drew on Anek Laothamatas' (1996) "Tale of Two Democracies", to argue that there is a deep conflict between the rural "electocracy" (who buy votes along patronage lines) and the urban, freemarket, liberal democracy. He characterised "the city" in terms of a capitalist agenda: "the city's greater purchasing power plus undemocratic economic freedom to trade, invest, consume, overspend, exploit, and pollute," calling this the "urban uncivil society" that exploits the countryside. Thus, he sees the anti-Thaksin movement as a conflict, as another turn in the never-ending "vicious circle" of Thai politics, where the rural population elects an inept and corrupt premier and it is the task of the urban population to drive him out of office.
In contrast with these perspectives, in this article we argue that the Thaksin conflict was not simply one between a pro-poor, populist premier supported by the mass of the rural poor (a kind of Asian Hugo Chavez) against an urban, royalist elite. Instead, we will try and show that the anti-Thaksin movement was rooted in the contradictory nature of Thaksin's project itself, which combined populist programmes with a deeper restructuring of Thai capitalism. Inherent contradictions explain the dynamics involved in the emergence of opposition and in the transformation of former supporters into enemies.
The characterisation of the anti-Thaksin movement as "middle class" does not do justice to the complex make-up of the protest movement. It will be shown that the dynamics of the protests led to a broadening of its social base, and opened the space for discontent towards Thaksin, which had grown over the preceding several years, to emerge in activist form. The People's Alliance for Democracy represented a coalition between heterogeneous groups (including elite factions, grassroots organisations, social movements and NGOs) against Thaksin. Elite opposition combined dissatisfied business groups that had lost the political patronage necessary for economic success (see Ukrist, 2008) and the old network of civil servants around the king, who were losing out to the Thai Rak Thai's takeover of the state apparatus (see Hewison, 2008).
As we will show, the opposition from below, on the other hand, arose from conflicts around different economic, social and political questions and issues. Rather than a coincidental collection of single issues, we argue that these questions and issues were connected and interrelated, because they all arose out of the inherent contradictions of the Thaksin project. We introduce the term "post-neoliberal restructuring" to analyse the Thaksin project, rather than populism. We then try and show that this contradictory restructuring project gave rise to different oppositions at different times during the TRT government. These were to re-emerge as part of the PAD-led mass movement in 2006. (2)
The Mass Movement against Thaksin
The anti-Thaksin movement was huge. Over a period of two months, from the beginning of February until the end of March 2006, hundreds of thousands of people took part in a series of demonstrations that were led by a coalition called the "People's Alliance for Democracy" (PAD, Phantharnit Prachachon Phuea Prachathippatai). The PAD was able to organise a series of rallies and demonstrations with between 50,000 and 300,000 participants in Bangkok (11, 26 February; 5, 17, 25, 29 March), some of which lasted overnight or for several days, as well as protests in many other parts of Thailand (including Chumphon, Surat Thani, Hat Yai, Songkhla, Patthalung, Pattani, Trang, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Ratchasima, Surin and Ubon Ratchathani (The Nation Online, 11 and 27 February, 2006).
The PAD was an alliance between a wide range of sections of Thai society and between diverse political organisations. One wing was made up groups who could be described as an urban elite or as conservatives, such as disgruntled royalist civil servants who were being marginalised by the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party, or sections of business who were not part of Thaksin's patronage system (see Ukrist, 2008). Another wing (and this is what we will focus on in our argument) was made up of social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a grassroots base, such as workers, farmers, teachers and students. The PAD thus brought together elite and grassroots opposition to Thaksin.
Urban elite and royalist opposition to Thaksin was epitomised by media mogul and former backer of Thaksin, Sondhi Limthongkul, whose Lumpini Park talk shows from September 2005 were one source of the anti-Thaksin movement. Sondhi's Manager Business Group had been resuscitated under Thaksin, but Sondhi fell out with Thaksin after he was not given privileged business opportunities (see Kasian, 2006: 33) and when his increasingly critical talk show "Thailand Weekly" was cut off after intervention by Thaksin, he began to hold his shows at Lumpini Park, attracting up to 30,000 people. In January 2006, Sondhi led around 2000 people in a march on Government House and several hundred demonstrators pushed into the compound after midnight (The Nation Online, 14 January 2006).
Parallel to Sondhi's open-air protest talk show, another protest movement against Thaksin's free trade policies was gathering steam. In December 2005, massive protests against the 6th WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong brought together protesters from across South-east Asia. Based on interviews by the authors, the hundred-odd strong delegation of Thai activists was made up of representatives of farmer networks such as the Alternative Agriculture Network and the Northern Farmers Alliance, the Southern Federation of Small Scale Fishers; HIV-activist groups; and various NGOs. Apart from making headlines in Thailand by getting arrested in Hong Kong, they returned with new inspiration to take on the free trade agreement (FTA) talks between the Thai government and the USA.
A coalition of NGOs called FTA Watch had been organising against FTAs for several years. In January 2006, they mobilised 10,000 demonstrators against the US-Thailand FTA 6th round of talks in Chiangmai. The size of the demonstration, for the most part small-scale farmers and HIV activists, was remarkable given the much smaller turnout at previous FTA talks. A new militancy was also evident. Protesters adapted the militant tactics of Korean farmers in Hong Kong, first by swimming across a river to reach the hotel in which the negotiations were taking place (the Koreans had jumped into Hong Kong harbour), and then by breaking through police lines, nearly storming the meeting (Bangkok Post, 11 January 2006). This led to the premature closing of the talks (which then shifted to a nearby golf course) and, as Thanong (2006) argued, probably to a more general de-legitimisation of the Thaksin government.
The spark for a more generalised movement against Thaksin, and an alliance between these two independent strands, was the Shin Corp sale. At the end of January 2006, it was announced that Thaksin's family had sold their Shin Corp business to a Singaporean government investment company in a tax-free sale. The deal involved a shadowy investment firm called Ample Rich that had been set up in the British Virgin Islands tax-haven. Sondhi immediately took up the issue. Because he had been the most outspoken critic of Thaksin, he was now in a position to lead the massive public outrage over the Shin Corp deal, and his demonstration on 4 February attracted 50,000 participants.
Sondhi's agenda was to criticise Thaksin for corruption and for not respecting the king (on the latter, see Hewison, 2008). The royalist colouring of his movement was symbolised by the wearing of yellow shirts, associated with the king's birthday. However, Sondhi had also taken up issues around the FTAs with China and Australia (particularly after the Chiangmai protest), alleging that Thaksin had negotiated the deals for his own private interests and to the detriment of Thai farmers (The Nation Online, 13 January 2006). He now actively wooed FTA Watch and other NGOs to join him.
Immediately after Sondhi's first big demonstration on 4 February, Suriyasai Katasila, the secretary-general of the Campaign for Popular Democracy, announced the formation of the PAD with an aim to oust Thaksin. According to Suriyasai, the PAD was formed by 40 organisations representing "academics, businessmen, farmers, urban poor, non-government organisations, labour and students" (Supalak and Subhatra, 2006). The PAD's leadership consisted of five men: Sondhi Limthongkul; so-called Dharma Army leader and former Bangkok governor and one of the 1992 democracy movement's leaders Chamlong Srimuang; President of Campaign for Popular Democracy Phipop Thongchai; the veteran trade unionist Somsak Kosaisuk; and university lecturer Somkiat Phongpaiboon; with Suriyasai as co-ordinator.
The contradictory nature of the PAD coalition was epitomised by the debate around the demand for royal intervention and the reference to Clause 7 of the 1997 Constitution (see Connors, 2008). This was highly contested from the onset, and was one of the reasons for the hesitation of many grassroots organisations to join the PAD. Because of general scepticism about Sondhi Limthongkul who was seen as a royalist conservative, some groups decided not to join the PAD at all (e.g. some smaller student groups and the Thai Labour Campaign). The important activist network known as the Assembly of the Poor also did not join. Its position was that the organisation was created around concrete problems such as large development projects and so was not directly involved in "politics." After long discussion, it was decided that the Assembly as a whole would not actively support the PAD, but that individual groups of the network could, which they did.
Even so, many organised activist groups and social movements did join with Sondhi to create the PAD. This was based on the consensus that the demand for Thaksin's resignation, and not the demand for royal intervention, was the unifying element. The Midnight University, Phipob Thongchai and the Student Federation of Thailand were among those within the PAD who publicly rejected the demand for royal intervention, and initially at least, calls for royal intervention to oust Thaksin did not form an official consensus position of the PAD (see Piyamiton, 2006).
The first big rally of the new alliance on 11 February 2006 reflected the broad spectrum of the movement. Apart from senators, such as Kraisak Choonhavan and Chirmsak Pinthong, and politicians, such as the former Palang Dharma Party leader Chaiwat Sinsuwong, speakers included state enterprise trade union leaders Phien Yong-nu and Somsak Kosaisuk, Angkhana Neelapaichit (the wife of abducted, presumed murdered, lawyer Somchai Neelapaichit), Supinya Klangnarong, Secretary-General for the Campaign for Media Reform and Kochawan Chaibutr, the Secretary-General of the Students Federation of Thailand. Notably, Sondhi Limthongkul was restrained in his calls for royal intervention, focusing instead on Thaksin's use of power for personal profit, his alleged tax evasion, and the sell-off of "national assets"--Shin Corp operated most of Thailand's satellite communications to a foreign country (see the account in The Nation Online, 11 February, 2006). Other issues addressed at the rallies were the negative social effects of the FTA with Australia, media censorship and violence in southern Thailand (The Nation Online, 11 February 2006).
For the first time during Thaksin's period in government, a mass movement was articulating different criticisms against him at the same place and time. Previously, he had tended to face criticism on single issues. Moreover, the public and mass nature of the criticism, broke through the previous apathy and fear that Thaksin's powerful hold on the media and government had generated, and opened up space for politicisation and self-organisation. The single issues became connected to each other through the common demand for Thaksin's resignation. Students were now protesting side by side with state enterprise unionists, and listening to speeches about the violence in the south. A new self-confidence was born out of a mass movement, where previously, solutions to particular problems had seemed unattainable because of Thaksin's dominating position.
A range of protests ensued. School students developed initiatives, university campus demonstrations were held, women's marches were organised, and rallies, marches and protests in towns and cities up and down the country were held. There was talk of strike action, and the countless and ongoing discussions and organising meetings meant that politics became everyday fare for hundreds of thousands of people over a period of several weeks. In the south of the country, local PAD branches could fill sport stadiums with political meetings (Nok Parkpoom, pers. comm., Trang, 18 October 2006) and, despite martial law, students in the Muslim-dominated Pattani province could even organise a small, technically illegal, demonstration on their campus (interview, Student Federation of Thailand, Pattani, 16 October 2006).
The large demonstrations gave a focus for different groups to develop their own initiatives and self-organisation. On the eve of the 4 February demonstration, lecturers from Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Political Science signed a public declaration calling for Thaksin's resignation. After Professor Amara Pongsapich, Dean of the Faculty, supported the declaration, she was leaned on to resign by pro-Thaksin government officials in the Political Science Alumni Association. In support, faculty members threatened to resign in protest if Amara was punished (Wattana, 2006; The Nation Online, 7 February 2006). Meanwhile, students at Thammasat University launched a campaign to collect 50,000 signatures calling for Thaksin's resignation and Thammasat professors organised a controversial mock trial of Thaksin on his conflict of interest as prime minister and businessman. The Student Federation of Thailand kicked off the first PAD demonstration on 11 February 2006 by marching from Thammasat University to the Royal Plaza, in defiance of the government ban of the rally.
The teachers groups who had been organising mass protests against the "decentralisation of education" (Funston, 2006) also joined the movement against Thaksin. On 26 February, Uaychai Watha, a leader of the teachers' campaign against the transfer of schools to local authorities, threatened strike action if Thaksin refused to resign (The Nation Online, 26 February 2006). School students also became increasingly politicised, launching a new organisation called "Students for Democracy."
EGAT workers and workers from other state enterprises soon joined the anti-Thaksin protests in an organised fashion. During the second PAD demonstration on 26 February, 5000 state enterprise workers gathered in front of the Democracy Monument and threatened strike action to force Thaksin to resign (The Nation Online, 27 February, 2006). During the 14 March demonstration, thousands of state enterprise workers, including a large delegation of EGAT workers, marched en masse from Sanam Luang to Government House (as witnessed by the authors, see also Bangkok Post Online 17 March 2006).
Some rural networks also joined the protests. By the 4th PAD demonstration on 14 March, activists from the Southern Community Forestry Network, the Federation of Small Scale Fishers from the south, the Isan Network of Small-Scale Farmers and the Northern Peasants Federation had joined the movement (interviews, 14 March 2006).
As the movement progressed, the royalist yellow T-shirts became less evident and the protests became more active in their character, while elements of civil disobedience, such as road blocks, became more pronounced. The 14 March demonstration was no longer an extended Sondhi talk show but resulted in the blockade of Government House for many hours. The participation of organised groups became more apparent and, while some authors have argued that participation by organised labour was limited (Ji, 2007: 36), our observations on 14 March 2006 were that trade unionists from EGAT, the railways and the post offices, and teacher activists in their hundreds and thousands participated (see also Bangkok Post Online 17 March 2006). This demonstration brought together many groups, was not dominated by royalists and boasted a large number of self-made banners, placards and demands. The protests on 29 March blocked the Rama I road for several hours (The Nation Online, 29 March 2006).
The mass movement against Thaksin was not simply made up of royalist followers of Sondhi and nor was it comprised of an urban, free-market elite as suggested by Kasian (2005: 132). At least part of the movement was made up of self-organised groups of workers, students, farmers and teachers, and of political activists from social movements and NGOs. The issues that were articulated under the common demand for Thaksin to resign, from media reform to FTAs, from teachers pensions to peace in the south, were, as we will proceed to argue, interconnected and sustained through contradictions within Thaksin's project itself.
Is Thaksin an Asian Hugo Chavez?
In March 2006, the web journal "Axis of Logic" took a New York Times article on Thaksin, exchanged the Thai personal and place names with Venezuelan names and showed that the article on Thaksin could have been written about Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez (Axis of Logic, 2006). The reason this was possible is that both Chavez and Thaksin had adopted social programmes and nationalist economic policies that have been criticised by neo-liberal purists as economically unsound, backward and "populist." As with Chavez's "Mission Barrio Adentro" health care programme, Thaksin's tax-financed universal health coverage clashed with the World Bank models of privatised health care. (3) Also, like Chavez, when Thaksin was facing recurrent mass demonstrations, his response was to mobilise his own supporters. And the masses he mobilised resembled the huge numbers of supporters who brought Chavez back into office after a short-lived coup d'etat in 2001 in Caracas.
Faced with the evidently massive support for Thaksin, two interpretations have been made that we will discuss here. The first is that Thaksin was a kind of Asian Chavez, that because of his populist policies, he commanded the support of the poor, and that the opposition against him was middle class and elitist (on Thaksin as a populist, see Pasuk and Baker, 2008). The second view, dominant within the PAD itself, was that Thaksin's supporters were either duped by his media propaganda or paid to join his demonstrations; that is, Thaksin was not an Asian Chavez because he was not really pro-poor.
As we will now argue, both these perspectives are simplistic in that they look at certain government programmes in isolation from Thaksin's overall project. Thaksin generated real popular support with social programmes for the poor and a nationalist response to the Asian economic crisis. This break with the perceived wisdom of the World Bank and the IMF makes Thaksin similar to Chavez. The key difference is that Thaksin's policies were embedded within a bigger project of rapid capitalist restructuring in the interests of large Thai corporations looking for competitiveness on the global market. As we will explain in this chapter, whereas Chavez's economic policy can be described as being opposed to neo-liberal prescriptions (Gibbs, 2006), Thaksin pursued an economic policy that might be called the post-Washington Consensus. (4) Because of this fundamental difference in the political orientation of these two leaders, we prefer to use "post neo-liberalism" rather than "populism" as a category of analysis, despite the fact that Thaksin and Chavez show similarities in their highly personalised political style. (5)
One of the Chavez-Thaksin similarities is seen in a capacity for mobilising mass support. In early March 2006, TRT mobilised its supporters to assemble at Bangkok's Sanam Luang to show their support for the TRT government. Rumours circulated that the people who joined the demonstration were paid 300 or 500 baht (as an example, see The Nation, 4 March 2006). Such rumours were never substantiated, and the 200,000 turnout and the enthusiasm for the prime minister demonstrated genuine mass support. People came from all over Thailand and from all walks of life, but the vast majority were farmers, small business people and workers, including a significant group of motorcycle taxi drivers. Despite self-comforting arguments by leaders of the anti-Thaksin protests and their sympathetic press that the Thaksin supporters were ignorant, gullible or bought, the Thaksin supporters had good arguments for their position.
During the demonstration, we talked to participants who had come to Bangkok on their own accord and usually in an organised fashion. Some were rural folk, farmers or small traders, others were workers and management from the Rangsit industrial area or from small rural-based factories, but they were all able to give coherent answers as to why they were there (interviews, Sanam Luang, 3 March 2006). The key arguments, again and again, were that Thaksin was a prime minister who actually helped the poor, with the 30 baht health programme, the one million baht community fund, and other development projects. Argument that Thaksin and his government were corrupt typically elicited the response that many former prime ministers were also corrupt.
Thaksin's rural support, apart from the impressive turnout to his election campaigns in scores of provincial towns, was symbolised by the "Caravan of the Poor," a trek of several thousand farmers from the north-east who travelled to Bangkok on foot or on self-constructed tractors. The picture of poor farmers marching to Bangkok used to be the monopoly of anti-government, grassroots movements. (6) The fact that the same symbolism was used successfully by pro-Thaksin forces is significant. Even more so the fact that the Caravan was led by ex-leaders of the Assembly of the Poor (Luen Sichampho, pers. comm., 16 March 2006).
The point is that Thaksin's support was real because his rural and pro-poor policies were real too. The debt-restructuring scheme, the one million baht community fund, the 30 baht health programme, and government-funded infrastructure projects had a noticeable effect on people's lives. The key ideas for these projects came from farmer leaders and aligned progressive academics, some of whom were also incorporated into the TRT government. Former student and NGO activists in Thaksin's cabinet included Adisorn Piengkes (Deputy Minister for Agriculture); Chaturon Chaisaeng (Minister for Education); Sora-at Klinpratoom (Minister for Information and Communication Technology); and Phumtham Vejjayachai (Deputy Minister for Transport and Deputy Secretary-General of TRT). Pasuk and Baker (2004: 81) told the tale of how much of Thaksin's rural programme was adapted from a three-page fax sent to him by a former student activist from the 1970s. Kasian (2002: 339) put it succinctly: "... Thaksin's 'populism' was actually begotten by a bunch of ex-communist guerrillas and former student activists among his close aides ...". Thaksin's reforms, therefore, represented a serious attempt to incorporate part of the NGOs and social movements into his hegemonic project by taking up some of their demands and offering a consensus based around a new social contract (Hewison, 2003a: 13).
A second similarity apparent in Chavez and Thaksin is their orientation to economic nationalism. Chavez invoked the wrath of the USA by re-nationalising the oil industry and other key sectors of economy. Early in his government's term, Thaksin was criticised by mainstream neo-liberal economists and journalists as representing a revival of protectionist nationalism (cf. Glassman, 2004:37-8 for a summary of this criticism). It is clear that TRT's election in 2001 was won on a groundswell of popular nationalist reaction to the IMF policies implemented by the Chuan Leekpai government in response to the economic crisis (see Hewison, 2003a). Kasian (2002: 331-5) argued that the 1997 crisis led the middle classes to turn towards nationalism, and that they, together with the "Octobrists," the "Senior Citizens" and "entrepreneurs" formed various "ad hoc loose nationalist groupings" that campaigned against the IMF loan conditionalities and the takeover of formerly Thai-owned businesses by foreign corporations. (7)
As Hewison (2003a: 5) noted, the Democrats, who implemented the standard IMF prescriptions of "privatisation, regulatory reform, liberalisation, improved corporate governance, and further foreign investment" (including, for example, the Foreign Business Act of March 2000, which opened up key sectors to majority foreign ownership) were seen by the politicised populace as IMF stooges. Thaksin, and his aptly named party, was able to exploit this by promising to free Thailand from foreign IMF dominance and by promising that privatised state enterprises would be offered only to Thais (Dixon, 2004: 47, 62).
Thaksin's anti-IMF stance, apart from being a key marketing plank of his election campaign, was based on the support of Thai big business groups, including some of the country's biggest conglomerates, such as the Charoen Phokphand (CP) group and the Bangkok Bank, as well as smaller, export-orientated companies. (8) Once in power, he broke with the IMF-line followed by the Chuan government. These policies used the crisis as an opportunity to allow foreign multinationals to buy up domestic companies and to let "uncompetitive" businesses go to the wall. Key state interventions in debt restructuring and support programmes for small and medium enterprises helped key sections of Thai capital to recoup and to again engage in the global market (Glassman, 2004: 46-9).
These interventions were quite successful, both in terms of economic recovery and also in preventing a general take-over of Thai businesses by transnational corporations (TNCs) (Dixon, 2004). In July 2003, Thaksin triumphantly declared the repayment of the IMF loan, two years ahead of schedule, and, standing against the background of a huge Thai flag, proclaimed Thailand's "independence from the IMF." Many of the pro-Thaksin demonstrators specified his stand against the IMF as one of their key reasons for supporting him (interviews, Sanam Luang, 3 March 2006). (9)
Although Thaksin was criticised by mainstream neo-liberal economists and journalists as representing a revival of protectionist nationalism (Glassman, 2004: 37-8), Thaksin's project was radically different from Chavez's. While the latter addresses the problem of social inequality by means of a policy of redistribution that confronts elite interests, Thaksin represents big business, with "a government by and for the rich" (Hewison, 2003a: 9). As Kasian (2002: 339) put it: "Through him, the crony capitalists, especially the telecommunications, media, auto manufacturing and agribusiness oligarchic interests, who are strongly represented in his cabinet and party, have won back their state." In addition, Thaksin's form of economic nationalism is different from that pursued by Chavez. Rather than challenging the Washington Consensus by increasing the economic role of the state and integrating an "anti-imperialist" nationalism within a broader internationalist strategy as Chavez has done (Gibbs, 2006), Thaksin was not motivated by a principled rejection of the key components of neo-liberalism, but by an opportunistic reaction of key sections of Thai business to compete successfully within a broad neo-liberal paradigm.
As Glassman (2004: 59) argued, "TRT's economic nationalism is not only not an effort to construct a highly auto-centred or closed-door (and especially not state-owned) economy. It is not even an attempt to resurrect anything like import-substitution industrialization." Instead, he characterised Thaksin's economic policy as mildly Keynsian, emphasising state social and economic support programmes rather than neo-liberal austerity and as a "geographically expansionist neo-mercantilist project," involving export-orientated industrialisation supported by state intervention (Glassman, 2004: 60). A similar point was made by Brown and Hewison (2005), who analysed TRT "dual track development strategy" as a strategy to protect domestic capital after the shock of the Asian crisis in order to allow its restructuring with the ultimate aim to develop a more competitive economy. The crafting of a "new social contract," as Hewison (2003b) analysed Thaksin's social programmes, served as a tool to guarantee social stability which was needed for the process of restructuring a policy subordinate to the ultimate aim of developing better competitiveness for the global market (Brown and Hewison, 2005: 361).
The big business agenda of Thaksin's regime was reflected by the endorsement of his election victory in 2005 by key business spokesmen (Bangkok Post Online, 7 and 8 February 2005). Corporate representatives also held back throughout the protests, only offering their concern that political stability might be compromised if they continued.
Thaksin's policy fits into the paradigm of what has been called "post neo-liberal," which is also reflected in the World Bank's recent attention to better "balance elite-driven reforms and popular pressure" but which does not go beyond "poverty management within the [neo-liberal] paradigm" (Gibbs, 2006: 266). Gibbs cast doubt on this new political orientation, noting that "it is not clear how they intend to marry their dual goals of promoting market-oriented reform, including ongoing privatisation, with increasing participation by the poor and 'subordinate' groups." It is this difficult marriage that is one of the key contradictions inherent in Thaksin's project. (10)
Internal Contradictions of Thaksin's Project
The crucial point about Thaksin's "post neo-liberal" paradigm is that neo-liberal principles actually remained unchallenged and were pursued with force. In fact, as we will discuss in detail in this section, Thaksin pursued a lot of policies that were basic tenets of neo-liberalism with considerable vigour, and contradicted the "social contract" he offered to the poor. These contradictions gradually unfolded in the course of his premiership. Not, as often criticised by neo-liberal ideologues, between "unsustainable" state-funded projects and fiscal prudence, but between Thaksin's ambitious capitalist restructuring of economic and social relations in the interest of big business, and the interests of his popular base. We argue that it was precisely these internal contradictions that laid the foundation for the mass movement against Thaksin and his TRT government.
Agriculture
The internal contradictions within Thaksin's overall project can be illustrated in one of his flagship policies. The rural development programmes, particularly the one million baht per community programme and debt restructuring schemes were not part of a redistribution policy for the poor against the rich, but aimed to accelerate a major capitalist restructuring of agriculture and to lessen the hardships this caused (i.e. "post neo-liberal"). Parallel to debt restructuring, credit programmes, the promotion of local products and help to local infrastructure, Thaksin was basically committed to the capital-intensive, export-orientated "success" story of Thai agriculture and sought to promote this model.
An important symbol of Thaksin's agricultural policies was his close collaboration with the agribusiness giant CP, and the appointment of Wattana Muengsuk, the son-in-law of CP's chairman Dhanin Chearavanont, as minister of Commerce (and later Social Development). Under the TRT government, CP Foods, the keystone agribusiness company of the group, received five- or ten-year exemptions on income tax on 29 major projects including feedmills, broiler and chicken farms, shrimp hatcheries and processing plants (CP Foods n.d.: 20-1). Despite the bird flu scare, exports of processed chicken and duck--key CP businesses doubled under Thaksin, as did pork and shrimp exports (CP Foods, n.d.: 25-31). CP Foods also expanded its global reach during this period, with new subsidiaries in Britain, China, Europe and the USA (CP Foods, n.d.: 94-6).
In addition to TRT promotion of agribusiness itself, the flow of easy credit accelerated the long-term structural transformation of agriculture away from independent smallholders to capital intensive production, aimed, as Thaksin was keen to reiterate, to change farmers into "entrepreneurs." With the possibilities of higher returns promising an escape from poverty, the trend towards monoculture crops and high-cost inputs such as herbicides, fertilizers and hybrid seed increased. The capital-intensive transformation was epitomised by the expansion of contract-farming, which was pioneered by CP, the latter now having tens of thousands of corn, maize, rice, chicken, broiler, duck, and swine farmers under contract to buy CP inputs and to sell cash crops to CP specifications (see Delforge, 2007).
TRT's community fund and debt-restructuring schemes were important capital sources for farmers and not only agribusiness profited. However, not everybody had an equal share in the benefits. According to research by Delforge (2007), contract broiler farmers earned an average of only 3500 baht per month (for two workers) in 2004 and, in general, rice farmers did not benefit from higher volumes of rice exports (which increased to over seven million tons under Thaksin). According to Jacques-Chai (2004: 24), farm-gate paddy prices actually dropped in real terms, from 4663 baht/ton in 1996 to 3667 baht/ton in 2003.
Although Thaksin's easy credit was a godsend to farmers in the grip of loan sharks and assisted some in business start-ups, it could not solve the general problem of indebtedness. Rather, in connection with the promotion of capital-intensive production, debt increased. If 60% of rural households were indebted in 1994/ 1995, with an average debt of 37,000 baht, this increased to 68,000 baht in 2003 (with the same percentage of indebted households, National Statistical Office Thailand, n.d.). For many Thaksin opponents, the easy credit policy was seen to exacerbate indebtedness, and they criticised farmers for rushing to buy consumer goods such as motorcycles and mobile phones. (11)
TRT's promotion of export-orientated agriculture--monoculture crops; high-cost inputs such as herbicides, fertilizers and hybrid seed; commercial orientation and corporate-dominated market and production structures such as contract farming increased the profits of agribusiness but also contributed to high indebtedness, land concentration and the general demise of the independent small-scale farmer. Thaksin and TRT were not interested in alternatives propagated by NGOs and small-scale farmer networks such as integrated, subsistence-orientated agriculture, community forestry and certainly not in agrarian reform. For this reason, organised farmer networks under the Assembly of the Poor umbrella were soon in opposition to Thaksin.
Land concentration led to a new wave of protests and organising, polarising the situation in some rural areas in 2004. In the south, the Southern Land Reform for the Poor Network (SLRP), with a claimed membership of 10,000, organised protests in February, August, October and December, demanding that expired large-scale palm oil concessions be divided up among landless and farmers with little land (Supara, 2004). In the north, partly inspired by the Brazilian landless movement (MST), a wave of land occupations that started before TRT came to power in Lamphun in 2000, spread rapidly under TRT to 27 different places, despite increased repression of this movement by the government (Rangsan, 2006).
TRT's domestic agrarian policy had a counterpart in the consistent movement towards free trade. As an agrarian exporter whose trade positions are influenced directly by the giant agribusinesses like CP, Thailand has long supported trade liberalisation (and was, for example, a member of the Cairns group in the World Trade Organisation). However, under Thaksin, this support for trade liberalisation was taken to new levels. Bilateral and regional FTAs, successfully concluded with Australia and with ASEAN/China, have had negative effects on small-scale farmers. In October 2003, Thailand and China bilaterally accelerated the "Early Harvest Agreement" of a regional FTA, and completely eliminated tariffs on fruit and vegetables. This led to a massive drop in prices for garlic and onions in Thailand, leading to severe difficulties and even bankruptcies for farmers in the north (Pye and Coghlan, 2004). The negotiations for an FTA with Australia led to protests by Thai dairy farmers in June 2004, and to accusations that Thaksin was sacrificing the livelihoods of tens of thousands of dairy farmers in exchange for the liberalisation of Australia's telecommunications industry that would directly benefit Thaksin's Shin Corp (Moxham, 2004).
As noted above, experience with the ASEAN-China FTA, and then the opening of negotiations around an FTA with the USA in 2004 led to the formation of FTA Watch. (12) Although opposition to FTAs was limited initially due to a widespread acceptance of the basic neo-liberal logic behind free trade, with the first demonstration against the US-Thai FTA attracting only 300 people, the anti-FTA coalition developed its educational and networking work in ways that bore fruit in early 2006 when the issue of FTAs became a key element of attacks on the TRT government and with anti-FTA groups taking a significant role in the anti-Thaksin movement. Much of the strength of this attack was based on FTA Watch's attention to negative impacts on farmers.
Health Politics
Another key contradiction of Thaksin's political agenda was in the area of health care. The 30 baht health scheme was tax financed and offered affordable health care for every citizen in hospitals which take part in the programme--mostly public hospitals. The health programme was one of TRT's main appealing campaign planks and remained so throughout its time in government. Indeed, huge posters proclaiming that every illness would be treated for 30 baht could be seen all over Bangkok in the run-up to the snap elections in April 2006.
Parallel to the implementation oft the 30 baht scheme, however, Thaksin launched an export promotion of health care services under the title "medical hub project" to lure rich foreign patients to Thailand for medical treatment. The initiative was so successful that the number of foreign patients increased from 500,000 in 2001 to over a million in 2005 (The Nation Online, 13 February and 4 April 2006) generating revenues of some 33 billion baht and establishing Thailand as Asia's number one destination for foreign patients even before Singapore (Cha-aim and Suwit, 2006:313).
Under Thaksin's contradictory policies, the chronic underfunding of public hospitals and the effect that the best medical staff took up better paid job offers from private hospitals led to a large-scale exodus of medical doctors from public hospitals, especially in rural areas. (13) This "internal brain drain" led to a widening cleavage within the health sector and brought about a paradoxical situation: at the same time when the universal coverage of the 30 baht scheme was implemented, patients with serious diseases who could not afford to go to hospital before, could now go, but would not find a doctor to treat them (Cha-aim and Suwit, 2006). That is why critics of the 30 baht programme re-named it as the 30 baht scheme to cure some illnesses, rather than as the government proclaimed it, the 30 baht scheme to cure all diseases. Such criticism goes beyond the early opposition to TRT's 30 baht scheme raised in 2000 and 2001, which focused on financial sustainability. These critics called the scheme "unsustainable" because it was not clear whether the government could afford the expenditure, thus implicitly accepting the IMF and World Bank ideology of a lean state. Criticising it as dysfunctional because of the internal contradictions between a redistributive state-organised health scheme and the export-orientated promotion of health services is a more fundamental critique as it also targets neoliberal dogma.
The contradictions in the health care scheme are particularly grievous for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA). Although their treatment with anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs was also covered by the state health system--an achievement of the Thaksin administration which made Thailand a shining example in the developing world as far as treatment of HIV/AIDS is concerned--the access to drugs came under attack as a side effect of the Thaksin government's trade policy.
As we have already noted, a central TRT economic project was FTAs. Especially significant was the US-Thai Free Trade Agreement negotiations, initiated at the 2003 APEC summit in Bangkok. The stringent intellectual property rights being demanded by US negotiators during the FTA talks went beyond the already restrictive Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the WTO and would have severely restricted the Thai government's pharmaceutical company in its ability to produce affordable generic drugs, including ARV drugs. If put into force, the FTA would have undermined the health care scheme and effectively cut off PLHA from access to treatment with affordable ARVs (Jiraporn, 2005).
The resistance to Thaksin's free trade policies by the PLHA has its roots in a campaign for access to ARV drugs which, during the years 1999-2002, brought together a broad coalition of NGOs, activists and concerned individuals in a legal struggle to revoke a patent on one ARV drug. (14) When, in October 2003, FTA Watch was formed, the PLHA network became an integral part of it.
The Media
Another sector where the internal contradictions of the Thaksin system emerged was the media. The most prominent example was the libel suit taken out by Thaksin against Supinya Klangnarong, Secretary-General of the Campaign for Popular Media Reform, who suggested a connection between the prime minister's policies and the huge increase in profits of Shin Corp in an article in the newspaper Thai Post, claiming that Shin Corp's profits soared by almost 40 billion baht between 2001 and 2003 (Thai Post, 16 July 2003). Thaksin sued her and three editors of Thai Post for 400 million baht compensation in an apparent attempt to silence a critical voice that had dared to challenge the prime minister's cronyism and nepotism. Supinya regularly appeared on stage at the anti-Thaksin rallies and her struggle was often portrayed as a brave and personalised stand for the liberty of expression. However, her case was the expression of a much deeper conflict with the question of how to organise democratic media control at its core. This issue had been highly contested at least since 1992, when a blackout of pro-democracy demonstrations and the violence in the streets of Bangkok in May 1992 demonstrated the extent of state control of the media and its ability to manipulate public communication to a large extent (Ubonrat, 2001: 90-1).
The establishment of iTV in 1996 as an independent TV channel was the direct outcome of this struggle. Its statutes defined it as an independent news station with no more than 30% entertainment programme at prime time, and a limitation that private shareholders would not be allowed to hold more than 10% of the company. iTV developed into a popular channel with investigative journalism, independent news coverage and set new standards for new reporting (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 149). A second outcome of the post-1992 struggle were Articles 39 to 41 in the 1997 Constitution which guaranteed freedom of expression and defined frequencies as a public property that would be allocated by an independent regulatory body.
However, the economic difficulties created by the Asian crisis permitted an alliance of state agencies and newly established private media companies to alter iTV's statutes in a way that paved the way for a take-over of iTV by Shin Corp between 2000 and 2003 (see Ubonrat, 2001: 93). Thaksin's ultimate goal was to reshape iTV as an entertainment channel and to expand his telecommunication empire into the rapidly growing entertainment business (see McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 47ff.; Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 218ff.). Reshaping iTV as a profit-making entertainment channel followed a pattern typical of Thaksin's use of his government's power to promote his family's economic interests: After Shin Corp had acquired the majority of the stake in 2001, in early 2004 the licence fees were lowered to a fraction of the existing level and the restriction on the proportion of entertainment at prime time was circumvented by simply redefining prime time (see Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 119-20). With this new favourable framework, iTV was listed on the stock exchange and generated considerable profits (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 50; Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 219-20).
Taking over iTV and reshaping it into a commercial channel served Thaksin's project in two respects: first, in a purely commercial sense, Thaksin achieved the diversification of Shin Corp and the convergence of telecommunication and media as a strategic move of his own business empire. Secondly, he knew that media control was important to gain command of public opinion and to create the political stability and government longevity needed to achieve his overall economic project (Brown and Hewison, 2005: 360). As many as 23 critical editors of iTV were fired immediately after Thaksin took over the majority of the shares in 2001, which was only one detail of a broad offensive against critical media coverage (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 149ff.).
If the incidents in May 1992 were the proof that state control prevents independent and critical journalism, then the ascent of Thaksin as a media tycoon was proof that private ownership of the media could have the very same effect. Against this background, the libel suit against Supinya can be seen as an attack on the Campaign for Popular Media Reform, an outspoken NGO, that had repeatedly criticised the stalemate in the nomination process for the proposed National Broadcasting Commission, the regulatory body for frequencies introduced by the 1997 Constitution (Bangkok Post Online, 25 December 2004). For companies like Shin Corp, which were seeking to monopolise the media, this Commission was seen as a threat (Ubonrat, 2004).
Other Issues
If the contradiction between pro-poor programmes and a neo-liberal capitalist agenda were evident in flagship areas such as agriculture, health and media, active opposition to Thaksin was more pronounced in other areas, particularly with regard to labour and to policies implemented by the government in the deep south of Thailand.
Brown and Hewison (2005) have already analysed the conflict between capital, state and labour under Thaksin. One of the key planks of economic liberalisation that Thaksin soon embraced was the privatisation of state enterprises. This policy led to a major confrontation with the state enterprise unions over the privatisation of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). In February 2004, the government announced plans to privatise EGAT by registering it as a public company on the stock exchange. EGAT workers reacted with demonstrations involving tens of thousands, road blockades, extended "absences from work" and the "patriotic leave from work," and even storming government house. (15) Their protest was one of the most forceful and militant in recent years and, as Brown and Hewison (2005: 373) pointed out, led to political opposition to the TRT at a time when most of the other social movements were still intimidated and paralysed by the violent oppression of Thaksin's "war on drugs" campaign. Pien Yongnu, Chairman of the Network of Power and Water Utilities for the Country and the Public, stated that "from now on we will be an enemy of the Thai Rak Thai Party." At issue was not only expected deterioration of pay and working conditions, but also wider questions of public control and access to water and electricity and conflicts of interest involved in the sale of the shares of privatised enterprises. Their protests attracted widespread solidarity from other state enterprise employees, who felt they might be next in line for privatisation. Finally, the government had to back down. However, in February 2005, Thaksin, getting overly confident after his landslide victory, announced that the listing of EGAT and other state enterprises on the stock exchange would be stepped up, adding that, given TRT's voter mandate "we won't tolerate pressure against the privatisation policy" (Bangkok Post, 8 February 2005). As we have seen, state enterprise workers joined the anti-Thaksin movement over this issue.
Critics who had identified a lack of democracy due to the increased corporate domination of politics and control of the media under Thaksin saw this as accompanying an increasingly authoritarian and repressive form of rule. This was particularly severe in the south, where Thaksin's "hawkish approach" (Ukrist, 2006: 73) against insurgents escalated a simmering conflict. (16) While this is not the place to go into detail regarding the southern conflict, it is worth pointing out that while the south had long been a stronghold of the opposition Democrat Party, the escalating conflict led to a widespread rejection of the TRT government in the south.
Already in 2003, Thaksin's otherwise widely popular "war on drugs" campaign was met by a demonstration in Pattani, as extra-judicial killings by the police and army, the use of blacklists and the increased powers of the police were seen as directed against the Muslim majority in that area (Croissant, 2005: 34-5). After a massacre of people identified by the military as insurgents in the Krue Se mosque in April 2004 and the death of 78 people following a demonstration at Tak Bai (Ukrist, 2006: 75), a pattern of civil disobedience emerged. For example, in September 2005, hundreds of women of Ban Tanyonglimo in Narathiwat Province blocked the military from entering their village, while two soldiers suspected of killing local villagers were held and subsequently killed. One sign read: "Evil has spread since Thaksin's party came to power. Ethnic Malay people have been cruelly killed by soldiers. They are the real terrorists" (The Nation Online, 7 September 2005). In February 2006, 300 villagers took 32 teachers hostage to force the release of a local imam, arrested on trumped-up charges (The Nation Online, 11 February 2006).
The issue of state violence in the south not only featured prominently in all PAD demonstrations, but also gave rise to anti-Thaksin demonstrations in the south, as well as participation by grassroots organisations (such as the Federation of Small-Scale Fishers of the South and the Southern Community Forestry Network) at the protests in Bangkok. The southern electoral chickens came home to roost when, in the boycotted April 2006 election, TRT failed to gain the minimum 20% of the vote required in 38 constituencies (out of a national total of 400). These southern constituencies became centrepieces in the decision to annul the election.
Royal Interventions
As we have argued above, the PAD was a broad alliance. One section of the alliance, led by Sondhi, had a limited, elite agenda to get rid of Thaksin by royal intervention. The common, unifying slogan, "Thaksin ok pai" (Thaksin Get Out!), was this group's programme, and having the king replace Thaksin with his own man as interim prime minister was their favoured means to this end. A large part of the alliance, in contrast, had very concrete agendas and demands (no patenting of medicines via FTAs, pensions, land reform, the situation in the south, democratic media, etc.) that were represented and unified by the common slogan, but which had no similar means of accomplishment.
The PAD managed to unite a wide range of different movements and groups that had not protested together before. This was the strength of the PAD. In a space of a few weeks, many of the protesting groups could achieve more than in previous months or even years of campaigning. Thaksin and TRT were weakened by the movement that provided space for the government's privatisation policy to be challenged, for Supinya's libel suit to be quashed in court on 15 March 2006 and, at the end of March 2006, for the Supreme Administrative Court to revoke two Royal Decrees that had laid the basis for EGAT's privatisation in 2005 (The Nation Online, 26 February 2006; Nantiya, 2006).
The unifying force of the PAD demand for Thaksin's resignation also had its weaknesses. One was the question of how to force Thaksin to resign. As the protests went on, it became increasingly clear that he would not just bow to the opposition; indeed, Thaksin retook the initiative by mobilising his supporters and calling new elections. The reaction of the PAD was to expand the mass campaign of civil disobedience into the electoral arena. Going beyond an endorsement of weak "opposition" parties such as the Democrats (who bowed to PAD pressure not to stand for election) or a passive boycott of the new elections, the PAD organised a hugely successful, active "No" vote, in which ten million no votes were cast against Thaksin and--in a turnabout from the initial PAD consensus not to seek royal intervention the group called for the king to intervene and to replace Thaksin with an interim prime minister.
In their 6th declaration on 23 March, the PAD called a demonstration for 25 March, with, for the first time, the demand for royal intervention based on Article 7 of the constitution as the "only way to solve the national crisis" and to initiate a "process of political reform" (PAD, 2006).
Does this call for royal intervention justify the characterisation of the PAD as an elite, royalist movement? Does the fact that the PAD as a whole accepted this demand imply that Sondhi's faction won out within the alliance? We would argue that the demand for royal intervention was a concrete tactical option to overcome the crisis. It was not a statement for a return to an undemocratic political order (i.e. a general call for prime ministers to be royally appointed or for a return to military dictatorship). This can be seen, for example, by the fact that the same 6th declaration also included demands that an interim government should stop FTA negotiations with the USA and stop privatising public utilities.
Interestingly, where Ji (2007: 36), suggested that Sondhi Limthongkul dominated the other sections of PAD and that only "middle class" or neo-liberal criticisms of Thaksin were articulated by PAD, the PAD took up critical issues that were clearly directed against neo-liberalism. Indeed, it seems to us that Sondhi's media was pushed to take up issues raised by the social movements and NGOs associated with PAD. For example, the 24 February special edition of the Manager Daily criticised Thaksin on a range of issues, including for not paying taxes on the sale of Shin Corp (considered a question of social justice), for using his political power to benefit himself and his family and friends, for his heavy-handed violence in the south, and for the "free trade madness" of his FTAs. The 30 baht programme was criticised not because it was tax-funded but because of under funding and because of the brain drain to the private hospitals in Bangkok.
As we have pointed out, FTA Watch became a prominent player in the antiThaksin protests, with a continuous presence by activists who made sure most of the demonstrators had leaflets and "Stop FTA" flags. There were systematic attempts to formulate more grassroots perspectives. In a pamphlet produced jointly by NGOCOD, FTA Watch and PAD (2006), for example, not only was Thaksin alleged to have engaged in massive tax evasion, the massacres at Krue Se and Tak Bai were linked to his policies and claimed to be threats to democracy, and the call for political reform was linked to a range of rural demands such as land reform, alternative agriculture and community-controlled natural resource management.
The call for royal intervention was, for many PAD supporters, merely invoking past experiences of the king intervening against dictatorial regimes in 1973 and 1992. At the time, many of these supporters were unable to propose any other concrete alternative to royal intervention. Key critics of the PAD argued that the alternative to demonstrating for Thaksin's resignation was to contest elections (e.g. Supalak, 2006; and, retrospectively, Somchai Preechasilpakul (17)). Given Thaksin's electoral power and control of the media at that time, however, the majority of activists involved in the PAD did not see this as being a viable option under the circumstances. Fighting Thaksin in a new round of elections would have been fighting him on his turf, one where his party machine, wealth and media influence would have ensured a defeat for the movement. In addition, the idea of fighting elections rather misses the point that part of PAD's protestation was about the corporate undermining of a formally democratic system.
While there was some discussion of the option of direct democracy and of "people's power," this remained a minority position within the movement. (18) The lack of this kind of independent strategy meant that the longer Thaksin stayed in power, the more attractive an intervention by the king seemed to members of the anti-Thaksin movement.
Demanding and then waiting for royal intervention meant that as soon as that intervention came there was an abrupt end to the PAD as an independent movement. In his speech on 25 April 2006, the king suggested that the courts annul the election of 2 April, but he also rejected the PAD's call for a royally instated prime minister, calling this demand "undemocratic" and "irrational" (The Nation Online, 27 April 2006). The double nature of the king's intervention is clear from these comments. On the one hand, he intervened against Thaksin, on the other hand, he made sure that an independent, mass campaign of political disobedience did not continue.
The coup d'etat of 19 September is indeed a repeat of this royal intervention, but this time backed by military force, after Thaksin refused to back down (reneging on his promise to step down if the king "whispered" to him). The coup fulfilled the main demand of the PAD to get rid of Thaksin and, on this basis, the coup was certainly enthusiastically supported by the elite section of the PAD around Sondhi. For many of the others associated with PAD, the coup seemed to be an unfortunate but necessary solution to an ongoing crisis. However, the deeper reasons for the emergence of the mass movement against Thaksin that were located in the internal contradictions of his "post-neoliberal" corporate project, will not be solved by the coup.
Conclusion
Any analysis of the anti-Thaksin movement needs to take account of the dynamics inherent in such a mass movement. Initially led by Sondhi Limthongkul, and exploding onto the streets after Thaksin's sale of Shin Corp, the protests quickly broadened their social base and the issues they raised. Although there is a clear demarcation in terms of elite conflict, with the "network monarchy" against Thaksin-friendly big business, the generalisations about the movement being "middle class" and opposed to the rural poor do not, as we have explained above, do justice to the complexities of the issues involved. As we have argued, the internal contradictions within Thaksin's project led to dissatisfaction and active opposition by different groups of society and at different times. This dissatisfaction was both rural and urban, and involved economic, social, political and cultural issues.
One of the greatest achievements of the anti-Thaksin movement, apart from concrete successes, such as the postponement of FTA talks or the halting of EGAT's privatisation, was to bring these social and economic issues together with a political criticism of Thaksin's regime. The misuse of political power for private economic gain was the predominant theme, of course, but the corporate undermining of free and democratic media, symbolised by Supinya's successful fight against the libel charge, was also highly significant. And the fact that Angkhana Neelapaichit could speak to tens of thousands of people in Bangkok was immensely important in connecting the criticism of Thaksin's repression in the south with the situation of the people in the rest of Thailand.
The involvement of grassroots networks and social movements in the PAD was crucial to expand the criticism of Thaksin to include deeper political and social issues such as repression in the south and FTAs. However, this independent role within the alliance was not coupled with an independent strategy of how to push for those demands. No clear strategy of "people's power" was developed and no plan for generalising political civil disobedience in the form of strike action, occupations, or of re-appropriating public resources and space emerged. Accepting Sondhi's call for royal intervention, then, gave the initiative back to conflicting elite factions. The "people" were put back into a spectator's seat.
The coup d'etat in September was the fulfilment of the elite opposition to Thaksin--but it was also directed against independent grassroots mobilisation. For the "network monarchy," the political crisis had to be resolved in the interest of political stability, and it was therefore no coincidence that the coup took place the evening before the PAD was planning to resume its protests. Although they have been keen to portray themselves as merely executing the people's will, in the first few months of military dictatorship, the generals showed themselves to be in contradiction to social and political aspirations of many in the anti-Thaksin movement. Their agenda is not more popular democracy, but rather, less democracy. On a policy level, they have made concessions to demands of the mass movement (for example by issuing compulsory licensing for anti-retroviral drugs or their plans to re-nationalise iTV as a public broadcasting company) but in general they have been following Thaksin's basic "extended neo-liberal agenda", for example by signing the FTA with Japan.
If an independent but unified formation of the grassroots movements was lacking during the PAD protests, an important step in this direction took place shortly after the coup. During 21-3 October, the Thai Social Forum (TSF) was held despite the military ban on political gatherings. It brought together 70 organisations and thousands of participants. Apart from the usual diversity of workshops and meetings, the gathering was significant for the consensus declaration it issued and the fact that this was read out by former Senator Jon Ungpakorn at the Democracy Monument on Ratchadamnoen Avenue before the commencement of a short illegal demonstration against the coup.
The TSF (2006) declaration A New Just Worm can be Built by the People is a kind of "transitionary programme" that draws together key demands of the anti-Thaksin movement, including those working for peace in the south, media reform and public referenda on FTAs. It goes beyond PAD's agenda by combining well-known rural alternatives (such as community control over natural resources and land reform) with the demand that the next constitution specifies that Thailand is a welfare state. Pensions, health care and unemployment benefit are demanded as social rights to be paid for by taxing the rich (i.e. through capital, property and inheritance tax). Without mentioning Thaksin or the coup directly, the declaration also stresses democratic participation that goes beyond parliamentary elections and the self-activity of the people themselves and that "social, economic and political reform is something that the people must and can do themselves" (Thai Social Forum, 2006). This could be an important starting point for a new mass movement for democracy and social justice in Thailand.
Acknowledgement
The authors would particularly like to thank Ae and Somkit from the Thai Volunteer Service, Luen from the Assembly of the Poor, Suraporn from Fa Dieo Kan [Same Sky] magazine and Wipaphan Korkeatkachorn for their time and help. They would also like to thank Michael Connors and Kevin Hewison for their editing.
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Notes
(1) Ji Ungpakorn (2006: 1) implied this by characterising the protests as a "conservative royalist movement."
(2) The authors spent several weeks in Thailand during the mass movement against Thaksin in February and March 2006, and again during the coup d'etat and the Thai Social Forum in September and October. Unless otherwise stated, this analysis draws on workshops, discussions, interviews and participatory observation during this time.
(3) For both, the central criticism was that using taxes for health care was not sustainable. Before the introduction of the universal coverage of the 30-Baht scheme, one third of the population was without any health insurance at all, so this criticism can be countered easily with the argument of Venezuela's Minister of Health and Social Development: "You can't fail to deal with a disaster because you haven't worked out the specifics of sustainability" (cited in Gibbs, 2006: 272). On the Thaksin programme, see Hewison (2003a: 13).
(4) The term "post-Washington Consensus" is often used to describe a shift in the economic and development guidelines of the World Bank at beginning of the new millennium away from the narrow agenda-setting fundamentals of the Washington Consensus such as zero inflation, broadening market access and promotion of privatisation, towards the recognition of the role of the state especially for social programmes (Drache, 2002; Williamson, 2000). Whereas some authors interpret this shift as a correction of a failed neo-liberal policy (Kohlmorgen, 2004), others have criticised it as mere windowdressing, where the core of neo-liberal dogma remains unchallenged (Gibbs, 2006). In our analysis of Thaksin's economic policy we follow Gibbs' view.
(5) The weekly television show "Alo Presidente" in Venezuela and Thaksin's weekly radio talk-show being just one striking parallel. For a different approach, see Pasuk and Baker (2008).
(6) For example, the anti-Khor Jor Kor movement in 1992 or the Assembly of the Poor in 1997. Khor Jor Kor is the abbreviation for a military-led plan for the restructuring of Thailand's forest reserves. If implemented as scheduled, it would have deprived thousands of families of their livelihood. On the anti-Khor Jor Kor movement, see Pye (2005).
(7) The Octobrists are activists from the 1973-76 democratic uprising, and the "Senior Citizens" are respected senior or retired officials. Kasian (2002: 333) listed the National Salvation Community, the Bangchak-lovers Club, the United Thai for National Liberation Club, the Free Thai Movement, the Withithas Project, the Thai Graduates' Group, the Patriotic People Club, and the Democracy for the People Group.
(8) For a more detailed analysis of different capitalist groups and the connection between domestic capital and Thaksin's ascent see Brown and Hewison (2005: 358ff) and Pasuk and Baker (2004).
(9) At the same time, the Democrats continuous embrace of notions like "good governance" and "fair competition" as a means to solve problems of poverty and underdevelopment explains why their recent turn to a social agenda was not convincing enough to challenge TRT's electoral basis. For a critical discussion of the ideological use of "good governance" with references to Thai political discourse, see Jayasuriya and Hewison (2004).
(10) However, the term "post neo-liberal" itself overstates the extent of the paradigm shift. While we agree with Gibbs' analysis, we reject the term "post neo-liberal," as well as the term "post-Washington Consensus" used by other authors for the same phenomenon (cf. Fine, 2001; Kohlmorgen, 2004). The prefix "post-" suggests a paradigm shift away from the doctrines of the Washington Consensus or the neo-liberal principles.
(11) This critical line was followed by Sondhi Limthongkul's Phujatkan raiwan [Manager Daily] see, for example, "Kongthun muban fanrai prachaniyom" [The village fund. A populist nightmare], 24 February 2006.
(12) FTA Watch's website is at: http://www.ftawatch.org.
(13) In rural areas the proportion of medical doctors per head of population fell to one per 10,000 compared to Thailand's average proportion of one per 2800 (The Nation Online, 4 April 2006).
(14) The network consisted of Thai Network of People Living With HIV/AIDS (TNP+), Foundation for Consumers, Doctors without Borders (MSF), and many others. For a detailed description of the campaign see Weeraboon (2004) and Ford et al. (2004).
(15) The Thai Labour Campaign gives a good chronology of the EGAT protests at http://www.thailabour. org/campaigns/privatiz/chronology.html
(16) A detailed analysis of this conflict has been offered by Duncan McCargo and his collaborators in a special edition of Critical Asian Studies (McCargo (ed.), 2006).
(17) In his presentation at the workshop "Botrian thangkanmueang jak rathaprahan 19 kanya" [Political lessons of the 19 September coup d'etat], Thai Social Forum, Thammasat University Rangsit Campus, 22 October 2006.
(18) In an interesting exchange with Supalak in the Fa Dieo Kan magazine, Piyamiton (2006) recommended democratising the PAD and the anti-Thaksin movement itself as a first step towards a democratic revolution along the lines of people's councils.
OLIVER PYE and WOLFRAM SCHAFFAR
Department of Southeast Asian Studies. Bonn University, Bonn, Germany
Correspondence Address: Oliver Pye, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Bonn University, Nassestr. 2, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Email: oliver.pye@uni-bonn.de
COPYRIGHT 2008 Journal of Contemporary Asia PublishersNo portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
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The 2006 anti-Thaksin movement in Thailand: an analysis.
In March 2005, after a landslide election victory, Thailand's billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra seemed invincible. His Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) gained 19 million votes (more than 60% of the votes cast), substantially improving on the result achieved in 2001. Social and political activists were dejected, even intimidated, by this result. By March 2006, the situation had changed completely. A massive and sustained protest movement occurred, with rallies of 50,000-100,000 people on a weekly and sometimes daily basis over a period of three months. The movement on the streets opened up political space for debate and criticism that would have been unthinkable only a few months previously and forced Thaksin to dissolve parliament and call snap elections on 2 April 2006. Six months later, a military coup d'etat ended the career of one of Thailand's most successful premiers. How can we explain this rather sudden and deep crisis of the Thaksin regime?
At first glance, the crisis appears to have developed as a struggle between different sections of Thailand's elite. Intra-elite conflict was obviously one key element in Thaksin's downfall. This is epitomised, first, by media mogul and former Thaksin supporter, Sondhi Limthongkul, whose open-air talk shows at Lumpini Park at the end of 2005 sparked the initial movement. More importantly, the crisis represented a conflict between Thaksin and what McCargo (2005) has coined the "network monarchy." The coup itself was orchestrated by members of this network and the ground for it was prepared for by direct interventions by the king and Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda (see Hewison, 2008). However, we argue that intra-elite conflict is an insufficient explanation for the dynamics or the social base of the protest movement, unless the hundreds of thousands of demonstrators are simply seen as royalist followers of protest leaders Sondhi Limthongkul and Chamlong Srimuang. (1)
It has become common to define the anti-Thaksin protests as a middle-class movement. This term is used loosely and lumped together with "the urban elite," implying that Thaksin was supported by the poor in the countryside and opposed by the relatively rich in the city. This is the basic line followed by newspapers such as The Nation and the Bangkok Post and is also argued by Kasian (2006: 32) and Pasuk and Baker (2008). Songpol Kaopatumtip (2006: 1), an editor of the Bangkok Post wrote of "the urban elite and like-minded activists those who were on the streets demanding Mr Thaksin's resignation"; while The Economist (8-14 April 2006: 14) projected a "spectacle of an urban elite overthrowing an elected leader."
Reflecting these popular views, Kasian (2005: 132) drew on Anek Laothamatas' (1996) "Tale of Two Democracies", to argue that there is a deep conflict between the rural "electocracy" (who buy votes along patronage lines) and the urban, freemarket, liberal democracy. He characterised "the city" in terms of a capitalist agenda: "the city's greater purchasing power plus undemocratic economic freedom to trade, invest, consume, overspend, exploit, and pollute," calling this the "urban uncivil society" that exploits the countryside. Thus, he sees the anti-Thaksin movement as a conflict, as another turn in the never-ending "vicious circle" of Thai politics, where the rural population elects an inept and corrupt premier and it is the task of the urban population to drive him out of office.
In contrast with these perspectives, in this article we argue that the Thaksin conflict was not simply one between a pro-poor, populist premier supported by the mass of the rural poor (a kind of Asian Hugo Chavez) against an urban, royalist elite. Instead, we will try and show that the anti-Thaksin movement was rooted in the contradictory nature of Thaksin's project itself, which combined populist programmes with a deeper restructuring of Thai capitalism. Inherent contradictions explain the dynamics involved in the emergence of opposition and in the transformation of former supporters into enemies.
The characterisation of the anti-Thaksin movement as "middle class" does not do justice to the complex make-up of the protest movement. It will be shown that the dynamics of the protests led to a broadening of its social base, and opened the space for discontent towards Thaksin, which had grown over the preceding several years, to emerge in activist form. The People's Alliance for Democracy represented a coalition between heterogeneous groups (including elite factions, grassroots organisations, social movements and NGOs) against Thaksin. Elite opposition combined dissatisfied business groups that had lost the political patronage necessary for economic success (see Ukrist, 2008) and the old network of civil servants around the king, who were losing out to the Thai Rak Thai's takeover of the state apparatus (see Hewison, 2008).
As we will show, the opposition from below, on the other hand, arose from conflicts around different economic, social and political questions and issues. Rather than a coincidental collection of single issues, we argue that these questions and issues were connected and interrelated, because they all arose out of the inherent contradictions of the Thaksin project. We introduce the term "post-neoliberal restructuring" to analyse the Thaksin project, rather than populism. We then try and show that this contradictory restructuring project gave rise to different oppositions at different times during the TRT government. These were to re-emerge as part of the PAD-led mass movement in 2006. (2)
The Mass Movement against Thaksin
The anti-Thaksin movement was huge. Over a period of two months, from the beginning of February until the end of March 2006, hundreds of thousands of people took part in a series of demonstrations that were led by a coalition called the "People's Alliance for Democracy" (PAD, Phantharnit Prachachon Phuea Prachathippatai). The PAD was able to organise a series of rallies and demonstrations with between 50,000 and 300,000 participants in Bangkok (11, 26 February; 5, 17, 25, 29 March), some of which lasted overnight or for several days, as well as protests in many other parts of Thailand (including Chumphon, Surat Thani, Hat Yai, Songkhla, Patthalung, Pattani, Trang, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Ratchasima, Surin and Ubon Ratchathani (The Nation Online, 11 and 27 February, 2006).
The PAD was an alliance between a wide range of sections of Thai society and between diverse political organisations. One wing was made up groups who could be described as an urban elite or as conservatives, such as disgruntled royalist civil servants who were being marginalised by the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party, or sections of business who were not part of Thaksin's patronage system (see Ukrist, 2008). Another wing (and this is what we will focus on in our argument) was made up of social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with a grassroots base, such as workers, farmers, teachers and students. The PAD thus brought together elite and grassroots opposition to Thaksin.
Urban elite and royalist opposition to Thaksin was epitomised by media mogul and former backer of Thaksin, Sondhi Limthongkul, whose Lumpini Park talk shows from September 2005 were one source of the anti-Thaksin movement. Sondhi's Manager Business Group had been resuscitated under Thaksin, but Sondhi fell out with Thaksin after he was not given privileged business opportunities (see Kasian, 2006: 33) and when his increasingly critical talk show "Thailand Weekly" was cut off after intervention by Thaksin, he began to hold his shows at Lumpini Park, attracting up to 30,000 people. In January 2006, Sondhi led around 2000 people in a march on Government House and several hundred demonstrators pushed into the compound after midnight (The Nation Online, 14 January 2006).
Parallel to Sondhi's open-air protest talk show, another protest movement against Thaksin's free trade policies was gathering steam. In December 2005, massive protests against the 6th WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong brought together protesters from across South-east Asia. Based on interviews by the authors, the hundred-odd strong delegation of Thai activists was made up of representatives of farmer networks such as the Alternative Agriculture Network and the Northern Farmers Alliance, the Southern Federation of Small Scale Fishers; HIV-activist groups; and various NGOs. Apart from making headlines in Thailand by getting arrested in Hong Kong, they returned with new inspiration to take on the free trade agreement (FTA) talks between the Thai government and the USA.
A coalition of NGOs called FTA Watch had been organising against FTAs for several years. In January 2006, they mobilised 10,000 demonstrators against the US-Thailand FTA 6th round of talks in Chiangmai. The size of the demonstration, for the most part small-scale farmers and HIV activists, was remarkable given the much smaller turnout at previous FTA talks. A new militancy was also evident. Protesters adapted the militant tactics of Korean farmers in Hong Kong, first by swimming across a river to reach the hotel in which the negotiations were taking place (the Koreans had jumped into Hong Kong harbour), and then by breaking through police lines, nearly storming the meeting (Bangkok Post, 11 January 2006). This led to the premature closing of the talks (which then shifted to a nearby golf course) and, as Thanong (2006) argued, probably to a more general de-legitimisation of the Thaksin government.
The spark for a more generalised movement against Thaksin, and an alliance between these two independent strands, was the Shin Corp sale. At the end of January 2006, it was announced that Thaksin's family had sold their Shin Corp business to a Singaporean government investment company in a tax-free sale. The deal involved a shadowy investment firm called Ample Rich that had been set up in the British Virgin Islands tax-haven. Sondhi immediately took up the issue. Because he had been the most outspoken critic of Thaksin, he was now in a position to lead the massive public outrage over the Shin Corp deal, and his demonstration on 4 February attracted 50,000 participants.
Sondhi's agenda was to criticise Thaksin for corruption and for not respecting the king (on the latter, see Hewison, 2008). The royalist colouring of his movement was symbolised by the wearing of yellow shirts, associated with the king's birthday. However, Sondhi had also taken up issues around the FTAs with China and Australia (particularly after the Chiangmai protest), alleging that Thaksin had negotiated the deals for his own private interests and to the detriment of Thai farmers (The Nation Online, 13 January 2006). He now actively wooed FTA Watch and other NGOs to join him.
Immediately after Sondhi's first big demonstration on 4 February, Suriyasai Katasila, the secretary-general of the Campaign for Popular Democracy, announced the formation of the PAD with an aim to oust Thaksin. According to Suriyasai, the PAD was formed by 40 organisations representing "academics, businessmen, farmers, urban poor, non-government organisations, labour and students" (Supalak and Subhatra, 2006). The PAD's leadership consisted of five men: Sondhi Limthongkul; so-called Dharma Army leader and former Bangkok governor and one of the 1992 democracy movement's leaders Chamlong Srimuang; President of Campaign for Popular Democracy Phipop Thongchai; the veteran trade unionist Somsak Kosaisuk; and university lecturer Somkiat Phongpaiboon; with Suriyasai as co-ordinator.
The contradictory nature of the PAD coalition was epitomised by the debate around the demand for royal intervention and the reference to Clause 7 of the 1997 Constitution (see Connors, 2008). This was highly contested from the onset, and was one of the reasons for the hesitation of many grassroots organisations to join the PAD. Because of general scepticism about Sondhi Limthongkul who was seen as a royalist conservative, some groups decided not to join the PAD at all (e.g. some smaller student groups and the Thai Labour Campaign). The important activist network known as the Assembly of the Poor also did not join. Its position was that the organisation was created around concrete problems such as large development projects and so was not directly involved in "politics." After long discussion, it was decided that the Assembly as a whole would not actively support the PAD, but that individual groups of the network could, which they did.
Even so, many organised activist groups and social movements did join with Sondhi to create the PAD. This was based on the consensus that the demand for Thaksin's resignation, and not the demand for royal intervention, was the unifying element. The Midnight University, Phipob Thongchai and the Student Federation of Thailand were among those within the PAD who publicly rejected the demand for royal intervention, and initially at least, calls for royal intervention to oust Thaksin did not form an official consensus position of the PAD (see Piyamiton, 2006).
The first big rally of the new alliance on 11 February 2006 reflected the broad spectrum of the movement. Apart from senators, such as Kraisak Choonhavan and Chirmsak Pinthong, and politicians, such as the former Palang Dharma Party leader Chaiwat Sinsuwong, speakers included state enterprise trade union leaders Phien Yong-nu and Somsak Kosaisuk, Angkhana Neelapaichit (the wife of abducted, presumed murdered, lawyer Somchai Neelapaichit), Supinya Klangnarong, Secretary-General for the Campaign for Media Reform and Kochawan Chaibutr, the Secretary-General of the Students Federation of Thailand. Notably, Sondhi Limthongkul was restrained in his calls for royal intervention, focusing instead on Thaksin's use of power for personal profit, his alleged tax evasion, and the sell-off of "national assets"--Shin Corp operated most of Thailand's satellite communications to a foreign country (see the account in The Nation Online, 11 February, 2006). Other issues addressed at the rallies were the negative social effects of the FTA with Australia, media censorship and violence in southern Thailand (The Nation Online, 11 February 2006).
For the first time during Thaksin's period in government, a mass movement was articulating different criticisms against him at the same place and time. Previously, he had tended to face criticism on single issues. Moreover, the public and mass nature of the criticism, broke through the previous apathy and fear that Thaksin's powerful hold on the media and government had generated, and opened up space for politicisation and self-organisation. The single issues became connected to each other through the common demand for Thaksin's resignation. Students were now protesting side by side with state enterprise unionists, and listening to speeches about the violence in the south. A new self-confidence was born out of a mass movement, where previously, solutions to particular problems had seemed unattainable because of Thaksin's dominating position.
A range of protests ensued. School students developed initiatives, university campus demonstrations were held, women's marches were organised, and rallies, marches and protests in towns and cities up and down the country were held. There was talk of strike action, and the countless and ongoing discussions and organising meetings meant that politics became everyday fare for hundreds of thousands of people over a period of several weeks. In the south of the country, local PAD branches could fill sport stadiums with political meetings (Nok Parkpoom, pers. comm., Trang, 18 October 2006) and, despite martial law, students in the Muslim-dominated Pattani province could even organise a small, technically illegal, demonstration on their campus (interview, Student Federation of Thailand, Pattani, 16 October 2006).
The large demonstrations gave a focus for different groups to develop their own initiatives and self-organisation. On the eve of the 4 February demonstration, lecturers from Chulalongkorn University's Faculty of Political Science signed a public declaration calling for Thaksin's resignation. After Professor Amara Pongsapich, Dean of the Faculty, supported the declaration, she was leaned on to resign by pro-Thaksin government officials in the Political Science Alumni Association. In support, faculty members threatened to resign in protest if Amara was punished (Wattana, 2006; The Nation Online, 7 February 2006). Meanwhile, students at Thammasat University launched a campaign to collect 50,000 signatures calling for Thaksin's resignation and Thammasat professors organised a controversial mock trial of Thaksin on his conflict of interest as prime minister and businessman. The Student Federation of Thailand kicked off the first PAD demonstration on 11 February 2006 by marching from Thammasat University to the Royal Plaza, in defiance of the government ban of the rally.
The teachers groups who had been organising mass protests against the "decentralisation of education" (Funston, 2006) also joined the movement against Thaksin. On 26 February, Uaychai Watha, a leader of the teachers' campaign against the transfer of schools to local authorities, threatened strike action if Thaksin refused to resign (The Nation Online, 26 February 2006). School students also became increasingly politicised, launching a new organisation called "Students for Democracy."
EGAT workers and workers from other state enterprises soon joined the anti-Thaksin protests in an organised fashion. During the second PAD demonstration on 26 February, 5000 state enterprise workers gathered in front of the Democracy Monument and threatened strike action to force Thaksin to resign (The Nation Online, 27 February, 2006). During the 14 March demonstration, thousands of state enterprise workers, including a large delegation of EGAT workers, marched en masse from Sanam Luang to Government House (as witnessed by the authors, see also Bangkok Post Online 17 March 2006).
Some rural networks also joined the protests. By the 4th PAD demonstration on 14 March, activists from the Southern Community Forestry Network, the Federation of Small Scale Fishers from the south, the Isan Network of Small-Scale Farmers and the Northern Peasants Federation had joined the movement (interviews, 14 March 2006).
As the movement progressed, the royalist yellow T-shirts became less evident and the protests became more active in their character, while elements of civil disobedience, such as road blocks, became more pronounced. The 14 March demonstration was no longer an extended Sondhi talk show but resulted in the blockade of Government House for many hours. The participation of organised groups became more apparent and, while some authors have argued that participation by organised labour was limited (Ji, 2007: 36), our observations on 14 March 2006 were that trade unionists from EGAT, the railways and the post offices, and teacher activists in their hundreds and thousands participated (see also Bangkok Post Online 17 March 2006). This demonstration brought together many groups, was not dominated by royalists and boasted a large number of self-made banners, placards and demands. The protests on 29 March blocked the Rama I road for several hours (The Nation Online, 29 March 2006).
The mass movement against Thaksin was not simply made up of royalist followers of Sondhi and nor was it comprised of an urban, free-market elite as suggested by Kasian (2005: 132). At least part of the movement was made up of self-organised groups of workers, students, farmers and teachers, and of political activists from social movements and NGOs. The issues that were articulated under the common demand for Thaksin to resign, from media reform to FTAs, from teachers pensions to peace in the south, were, as we will proceed to argue, interconnected and sustained through contradictions within Thaksin's project itself.
Is Thaksin an Asian Hugo Chavez?
In March 2006, the web journal "Axis of Logic" took a New York Times article on Thaksin, exchanged the Thai personal and place names with Venezuelan names and showed that the article on Thaksin could have been written about Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez (Axis of Logic, 2006). The reason this was possible is that both Chavez and Thaksin had adopted social programmes and nationalist economic policies that have been criticised by neo-liberal purists as economically unsound, backward and "populist." As with Chavez's "Mission Barrio Adentro" health care programme, Thaksin's tax-financed universal health coverage clashed with the World Bank models of privatised health care. (3) Also, like Chavez, when Thaksin was facing recurrent mass demonstrations, his response was to mobilise his own supporters. And the masses he mobilised resembled the huge numbers of supporters who brought Chavez back into office after a short-lived coup d'etat in 2001 in Caracas.
Faced with the evidently massive support for Thaksin, two interpretations have been made that we will discuss here. The first is that Thaksin was a kind of Asian Chavez, that because of his populist policies, he commanded the support of the poor, and that the opposition against him was middle class and elitist (on Thaksin as a populist, see Pasuk and Baker, 2008). The second view, dominant within the PAD itself, was that Thaksin's supporters were either duped by his media propaganda or paid to join his demonstrations; that is, Thaksin was not an Asian Chavez because he was not really pro-poor.
As we will now argue, both these perspectives are simplistic in that they look at certain government programmes in isolation from Thaksin's overall project. Thaksin generated real popular support with social programmes for the poor and a nationalist response to the Asian economic crisis. This break with the perceived wisdom of the World Bank and the IMF makes Thaksin similar to Chavez. The key difference is that Thaksin's policies were embedded within a bigger project of rapid capitalist restructuring in the interests of large Thai corporations looking for competitiveness on the global market. As we will explain in this chapter, whereas Chavez's economic policy can be described as being opposed to neo-liberal prescriptions (Gibbs, 2006), Thaksin pursued an economic policy that might be called the post-Washington Consensus. (4) Because of this fundamental difference in the political orientation of these two leaders, we prefer to use "post neo-liberalism" rather than "populism" as a category of analysis, despite the fact that Thaksin and Chavez show similarities in their highly personalised political style. (5)
One of the Chavez-Thaksin similarities is seen in a capacity for mobilising mass support. In early March 2006, TRT mobilised its supporters to assemble at Bangkok's Sanam Luang to show their support for the TRT government. Rumours circulated that the people who joined the demonstration were paid 300 or 500 baht (as an example, see The Nation, 4 March 2006). Such rumours were never substantiated, and the 200,000 turnout and the enthusiasm for the prime minister demonstrated genuine mass support. People came from all over Thailand and from all walks of life, but the vast majority were farmers, small business people and workers, including a significant group of motorcycle taxi drivers. Despite self-comforting arguments by leaders of the anti-Thaksin protests and their sympathetic press that the Thaksin supporters were ignorant, gullible or bought, the Thaksin supporters had good arguments for their position.
During the demonstration, we talked to participants who had come to Bangkok on their own accord and usually in an organised fashion. Some were rural folk, farmers or small traders, others were workers and management from the Rangsit industrial area or from small rural-based factories, but they were all able to give coherent answers as to why they were there (interviews, Sanam Luang, 3 March 2006). The key arguments, again and again, were that Thaksin was a prime minister who actually helped the poor, with the 30 baht health programme, the one million baht community fund, and other development projects. Argument that Thaksin and his government were corrupt typically elicited the response that many former prime ministers were also corrupt.
Thaksin's rural support, apart from the impressive turnout to his election campaigns in scores of provincial towns, was symbolised by the "Caravan of the Poor," a trek of several thousand farmers from the north-east who travelled to Bangkok on foot or on self-constructed tractors. The picture of poor farmers marching to Bangkok used to be the monopoly of anti-government, grassroots movements. (6) The fact that the same symbolism was used successfully by pro-Thaksin forces is significant. Even more so the fact that the Caravan was led by ex-leaders of the Assembly of the Poor (Luen Sichampho, pers. comm., 16 March 2006).
The point is that Thaksin's support was real because his rural and pro-poor policies were real too. The debt-restructuring scheme, the one million baht community fund, the 30 baht health programme, and government-funded infrastructure projects had a noticeable effect on people's lives. The key ideas for these projects came from farmer leaders and aligned progressive academics, some of whom were also incorporated into the TRT government. Former student and NGO activists in Thaksin's cabinet included Adisorn Piengkes (Deputy Minister for Agriculture); Chaturon Chaisaeng (Minister for Education); Sora-at Klinpratoom (Minister for Information and Communication Technology); and Phumtham Vejjayachai (Deputy Minister for Transport and Deputy Secretary-General of TRT). Pasuk and Baker (2004: 81) told the tale of how much of Thaksin's rural programme was adapted from a three-page fax sent to him by a former student activist from the 1970s. Kasian (2002: 339) put it succinctly: "... Thaksin's 'populism' was actually begotten by a bunch of ex-communist guerrillas and former student activists among his close aides ...". Thaksin's reforms, therefore, represented a serious attempt to incorporate part of the NGOs and social movements into his hegemonic project by taking up some of their demands and offering a consensus based around a new social contract (Hewison, 2003a: 13).
A second similarity apparent in Chavez and Thaksin is their orientation to economic nationalism. Chavez invoked the wrath of the USA by re-nationalising the oil industry and other key sectors of economy. Early in his government's term, Thaksin was criticised by mainstream neo-liberal economists and journalists as representing a revival of protectionist nationalism (cf. Glassman, 2004:37-8 for a summary of this criticism). It is clear that TRT's election in 2001 was won on a groundswell of popular nationalist reaction to the IMF policies implemented by the Chuan Leekpai government in response to the economic crisis (see Hewison, 2003a). Kasian (2002: 331-5) argued that the 1997 crisis led the middle classes to turn towards nationalism, and that they, together with the "Octobrists," the "Senior Citizens" and "entrepreneurs" formed various "ad hoc loose nationalist groupings" that campaigned against the IMF loan conditionalities and the takeover of formerly Thai-owned businesses by foreign corporations. (7)
As Hewison (2003a: 5) noted, the Democrats, who implemented the standard IMF prescriptions of "privatisation, regulatory reform, liberalisation, improved corporate governance, and further foreign investment" (including, for example, the Foreign Business Act of March 2000, which opened up key sectors to majority foreign ownership) were seen by the politicised populace as IMF stooges. Thaksin, and his aptly named party, was able to exploit this by promising to free Thailand from foreign IMF dominance and by promising that privatised state enterprises would be offered only to Thais (Dixon, 2004: 47, 62).
Thaksin's anti-IMF stance, apart from being a key marketing plank of his election campaign, was based on the support of Thai big business groups, including some of the country's biggest conglomerates, such as the Charoen Phokphand (CP) group and the Bangkok Bank, as well as smaller, export-orientated companies. (8) Once in power, he broke with the IMF-line followed by the Chuan government. These policies used the crisis as an opportunity to allow foreign multinationals to buy up domestic companies and to let "uncompetitive" businesses go to the wall. Key state interventions in debt restructuring and support programmes for small and medium enterprises helped key sections of Thai capital to recoup and to again engage in the global market (Glassman, 2004: 46-9).
These interventions were quite successful, both in terms of economic recovery and also in preventing a general take-over of Thai businesses by transnational corporations (TNCs) (Dixon, 2004). In July 2003, Thaksin triumphantly declared the repayment of the IMF loan, two years ahead of schedule, and, standing against the background of a huge Thai flag, proclaimed Thailand's "independence from the IMF." Many of the pro-Thaksin demonstrators specified his stand against the IMF as one of their key reasons for supporting him (interviews, Sanam Luang, 3 March 2006). (9)
Although Thaksin was criticised by mainstream neo-liberal economists and journalists as representing a revival of protectionist nationalism (Glassman, 2004: 37-8), Thaksin's project was radically different from Chavez's. While the latter addresses the problem of social inequality by means of a policy of redistribution that confronts elite interests, Thaksin represents big business, with "a government by and for the rich" (Hewison, 2003a: 9). As Kasian (2002: 339) put it: "Through him, the crony capitalists, especially the telecommunications, media, auto manufacturing and agribusiness oligarchic interests, who are strongly represented in his cabinet and party, have won back their state." In addition, Thaksin's form of economic nationalism is different from that pursued by Chavez. Rather than challenging the Washington Consensus by increasing the economic role of the state and integrating an "anti-imperialist" nationalism within a broader internationalist strategy as Chavez has done (Gibbs, 2006), Thaksin was not motivated by a principled rejection of the key components of neo-liberalism, but by an opportunistic reaction of key sections of Thai business to compete successfully within a broad neo-liberal paradigm.
As Glassman (2004: 59) argued, "TRT's economic nationalism is not only not an effort to construct a highly auto-centred or closed-door (and especially not state-owned) economy. It is not even an attempt to resurrect anything like import-substitution industrialization." Instead, he characterised Thaksin's economic policy as mildly Keynsian, emphasising state social and economic support programmes rather than neo-liberal austerity and as a "geographically expansionist neo-mercantilist project," involving export-orientated industrialisation supported by state intervention (Glassman, 2004: 60). A similar point was made by Brown and Hewison (2005), who analysed TRT "dual track development strategy" as a strategy to protect domestic capital after the shock of the Asian crisis in order to allow its restructuring with the ultimate aim to develop a more competitive economy. The crafting of a "new social contract," as Hewison (2003b) analysed Thaksin's social programmes, served as a tool to guarantee social stability which was needed for the process of restructuring a policy subordinate to the ultimate aim of developing better competitiveness for the global market (Brown and Hewison, 2005: 361).
The big business agenda of Thaksin's regime was reflected by the endorsement of his election victory in 2005 by key business spokesmen (Bangkok Post Online, 7 and 8 February 2005). Corporate representatives also held back throughout the protests, only offering their concern that political stability might be compromised if they continued.
Thaksin's policy fits into the paradigm of what has been called "post neo-liberal," which is also reflected in the World Bank's recent attention to better "balance elite-driven reforms and popular pressure" but which does not go beyond "poverty management within the [neo-liberal] paradigm" (Gibbs, 2006: 266). Gibbs cast doubt on this new political orientation, noting that "it is not clear how they intend to marry their dual goals of promoting market-oriented reform, including ongoing privatisation, with increasing participation by the poor and 'subordinate' groups." It is this difficult marriage that is one of the key contradictions inherent in Thaksin's project. (10)
Internal Contradictions of Thaksin's Project
The crucial point about Thaksin's "post neo-liberal" paradigm is that neo-liberal principles actually remained unchallenged and were pursued with force. In fact, as we will discuss in detail in this section, Thaksin pursued a lot of policies that were basic tenets of neo-liberalism with considerable vigour, and contradicted the "social contract" he offered to the poor. These contradictions gradually unfolded in the course of his premiership. Not, as often criticised by neo-liberal ideologues, between "unsustainable" state-funded projects and fiscal prudence, but between Thaksin's ambitious capitalist restructuring of economic and social relations in the interest of big business, and the interests of his popular base. We argue that it was precisely these internal contradictions that laid the foundation for the mass movement against Thaksin and his TRT government.
Agriculture
The internal contradictions within Thaksin's overall project can be illustrated in one of his flagship policies. The rural development programmes, particularly the one million baht per community programme and debt restructuring schemes were not part of a redistribution policy for the poor against the rich, but aimed to accelerate a major capitalist restructuring of agriculture and to lessen the hardships this caused (i.e. "post neo-liberal"). Parallel to debt restructuring, credit programmes, the promotion of local products and help to local infrastructure, Thaksin was basically committed to the capital-intensive, export-orientated "success" story of Thai agriculture and sought to promote this model.
An important symbol of Thaksin's agricultural policies was his close collaboration with the agribusiness giant CP, and the appointment of Wattana Muengsuk, the son-in-law of CP's chairman Dhanin Chearavanont, as minister of Commerce (and later Social Development). Under the TRT government, CP Foods, the keystone agribusiness company of the group, received five- or ten-year exemptions on income tax on 29 major projects including feedmills, broiler and chicken farms, shrimp hatcheries and processing plants (CP Foods n.d.: 20-1). Despite the bird flu scare, exports of processed chicken and duck--key CP businesses doubled under Thaksin, as did pork and shrimp exports (CP Foods, n.d.: 25-31). CP Foods also expanded its global reach during this period, with new subsidiaries in Britain, China, Europe and the USA (CP Foods, n.d.: 94-6).
In addition to TRT promotion of agribusiness itself, the flow of easy credit accelerated the long-term structural transformation of agriculture away from independent smallholders to capital intensive production, aimed, as Thaksin was keen to reiterate, to change farmers into "entrepreneurs." With the possibilities of higher returns promising an escape from poverty, the trend towards monoculture crops and high-cost inputs such as herbicides, fertilizers and hybrid seed increased. The capital-intensive transformation was epitomised by the expansion of contract-farming, which was pioneered by CP, the latter now having tens of thousands of corn, maize, rice, chicken, broiler, duck, and swine farmers under contract to buy CP inputs and to sell cash crops to CP specifications (see Delforge, 2007).
TRT's community fund and debt-restructuring schemes were important capital sources for farmers and not only agribusiness profited. However, not everybody had an equal share in the benefits. According to research by Delforge (2007), contract broiler farmers earned an average of only 3500 baht per month (for two workers) in 2004 and, in general, rice farmers did not benefit from higher volumes of rice exports (which increased to over seven million tons under Thaksin). According to Jacques-Chai (2004: 24), farm-gate paddy prices actually dropped in real terms, from 4663 baht/ton in 1996 to 3667 baht/ton in 2003.
Although Thaksin's easy credit was a godsend to farmers in the grip of loan sharks and assisted some in business start-ups, it could not solve the general problem of indebtedness. Rather, in connection with the promotion of capital-intensive production, debt increased. If 60% of rural households were indebted in 1994/ 1995, with an average debt of 37,000 baht, this increased to 68,000 baht in 2003 (with the same percentage of indebted households, National Statistical Office Thailand, n.d.). For many Thaksin opponents, the easy credit policy was seen to exacerbate indebtedness, and they criticised farmers for rushing to buy consumer goods such as motorcycles and mobile phones. (11)
TRT's promotion of export-orientated agriculture--monoculture crops; high-cost inputs such as herbicides, fertilizers and hybrid seed; commercial orientation and corporate-dominated market and production structures such as contract farming increased the profits of agribusiness but also contributed to high indebtedness, land concentration and the general demise of the independent small-scale farmer. Thaksin and TRT were not interested in alternatives propagated by NGOs and small-scale farmer networks such as integrated, subsistence-orientated agriculture, community forestry and certainly not in agrarian reform. For this reason, organised farmer networks under the Assembly of the Poor umbrella were soon in opposition to Thaksin.
Land concentration led to a new wave of protests and organising, polarising the situation in some rural areas in 2004. In the south, the Southern Land Reform for the Poor Network (SLRP), with a claimed membership of 10,000, organised protests in February, August, October and December, demanding that expired large-scale palm oil concessions be divided up among landless and farmers with little land (Supara, 2004). In the north, partly inspired by the Brazilian landless movement (MST), a wave of land occupations that started before TRT came to power in Lamphun in 2000, spread rapidly under TRT to 27 different places, despite increased repression of this movement by the government (Rangsan, 2006).
TRT's domestic agrarian policy had a counterpart in the consistent movement towards free trade. As an agrarian exporter whose trade positions are influenced directly by the giant agribusinesses like CP, Thailand has long supported trade liberalisation (and was, for example, a member of the Cairns group in the World Trade Organisation). However, under Thaksin, this support for trade liberalisation was taken to new levels. Bilateral and regional FTAs, successfully concluded with Australia and with ASEAN/China, have had negative effects on small-scale farmers. In October 2003, Thailand and China bilaterally accelerated the "Early Harvest Agreement" of a regional FTA, and completely eliminated tariffs on fruit and vegetables. This led to a massive drop in prices for garlic and onions in Thailand, leading to severe difficulties and even bankruptcies for farmers in the north (Pye and Coghlan, 2004). The negotiations for an FTA with Australia led to protests by Thai dairy farmers in June 2004, and to accusations that Thaksin was sacrificing the livelihoods of tens of thousands of dairy farmers in exchange for the liberalisation of Australia's telecommunications industry that would directly benefit Thaksin's Shin Corp (Moxham, 2004).
As noted above, experience with the ASEAN-China FTA, and then the opening of negotiations around an FTA with the USA in 2004 led to the formation of FTA Watch. (12) Although opposition to FTAs was limited initially due to a widespread acceptance of the basic neo-liberal logic behind free trade, with the first demonstration against the US-Thai FTA attracting only 300 people, the anti-FTA coalition developed its educational and networking work in ways that bore fruit in early 2006 when the issue of FTAs became a key element of attacks on the TRT government and with anti-FTA groups taking a significant role in the anti-Thaksin movement. Much of the strength of this attack was based on FTA Watch's attention to negative impacts on farmers.
Health Politics
Another key contradiction of Thaksin's political agenda was in the area of health care. The 30 baht health scheme was tax financed and offered affordable health care for every citizen in hospitals which take part in the programme--mostly public hospitals. The health programme was one of TRT's main appealing campaign planks and remained so throughout its time in government. Indeed, huge posters proclaiming that every illness would be treated for 30 baht could be seen all over Bangkok in the run-up to the snap elections in April 2006.
Parallel to the implementation oft the 30 baht scheme, however, Thaksin launched an export promotion of health care services under the title "medical hub project" to lure rich foreign patients to Thailand for medical treatment. The initiative was so successful that the number of foreign patients increased from 500,000 in 2001 to over a million in 2005 (The Nation Online, 13 February and 4 April 2006) generating revenues of some 33 billion baht and establishing Thailand as Asia's number one destination for foreign patients even before Singapore (Cha-aim and Suwit, 2006:313).
Under Thaksin's contradictory policies, the chronic underfunding of public hospitals and the effect that the best medical staff took up better paid job offers from private hospitals led to a large-scale exodus of medical doctors from public hospitals, especially in rural areas. (13) This "internal brain drain" led to a widening cleavage within the health sector and brought about a paradoxical situation: at the same time when the universal coverage of the 30 baht scheme was implemented, patients with serious diseases who could not afford to go to hospital before, could now go, but would not find a doctor to treat them (Cha-aim and Suwit, 2006). That is why critics of the 30 baht programme re-named it as the 30 baht scheme to cure some illnesses, rather than as the government proclaimed it, the 30 baht scheme to cure all diseases. Such criticism goes beyond the early opposition to TRT's 30 baht scheme raised in 2000 and 2001, which focused on financial sustainability. These critics called the scheme "unsustainable" because it was not clear whether the government could afford the expenditure, thus implicitly accepting the IMF and World Bank ideology of a lean state. Criticising it as dysfunctional because of the internal contradictions between a redistributive state-organised health scheme and the export-orientated promotion of health services is a more fundamental critique as it also targets neoliberal dogma.
The contradictions in the health care scheme are particularly grievous for people living with HIV/AIDS (PLHA). Although their treatment with anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs was also covered by the state health system--an achievement of the Thaksin administration which made Thailand a shining example in the developing world as far as treatment of HIV/AIDS is concerned--the access to drugs came under attack as a side effect of the Thaksin government's trade policy.
As we have already noted, a central TRT economic project was FTAs. Especially significant was the US-Thai Free Trade Agreement negotiations, initiated at the 2003 APEC summit in Bangkok. The stringent intellectual property rights being demanded by US negotiators during the FTA talks went beyond the already restrictive Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of the WTO and would have severely restricted the Thai government's pharmaceutical company in its ability to produce affordable generic drugs, including ARV drugs. If put into force, the FTA would have undermined the health care scheme and effectively cut off PLHA from access to treatment with affordable ARVs (Jiraporn, 2005).
The resistance to Thaksin's free trade policies by the PLHA has its roots in a campaign for access to ARV drugs which, during the years 1999-2002, brought together a broad coalition of NGOs, activists and concerned individuals in a legal struggle to revoke a patent on one ARV drug. (14) When, in October 2003, FTA Watch was formed, the PLHA network became an integral part of it.
The Media
Another sector where the internal contradictions of the Thaksin system emerged was the media. The most prominent example was the libel suit taken out by Thaksin against Supinya Klangnarong, Secretary-General of the Campaign for Popular Media Reform, who suggested a connection between the prime minister's policies and the huge increase in profits of Shin Corp in an article in the newspaper Thai Post, claiming that Shin Corp's profits soared by almost 40 billion baht between 2001 and 2003 (Thai Post, 16 July 2003). Thaksin sued her and three editors of Thai Post for 400 million baht compensation in an apparent attempt to silence a critical voice that had dared to challenge the prime minister's cronyism and nepotism. Supinya regularly appeared on stage at the anti-Thaksin rallies and her struggle was often portrayed as a brave and personalised stand for the liberty of expression. However, her case was the expression of a much deeper conflict with the question of how to organise democratic media control at its core. This issue had been highly contested at least since 1992, when a blackout of pro-democracy demonstrations and the violence in the streets of Bangkok in May 1992 demonstrated the extent of state control of the media and its ability to manipulate public communication to a large extent (Ubonrat, 2001: 90-1).
The establishment of iTV in 1996 as an independent TV channel was the direct outcome of this struggle. Its statutes defined it as an independent news station with no more than 30% entertainment programme at prime time, and a limitation that private shareholders would not be allowed to hold more than 10% of the company. iTV developed into a popular channel with investigative journalism, independent news coverage and set new standards for new reporting (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 149). A second outcome of the post-1992 struggle were Articles 39 to 41 in the 1997 Constitution which guaranteed freedom of expression and defined frequencies as a public property that would be allocated by an independent regulatory body.
However, the economic difficulties created by the Asian crisis permitted an alliance of state agencies and newly established private media companies to alter iTV's statutes in a way that paved the way for a take-over of iTV by Shin Corp between 2000 and 2003 (see Ubonrat, 2001: 93). Thaksin's ultimate goal was to reshape iTV as an entertainment channel and to expand his telecommunication empire into the rapidly growing entertainment business (see McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 47ff.; Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 218ff.). Reshaping iTV as a profit-making entertainment channel followed a pattern typical of Thaksin's use of his government's power to promote his family's economic interests: After Shin Corp had acquired the majority of the stake in 2001, in early 2004 the licence fees were lowered to a fraction of the existing level and the restriction on the proportion of entertainment at prime time was circumvented by simply redefining prime time (see Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 119-20). With this new favourable framework, iTV was listed on the stock exchange and generated considerable profits (McCargo and Ukrist, 2005: 50; Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 219-20).
Taking over iTV and reshaping it into a commercial channel served Thaksin's project in two respects: first, in a purely commercial sense, Thaksin achieved the diversification of Shin Corp and the convergence of telecommunication and media as a strategic move of his own business empire. Secondly, he knew that media control was important to gain command of public opinion and to create the political stability and government longevity needed to achieve his overall economic project (Brown and Hewison, 2005: 360). As many as 23 critical editors of iTV were fired immediately after Thaksin took over the majority of the shares in 2001, which was only one detail of a broad offensive against critical media coverage (Pasuk and Baker, 2004: 149ff.).
If the incidents in May 1992 were the proof that state control prevents independent and critical journalism, then the ascent of Thaksin as a media tycoon was proof that private ownership of the media could have the very same effect. Against this background, the libel suit against Supinya can be seen as an attack on the Campaign for Popular Media Reform, an outspoken NGO, that had repeatedly criticised the stalemate in the nomination process for the proposed National Broadcasting Commission, the regulatory body for frequencies introduced by the 1997 Constitution (Bangkok Post Online, 25 December 2004). For companies like Shin Corp, which were seeking to monopolise the media, this Commission was seen as a threat (Ubonrat, 2004).
Other Issues
If the contradiction between pro-poor programmes and a neo-liberal capitalist agenda were evident in flagship areas such as agriculture, health and media, active opposition to Thaksin was more pronounced in other areas, particularly with regard to labour and to policies implemented by the government in the deep south of Thailand.
Brown and Hewison (2005) have already analysed the conflict between capital, state and labour under Thaksin. One of the key planks of economic liberalisation that Thaksin soon embraced was the privatisation of state enterprises. This policy led to a major confrontation with the state enterprise unions over the privatisation of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). In February 2004, the government announced plans to privatise EGAT by registering it as a public company on the stock exchange. EGAT workers reacted with demonstrations involving tens of thousands, road blockades, extended "absences from work" and the "patriotic leave from work," and even storming government house. (15) Their protest was one of the most forceful and militant in recent years and, as Brown and Hewison (2005: 373) pointed out, led to political opposition to the TRT at a time when most of the other social movements were still intimidated and paralysed by the violent oppression of Thaksin's "war on drugs" campaign. Pien Yongnu, Chairman of the Network of Power and Water Utilities for the Country and the Public, stated that "from now on we will be an enemy of the Thai Rak Thai Party." At issue was not only expected deterioration of pay and working conditions, but also wider questions of public control and access to water and electricity and conflicts of interest involved in the sale of the shares of privatised enterprises. Their protests attracted widespread solidarity from other state enterprise employees, who felt they might be next in line for privatisation. Finally, the government had to back down. However, in February 2005, Thaksin, getting overly confident after his landslide victory, announced that the listing of EGAT and other state enterprises on the stock exchange would be stepped up, adding that, given TRT's voter mandate "we won't tolerate pressure against the privatisation policy" (Bangkok Post, 8 February 2005). As we have seen, state enterprise workers joined the anti-Thaksin movement over this issue.
Critics who had identified a lack of democracy due to the increased corporate domination of politics and control of the media under Thaksin saw this as accompanying an increasingly authoritarian and repressive form of rule. This was particularly severe in the south, where Thaksin's "hawkish approach" (Ukrist, 2006: 73) against insurgents escalated a simmering conflict. (16) While this is not the place to go into detail regarding the southern conflict, it is worth pointing out that while the south had long been a stronghold of the opposition Democrat Party, the escalating conflict led to a widespread rejection of the TRT government in the south.
Already in 2003, Thaksin's otherwise widely popular "war on drugs" campaign was met by a demonstration in Pattani, as extra-judicial killings by the police and army, the use of blacklists and the increased powers of the police were seen as directed against the Muslim majority in that area (Croissant, 2005: 34-5). After a massacre of people identified by the military as insurgents in the Krue Se mosque in April 2004 and the death of 78 people following a demonstration at Tak Bai (Ukrist, 2006: 75), a pattern of civil disobedience emerged. For example, in September 2005, hundreds of women of Ban Tanyonglimo in Narathiwat Province blocked the military from entering their village, while two soldiers suspected of killing local villagers were held and subsequently killed. One sign read: "Evil has spread since Thaksin's party came to power. Ethnic Malay people have been cruelly killed by soldiers. They are the real terrorists" (The Nation Online, 7 September 2005). In February 2006, 300 villagers took 32 teachers hostage to force the release of a local imam, arrested on trumped-up charges (The Nation Online, 11 February 2006).
The issue of state violence in the south not only featured prominently in all PAD demonstrations, but also gave rise to anti-Thaksin demonstrations in the south, as well as participation by grassroots organisations (such as the Federation of Small-Scale Fishers of the South and the Southern Community Forestry Network) at the protests in Bangkok. The southern electoral chickens came home to roost when, in the boycotted April 2006 election, TRT failed to gain the minimum 20% of the vote required in 38 constituencies (out of a national total of 400). These southern constituencies became centrepieces in the decision to annul the election.
Royal Interventions
As we have argued above, the PAD was a broad alliance. One section of the alliance, led by Sondhi, had a limited, elite agenda to get rid of Thaksin by royal intervention. The common, unifying slogan, "Thaksin ok pai" (Thaksin Get Out!), was this group's programme, and having the king replace Thaksin with his own man as interim prime minister was their favoured means to this end. A large part of the alliance, in contrast, had very concrete agendas and demands (no patenting of medicines via FTAs, pensions, land reform, the situation in the south, democratic media, etc.) that were represented and unified by the common slogan, but which had no similar means of accomplishment.
The PAD managed to unite a wide range of different movements and groups that had not protested together before. This was the strength of the PAD. In a space of a few weeks, many of the protesting groups could achieve more than in previous months or even years of campaigning. Thaksin and TRT were weakened by the movement that provided space for the government's privatisation policy to be challenged, for Supinya's libel suit to be quashed in court on 15 March 2006 and, at the end of March 2006, for the Supreme Administrative Court to revoke two Royal Decrees that had laid the basis for EGAT's privatisation in 2005 (The Nation Online, 26 February 2006; Nantiya, 2006).
The unifying force of the PAD demand for Thaksin's resignation also had its weaknesses. One was the question of how to force Thaksin to resign. As the protests went on, it became increasingly clear that he would not just bow to the opposition; indeed, Thaksin retook the initiative by mobilising his supporters and calling new elections. The reaction of the PAD was to expand the mass campaign of civil disobedience into the electoral arena. Going beyond an endorsement of weak "opposition" parties such as the Democrats (who bowed to PAD pressure not to stand for election) or a passive boycott of the new elections, the PAD organised a hugely successful, active "No" vote, in which ten million no votes were cast against Thaksin and--in a turnabout from the initial PAD consensus not to seek royal intervention the group called for the king to intervene and to replace Thaksin with an interim prime minister.
In their 6th declaration on 23 March, the PAD called a demonstration for 25 March, with, for the first time, the demand for royal intervention based on Article 7 of the constitution as the "only way to solve the national crisis" and to initiate a "process of political reform" (PAD, 2006).
Does this call for royal intervention justify the characterisation of the PAD as an elite, royalist movement? Does the fact that the PAD as a whole accepted this demand imply that Sondhi's faction won out within the alliance? We would argue that the demand for royal intervention was a concrete tactical option to overcome the crisis. It was not a statement for a return to an undemocratic political order (i.e. a general call for prime ministers to be royally appointed or for a return to military dictatorship). This can be seen, for example, by the fact that the same 6th declaration also included demands that an interim government should stop FTA negotiations with the USA and stop privatising public utilities.
Interestingly, where Ji (2007: 36), suggested that Sondhi Limthongkul dominated the other sections of PAD and that only "middle class" or neo-liberal criticisms of Thaksin were articulated by PAD, the PAD took up critical issues that were clearly directed against neo-liberalism. Indeed, it seems to us that Sondhi's media was pushed to take up issues raised by the social movements and NGOs associated with PAD. For example, the 24 February special edition of the Manager Daily criticised Thaksin on a range of issues, including for not paying taxes on the sale of Shin Corp (considered a question of social justice), for using his political power to benefit himself and his family and friends, for his heavy-handed violence in the south, and for the "free trade madness" of his FTAs. The 30 baht programme was criticised not because it was tax-funded but because of under funding and because of the brain drain to the private hospitals in Bangkok.
As we have pointed out, FTA Watch became a prominent player in the antiThaksin protests, with a continuous presence by activists who made sure most of the demonstrators had leaflets and "Stop FTA" flags. There were systematic attempts to formulate more grassroots perspectives. In a pamphlet produced jointly by NGOCOD, FTA Watch and PAD (2006), for example, not only was Thaksin alleged to have engaged in massive tax evasion, the massacres at Krue Se and Tak Bai were linked to his policies and claimed to be threats to democracy, and the call for political reform was linked to a range of rural demands such as land reform, alternative agriculture and community-controlled natural resource management.
The call for royal intervention was, for many PAD supporters, merely invoking past experiences of the king intervening against dictatorial regimes in 1973 and 1992. At the time, many of these supporters were unable to propose any other concrete alternative to royal intervention. Key critics of the PAD argued that the alternative to demonstrating for Thaksin's resignation was to contest elections (e.g. Supalak, 2006; and, retrospectively, Somchai Preechasilpakul (17)). Given Thaksin's electoral power and control of the media at that time, however, the majority of activists involved in the PAD did not see this as being a viable option under the circumstances. Fighting Thaksin in a new round of elections would have been fighting him on his turf, one where his party machine, wealth and media influence would have ensured a defeat for the movement. In addition, the idea of fighting elections rather misses the point that part of PAD's protestation was about the corporate undermining of a formally democratic system.
While there was some discussion of the option of direct democracy and of "people's power," this remained a minority position within the movement. (18) The lack of this kind of independent strategy meant that the longer Thaksin stayed in power, the more attractive an intervention by the king seemed to members of the anti-Thaksin movement.
Demanding and then waiting for royal intervention meant that as soon as that intervention came there was an abrupt end to the PAD as an independent movement. In his speech on 25 April 2006, the king suggested that the courts annul the election of 2 April, but he also rejected the PAD's call for a royally instated prime minister, calling this demand "undemocratic" and "irrational" (The Nation Online, 27 April 2006). The double nature of the king's intervention is clear from these comments. On the one hand, he intervened against Thaksin, on the other hand, he made sure that an independent, mass campaign of political disobedience did not continue.
The coup d'etat of 19 September is indeed a repeat of this royal intervention, but this time backed by military force, after Thaksin refused to back down (reneging on his promise to step down if the king "whispered" to him). The coup fulfilled the main demand of the PAD to get rid of Thaksin and, on this basis, the coup was certainly enthusiastically supported by the elite section of the PAD around Sondhi. For many of the others associated with PAD, the coup seemed to be an unfortunate but necessary solution to an ongoing crisis. However, the deeper reasons for the emergence of the mass movement against Thaksin that were located in the internal contradictions of his "post-neoliberal" corporate project, will not be solved by the coup.
Conclusion
Any analysis of the anti-Thaksin movement needs to take account of the dynamics inherent in such a mass movement. Initially led by Sondhi Limthongkul, and exploding onto the streets after Thaksin's sale of Shin Corp, the protests quickly broadened their social base and the issues they raised. Although there is a clear demarcation in terms of elite conflict, with the "network monarchy" against Thaksin-friendly big business, the generalisations about the movement being "middle class" and opposed to the rural poor do not, as we have explained above, do justice to the complexities of the issues involved. As we have argued, the internal contradictions within Thaksin's project led to dissatisfaction and active opposition by different groups of society and at different times. This dissatisfaction was both rural and urban, and involved economic, social, political and cultural issues.
One of the greatest achievements of the anti-Thaksin movement, apart from concrete successes, such as the postponement of FTA talks or the halting of EGAT's privatisation, was to bring these social and economic issues together with a political criticism of Thaksin's regime. The misuse of political power for private economic gain was the predominant theme, of course, but the corporate undermining of free and democratic media, symbolised by Supinya's successful fight against the libel charge, was also highly significant. And the fact that Angkhana Neelapaichit could speak to tens of thousands of people in Bangkok was immensely important in connecting the criticism of Thaksin's repression in the south with the situation of the people in the rest of Thailand.
The involvement of grassroots networks and social movements in the PAD was crucial to expand the criticism of Thaksin to include deeper political and social issues such as repression in the south and FTAs. However, this independent role within the alliance was not coupled with an independent strategy of how to push for those demands. No clear strategy of "people's power" was developed and no plan for generalising political civil disobedience in the form of strike action, occupations, or of re-appropriating public resources and space emerged. Accepting Sondhi's call for royal intervention, then, gave the initiative back to conflicting elite factions. The "people" were put back into a spectator's seat.
The coup d'etat in September was the fulfilment of the elite opposition to Thaksin--but it was also directed against independent grassroots mobilisation. For the "network monarchy," the political crisis had to be resolved in the interest of political stability, and it was therefore no coincidence that the coup took place the evening before the PAD was planning to resume its protests. Although they have been keen to portray themselves as merely executing the people's will, in the first few months of military dictatorship, the generals showed themselves to be in contradiction to social and political aspirations of many in the anti-Thaksin movement. Their agenda is not more popular democracy, but rather, less democracy. On a policy level, they have made concessions to demands of the mass movement (for example by issuing compulsory licensing for anti-retroviral drugs or their plans to re-nationalise iTV as a public broadcasting company) but in general they have been following Thaksin's basic "extended neo-liberal agenda", for example by signing the FTA with Japan.
If an independent but unified formation of the grassroots movements was lacking during the PAD protests, an important step in this direction took place shortly after the coup. During 21-3 October, the Thai Social Forum (TSF) was held despite the military ban on political gatherings. It brought together 70 organisations and thousands of participants. Apart from the usual diversity of workshops and meetings, the gathering was significant for the consensus declaration it issued and the fact that this was read out by former Senator Jon Ungpakorn at the Democracy Monument on Ratchadamnoen Avenue before the commencement of a short illegal demonstration against the coup.
The TSF (2006) declaration A New Just Worm can be Built by the People is a kind of "transitionary programme" that draws together key demands of the anti-Thaksin movement, including those working for peace in the south, media reform and public referenda on FTAs. It goes beyond PAD's agenda by combining well-known rural alternatives (such as community control over natural resources and land reform) with the demand that the next constitution specifies that Thailand is a welfare state. Pensions, health care and unemployment benefit are demanded as social rights to be paid for by taxing the rich (i.e. through capital, property and inheritance tax). Without mentioning Thaksin or the coup directly, the declaration also stresses democratic participation that goes beyond parliamentary elections and the self-activity of the people themselves and that "social, economic and political reform is something that the people must and can do themselves" (Thai Social Forum, 2006). This could be an important starting point for a new mass movement for democracy and social justice in Thailand.
Acknowledgement
The authors would particularly like to thank Ae and Somkit from the Thai Volunteer Service, Luen from the Assembly of the Poor, Suraporn from Fa Dieo Kan [Same Sky] magazine and Wipaphan Korkeatkachorn for their time and help. They would also like to thank Michael Connors and Kevin Hewison for their editing.
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Notes
(1) Ji Ungpakorn (2006: 1) implied this by characterising the protests as a "conservative royalist movement."
(2) The authors spent several weeks in Thailand during the mass movement against Thaksin in February and March 2006, and again during the coup d'etat and the Thai Social Forum in September and October. Unless otherwise stated, this analysis draws on workshops, discussions, interviews and participatory observation during this time.
(3) For both, the central criticism was that using taxes for health care was not sustainable. Before the introduction of the universal coverage of the 30-Baht scheme, one third of the population was without any health insurance at all, so this criticism can be countered easily with the argument of Venezuela's Minister of Health and Social Development: "You can't fail to deal with a disaster because you haven't worked out the specifics of sustainability" (cited in Gibbs, 2006: 272). On the Thaksin programme, see Hewison (2003a: 13).
(4) The term "post-Washington Consensus" is often used to describe a shift in the economic and development guidelines of the World Bank at beginning of the new millennium away from the narrow agenda-setting fundamentals of the Washington Consensus such as zero inflation, broadening market access and promotion of privatisation, towards the recognition of the role of the state especially for social programmes (Drache, 2002; Williamson, 2000). Whereas some authors interpret this shift as a correction of a failed neo-liberal policy (Kohlmorgen, 2004), others have criticised it as mere windowdressing, where the core of neo-liberal dogma remains unchallenged (Gibbs, 2006). In our analysis of Thaksin's economic policy we follow Gibbs' view.
(5) The weekly television show "Alo Presidente" in Venezuela and Thaksin's weekly radio talk-show being just one striking parallel. For a different approach, see Pasuk and Baker (2008).
(6) For example, the anti-Khor Jor Kor movement in 1992 or the Assembly of the Poor in 1997. Khor Jor Kor is the abbreviation for a military-led plan for the restructuring of Thailand's forest reserves. If implemented as scheduled, it would have deprived thousands of families of their livelihood. On the anti-Khor Jor Kor movement, see Pye (2005).
(7) The Octobrists are activists from the 1973-76 democratic uprising, and the "Senior Citizens" are respected senior or retired officials. Kasian (2002: 333) listed the National Salvation Community, the Bangchak-lovers Club, the United Thai for National Liberation Club, the Free Thai Movement, the Withithas Project, the Thai Graduates' Group, the Patriotic People Club, and the Democracy for the People Group.
(8) For a more detailed analysis of different capitalist groups and the connection between domestic capital and Thaksin's ascent see Brown and Hewison (2005: 358ff) and Pasuk and Baker (2004).
(9) At the same time, the Democrats continuous embrace of notions like "good governance" and "fair competition" as a means to solve problems of poverty and underdevelopment explains why their recent turn to a social agenda was not convincing enough to challenge TRT's electoral basis. For a critical discussion of the ideological use of "good governance" with references to Thai political discourse, see Jayasuriya and Hewison (2004).
(10) However, the term "post neo-liberal" itself overstates the extent of the paradigm shift. While we agree with Gibbs' analysis, we reject the term "post neo-liberal," as well as the term "post-Washington Consensus" used by other authors for the same phenomenon (cf. Fine, 2001; Kohlmorgen, 2004). The prefix "post-" suggests a paradigm shift away from the doctrines of the Washington Consensus or the neo-liberal principles.
(11) This critical line was followed by Sondhi Limthongkul's Phujatkan raiwan [Manager Daily] see, for example, "Kongthun muban fanrai prachaniyom" [The village fund. A populist nightmare], 24 February 2006.
(12) FTA Watch's website is at: http://www.ftawatch.org.
(13) In rural areas the proportion of medical doctors per head of population fell to one per 10,000 compared to Thailand's average proportion of one per 2800 (The Nation Online, 4 April 2006).
(14) The network consisted of Thai Network of People Living With HIV/AIDS (TNP+), Foundation for Consumers, Doctors without Borders (MSF), and many others. For a detailed description of the campaign see Weeraboon (2004) and Ford et al. (2004).
(15) The Thai Labour Campaign gives a good chronology of the EGAT protests at http://www.thailabour. org/campaigns/privatiz/chronology.html
(16) A detailed analysis of this conflict has been offered by Duncan McCargo and his collaborators in a special edition of Critical Asian Studies (McCargo (ed.), 2006).
(17) In his presentation at the workshop "Botrian thangkanmueang jak rathaprahan 19 kanya" [Political lessons of the 19 September coup d'etat], Thai Social Forum, Thammasat University Rangsit Campus, 22 October 2006.
(18) In an interesting exchange with Supalak in the Fa Dieo Kan magazine, Piyamiton (2006) recommended democratising the PAD and the anti-Thaksin movement itself as a first step towards a democratic revolution along the lines of people's councils.
OLIVER PYE and WOLFRAM SCHAFFAR
Department of Southeast Asian Studies. Bonn University, Bonn, Germany
Correspondence Address: Oliver Pye, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Bonn University, Nassestr. 2, 53113 Bonn, Germany. Email: oliver.pye@uni-bonn.de
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