So far not so good for Abhisit's govt

THAI POLITICS

 

So far not so good for Abhisit's govt

 

By: THITINAN PONGSUDIRAK

 

Published: 6/02/2009 at 12:00 AM

 

As it assumed office in less than ideal circumstances just over a month ago, the new government of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has had a number of deficits to make up for.

Thailand's sputtering economy, driven by the deteriorating global economic crisis, demands immediate policy delivery and results.

On this score, the Abhisit government has responded quickly with a raft of populist policies and deficit-financing to cushion impending hardships in lost jobs, corporate bankruptcies, weakening consumer purchasing power, slowing revenue, and poor exports and investment prospects.

The fiscal tap remains open with further stimulus expenditure and planned social safety nets from additional domestic deficit-financing and foreign borrowings.

While its pursuit of economic recovery and revival in dire times holds promise, the Abhisit government is less successful on the promotion of national reconciliation and the avoidance of corruption and graft.

 

The ongoing scandal over government procurement that has claimed the resignation of Social Development and Human Security Minister Witoon Nambutr, bodes ill for government stability.

If the outgoing minister's case is a harbinger of future graft scandals, the Democrat party-led government's longevity will be in doubt.

Moreover, the growing noises of the anti-government United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) will add pressure to government performance and Mr Abhisit's proclaimed integrity.

Mr Witoon's resignation stems from irregularities involving the government's provision of flood relief supplies that included rotten canned fish to a southern province.

The fishy canned fish deal is seen as a procurement infraction where commissions may have taken place.

While it relieves pressure on the prime minister, the downfall of Mr Witoon, who was earlier cleared of a vote-buying charge that could have dissolved the Democrat party, is indicative of the dynamics and constraints within the coalition government on the one hand and the ruling party on the other.

An MP from the Northeast, where the Democrat Party is scarcely represented, Mr Witoon's replacement will be yet another MP from the same province. This means that the Democrats operate more on a regional quota basis than on merits, reflecting Mr Abhisit's limitations.

When it comes to backroom manoeuvres and dirty deals, Democrat secretary-general Suthep Thaugsuban, who himself faces a vote-fraud probe, is in charge.

At the same time, another cabinet member, Boonjong Wongtrairat of Bhumjaithai party, is mired in a vote-buying investigation involving the hand-out of relief funds for the poor along with his name card. The allegation centres on the association between the government's funds and his name card.

Bhumjaithai is a small collection of MPs, mostly from the Northeast, without which the coalition government would collapse.

It has thus been given a disproportionately large quota of cabinet posts. Bhumjaithai firmly backs Mr Boonjong, tying the hands of the PM and the Democrats into the same position.

The longer the fishy Boonjong case drags on, the more the Democrat-led government's image and Mr Abhisit's integrity and good governance pledges will be tarnished.

The Abhisit government is in a tight spot. While its efforts to shore up the economy and restore investor and stakeholder confidence are being given the benefit of the doubt, its management of corruption and graft - the Achilles' heel of every Thai government - is problematic.

It is alarming that the Witoon and Boonjong cases surfaced in a matter of days after they took office. If this rate of graft allegations keeps up, it is likely to erode government legitimacy and slash months off Mr Abhisit's rule.

To make matters worse for the government, the UDD is back in full force. Its protest rally in the streets on Jan 31 brought out some 30,000-odd red-shirted UDD followers who are supportive of convicted former premier Thaksin Shinawatra and opposed to the pro-government People's Alliance for Democracy.

With unappealing leadership, apparent shortage of funds and defections of key columns in the lower Northeast to the government's side, the UDD's considerable and resilient show of strength will pile pressure on government stability on top of the graft scandals.

Just as the PAD appeared to work hand-in-glove in street protests with the Democrats in Parliament last year, the UDD will be in cahoots with the opposition Puea Thai party this year.

If the economy turns inexorably south despite the various stimulus measures, Mr Abhisit's legitimacy-building efforts that bank on economic recovery, integrity and reconciliation may well come to naught, bringing forward his government's endgame before many Thais who are tired of intractable crisis and quagmire would prefer to see.

The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. 

( Bangkokpost.com )

Feet to the fire

Feet to the fire    

 

Bangkokpost.com,Friday December 19, 2008 06:50 

 

New Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva will be tested by both the red shirts under the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship and the yellow shirts under the PAD. ANALYSIS By Thitinan Pongsudhirak

 

For those who have tracked Abhisit Vejjajiva's career with high hopes since his meteoric rise to the political limelight in March 1992, when the 28-year-old upstart out-debated political veteran Samak Sundaravej to the point of frustration and bluster on national television, his premiership has arrived in less than ideal circumstances.

It is an outcome of military meddling in politics, political reconfigurations in the aftermath of judicial decisions, a virtual blackmail by the People's Alliance for Democracy, and an emblematic embrace of old-style politicians of Newin Chidchob's ilk.

Lest we forget, Mr Abhisit and his Democrat Party have committed repeated misjudgements, demonstrated poor political skills and exploited myopic opportunism over the past three years. Yet much will be forgiven and forgotten if he can deliver Thailand into the 21st century on a solid footing, healing deep-seated rifts and reconciling the raw urban-rural inequality at the root of Thailand's crisis.

When Thailand's protracted political crisis began in late 2005, Mr Abhisit and the Democrats understandably sided with civil society groups that stood up to the corruption and abuse of power by ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. During the crescendo of the anti-Thaksin protests in early 2006, Mr Abhisit called for royal intervention with the invocation of Article 7 of the 1997 charter. When a snap election was called shortly thereafter, Mr Abhisit, as opposition leader, boycotted the polls, setting in train the topsy-turvy electoral environment that induced unprecedented judicial activism and eventually brought on the military coup in September 2006.

The coup was a cue for the Democrats to take charge by providing an alternative leadership and policy platform. It was not rocket science. All the Democrats needed to do was to adopt some of the pro-grass-roots policies that won elections for Thaksin and his allies time and again, while keeping corruption and abuse of power at bay. But the now-governing party dithered and trapped itself into an anti-Thaksin box, invariably deploring the Thaksin programmes and his rule without proclaiming what the Democrat party actually stood for.

An entire year under the coup-appointed government elapsed before the Democrats found themselves in a military-endorsed election in December 2007 only to ape Thaksin's populist programmes. When they resoundingly lost the election, the Democrats reverted to their comfortable anti-Thaksin box. The party's disregard for the pro-poor policy planks suggested that they emanated not from outlook and conviction but expediency and opportunism. The Democrats then spent much of 2008 just as they did in 2006, going after Thaksin, his proxies and allies, whose best political talents have been disqualified and banned from politics. In doing so, Mr Abhisit and the Democrats developed a symbiotic relationship with the PAD. A number of PAD organisers and advisors ran under the Democrat banner in the election, while a number of Democrats were regular speakers and visitors to PAD-occupied sites.

Not once this year has Mr Abhisit laid out his vision for Thailand and the attendant policy ideas to move Thailand forward. It is still not rocket science. Some of the Thaksin-era policies for rural uplift, industrial upgrading, cluster-development projects and competitiveness-boosting structural reforms should be considered to bring Thailand firmly into the globalisation age. Mr Abhisit also will need to provide policy directions on mega-infrastructure projects, bilateral free-trade agreements in view of the stalled global trade talks, and privatisation of key state enterprises. Here is where the new prime minister's mettle will be challenged the most. The Democrats' implicit alliance with conservative forces may come back to haunt them if pressure for a more inward-looking Thailand builds.

More critically, Mr Abhisit will be tested by both the red shirts under the United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship and the yellow shirts under the PAD. For the UDD supporters, the new prime minister radiates yellow, complicit in what they see as the PAD's highway robbery of their election victory. Mr Abhisit will have to exercise magnanimity and restraint when the red shirts mobilise and protest in much the same way the PAD has done. For the yellow shirts, Mr Abhisit, as the scion of the Establishment, ironically may not be yellow enough, as the PAD leadership still calls for an extra-parliamentary and extra-constitutional way out of the crisis. Mr Abhisit's worst spot is to be caught between this rock and that hard place, between red and yellow shirts that will be unhappy and unsatisfied irrespective of the PM's response.

Beyond this seemingly dialectical conflict, Mr Abhisit will have to keep unruly coalition MPs in line. That the coalition partners, with half of the strength of MPs compared to the Democrats', have garnered almost as many cabinet seats indicates disproportionate leverage. In this rough-and-tumble coalition jockeying and jostling, Mr Abhisit and his handlers should start making inroads into the opposition Puea Thai party for potential defections to impose a prisoner's dilemma on Mr Newin's and other wayward factions.

Economic adversity and foreign policy are obvious challenges. As the triple crises of global recession, domestic crisis-induced economic slowdown and airport closures intensify, the Abhisit government will be under pressure from a bewildering array of pent-up groups from farmers and industrialists to labourers and urban dwellers. A pump-priming stimulus package is imperative, and should be geared to have immediate effects. The imperative of fiscal expansion and deficit-financing should be explained and substantiated. Thailand's standing in the international community is in tatters. The Asean summit requires focus, and relations with the major players in the region and beyond need immediate revival and reassurance. These two broad policy fronts are the Democrats' forte.

To be sure, Mr Abhisit deserves every opportunity to set things right. He has to find a way to wriggle out of the Faustian bargain his party has struck. His political instincts will ultimately set the tone and content of his rule. Whether his Eton and Oxford grooming can overcome the elitist trappings of his Chulalongkorn Demonstration school and Sukhumvit road upbringing will have much to say about his premiership prospects. Many of his critics and detractors near and far are willing to take a pause while the jury is out on his rule.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.

Going all the way

ANALYSIS   By Thitinan Pongsudhirak

 

Bangkokpost.com,Thursday November 27, 2008  

 

By physically shutting down Suvarnabhumi airport, the People's Alliance for Democracy has upped the stakes in Thailand's ongoing political polarisation. It has demonstrated the extent to which it will resort to mob violence to achieve its aims.

The PAD is bent on creating the conditions of ungovernability and then to demand the ouster of Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat on grounds that Thailand is ungovernable.

Its tactics have warped into a blatant street campaign of intimidation and fear, of coercion and force.

That the PAD has come this far in its thuggish ways is attributable to its powerful backing, without which its relative impunity in the face of flagrant violations of the law can hardly be explained.

The PAD's latest antic at Suvarnabhumi airport will likely narrow its support base, especially in Bangkok as the capital reels from the longer-term impact of the airport closure to business confidence, but its remaining columns will still be deep in their resolve to get their way.

What the PAD wants has not changed. After an unsuccessful bid under the guise of the so-called "new politics," it first demanded the ouster of former prime minister Samak Sundaravej earlier this year, and it is now after Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat.

To reach its endgame, the PAD has to clear the slate of government, led by the People Power party. As a result, the PAD has bayed for blood, openly inviting a military coup in order to bring up an interim arrangement.

This would allow the PAD to either rewrite the current constitution or come up with an entirely new charter. Its ultimate objective is to fashion the rules of the democratic game to guarantee elite representation in the elected parliament through partial appointments.

Its logic is simple. A one-man, one-vote democratic system will indefinitely return the same parliamentary faces with a similar populist policy agenda that has appealed to the vast majority of the electorate in the Northeast and North, who voted for deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his disbanded Thai Rak Thai party for six years and for Mr Samak and Mr Somchai and PPP more recently.

Unsurprisingly, the PAD has openly shown disdain for these rural constituencies as faceless and gullible vote-sellers who should not be counted on equal terms with the PAD's urban minority in Thailand's electorate.

But the PAD faces a daunting uphill task in resetting the political environment and realising its anti-democratic agenda.

Somehow it would have to dislodge the PPP and perhaps its successor Puea Thai party from elected power, and to keep them out.

The PAD would then have to force an interim period during which its cadres would assert themselves in charter alterations. In an age when democratic rule is an emerging norm of the international community, when information is more widely accessible due to new technologies, any anti-democratic movement will be hard-pressed to get away with elite dominance.

Yet the PAD has shown that it is willing to go all the way.

It is willing to hold Thailand captive by disrupting airport operations, and to even cause an international embarrassment as Thailand gears up for its chairmanship of the Asean and East Asia summits in Chiang Mai next month.

Only its backers can pull the plug on the PAD but they may now be too insecure and paranoid to go back.

The longer this crisis goes on, the more exposed and compromised the PAD's backers have become.

And the PAD is continually dragging them down to the cut-and-thrust of Thai politics to their own detriment.

While the stakes are high, with wide and deep longer-term damages, it is not too late for the PAD's backers to rein in this rabid and reckless movement or to pull its plug altogether.

The ultimate danger for the PAD on the one hand and for Thailand on the other is not from the government, army or police - but from the red shirts banded under the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship.

Capable of a corresponding sort of mob violence, these UDD red shirts have decidedly displayed patience, order and restraint in their recent mass rallies, in deliberate contrast to the PAD's open incitement of violence and gross distortions of information. Widespread civil strife would be the outcome in the event the UDD turns on the PAD in full force.

A House dissolution, as proposed by army chief General Anupong Paojinda, is a release valve from such a UDD-PAD clash.

Although it would not resolve Thailand's urban-rural structural crisis in the long term, a new slate through new elections would buy time for the various protagonists to come to their senses and for Thai voters to have a say after a year of turmoil and volatility.

It is an option which Prime Minister Somchai should not dismiss out of hand for self-righteous reasons, especially if he is confident of his party's - and successor party's - winning policy platform.

The same goes for the People's Alliance for Democracy - if it still claims to stand for the Thai people.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.

Thailand's middle classes against democracy

 

Thailand's middle classes lead unlikely protest - against democracy

 

As the crowds of angry demonstrators beseiged the parliament, it looked as if a classic people's revolution was underway.

 

By Thomas Bell in Bangkok 

Last Updated: 7:38AM BST 12 Oct 2008

 

With the scent of police teargas in his nostrils and screams of protest ringing in his ears, Thailand's embattled prime minister Somchai Wongsawat fled the building, vaulted over a fence and clambered into a waiting helicopter to escape the crowds who had besieged all four exits.

 

Yet while it might have evoked memories of the fall of Saigon in 1975, last week's violent protest in Bangkok was not the dawn of a new order, but an attempt to restore an old one. Welcome to the Yellow Revolution - where the chosen hue represents the colours of the Thai king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, and where the clamor is for less democracy, not more.

 

"We cannot accept this robber government, we want to protect this nation and royalty. This government is cheating everything from this land, and they want to destroy the monarchy," said Praek, a computer technician stood among the sea of yellow-clad demonstrators outside the parliament.

 

"We want a new politics, with some leaders appointed, and some from the people, because these politicians buy the vote."

 

King Bhumibol is revered by Thais as a semi-divine figure who, during 62 years on the throne, has transformed his country from a rural backwater to a prosperous land of sky-scrapers, sky-trains and shopping malls. His royal highness's portrait appears all over the country, often covering the side of buildings many storeys high.

 

But while Thais have always revered him as unifying figure who is above everyday politics, successive elected leaders have enjoyed less respect - the country has suffered 18 coups since 1932. Just such a fate, it is feared, may now beckon for Mr Somchai, whose People Power Party has continued to foment a bitter urban-rural divide among the country's 63 million citizens first created by his brother-in-law and ideological predecessor, Thaksin Shinawatra.

 

Mr Thaksin, a billionaire businessman, effectively redraw the Asian nation's political map by aggressively courting the countryside vote, building up an unassailable lead among by offering cheap healthcare and loans for economic development.

 

But while such tactics won landslide votes among poor farmers in the paddy fields, they proved less popular with the educated urban elite of Bangkok, who resented the toll that such largesse takes on their tax contributions.

 

Others among the capital's middle class were appalled by what they saw as Thaksin's corruption and use of government power to promote his business interests, which led to him being deposed in a military coup in 2006.

 

He currently lives in Britain, where he was until last month the owner of Manchester City FC, but is widely held to be using Mr Somchai's government to continue his policies.

 

The demonstrators' problem is that the government's support among the rural poor gives it a virtually unassailable majority - hence its opponents' blunt rebuff of democratic principles. They argue that rural Thais are too uneducated to elect a parliament directly, and that it should be done largely by appointment instead.

 

"Many farmers, they don't know politics and they don't understand," said Tamesak, 53, a factory worker stood among the crowds last week outside parliament, where yellow T- shirts with the slogan "We love the king" are on sale. "We don't want a corrupt government," he added.

 

"Many people hate us, but that's only because the government lies on television," added another demonstrator, a 27-year-old hip hop DJ who had come down with his mother to join the protests. "They've just been given the wrong information."

 

Not everybody in Thailand, though, shares the educated elite's opinion that it alone knows what is best for the future of the country.

 

"They are not opposed just to individuals any more. They are opposed to the entire system of one man, one vote," said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political scientist at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University said. "That's the bottom line. It's a sophisticated, protracted power grab."

 

Critics also say that the movement is little more than a mouthpiece for establishment interests, whose traditional domineering role in Thai politics has done little to nurture an effective party system. They claim that the People’s Alliance for Democracy, or PAD, as the Yellow Revolution is officially known, also has support from the monarchy and its traditional allies in the civil service and military.

 

"Chief among these opponents (to the government) were the bureaucrats, the military and the monarchy – a troika that has called the shots in Thailand for decades," said Mr Thitinan.

While the PAD is now openly trying to persuade the army to stage what would be Thailand's 19th coup against the prime minister, Mr Somchai has vowed to stay on in government, despite being forced to run the country from a makeshift office in the VIP lounge of a disused airport.

 

"He will continue to run the country as he has a mandate from the people because the government is not convinced that either House dissolution or resignation will solve the crisis," his spokesman, Natthawut Saikua, said.

 

"These two scenarios would not stop PAD from protesting as PAD's true objective is to overthrow the democratically elected government and replace it with the government they want."

 

All the same, Thailand's institutions appear ambivalent about the protest. On Friday, a court threw out treason charges against the leaders of last week's disturbances, in which two protesters were killed and more than 400 people injured, including 20 policemen.

 

It said the grounds for the charges were "too vague". The leaders were charged with the less serious offences of illegal assembly and inciting unrest and then, bizarrely, bailed – even as they vowed to continue committing the alleged crimes.

 

The government has asked the army for support, only for army chief General Anupong Paochinda to insist his forces would remain "neutral". When trucks of unarmed soldiers drove through Bangkok's debris strewn streets on Tuesday night the protesters cheered them on.

 

For all the current machinations, however, the longer-term question is what will happen when King Bhumibol is gone. Despite his officially non-political role, he has, in his own words, been "in the middle, and working in every field".

 

In 1973 and in 1992 he intervened when military regimes opened fire on unarmed protesters to stop the slaughter and restore democracy. In 2006 he quickly endorsed the coup that toppled Mr Thaksin.

 

Thailand's laws, however inhibit virtually all public debate on the subject. Thais will not discuss who among his children might be best for the job, or what role they should play, for fear of running foul of wide-ranging statues which can lead to 20 years in jail for "insulting" the monarchy.

 

However, a recent commentary by Dr Thitinan in the lastest edition of American scholarly quarterly Journal of Democracy, hints at the troubles that may lie ahead. "King Bhumibol's unsurpassed moral authority has been Thailand's sheet anchor, the mainstay of national stability and continuity," he observed. "Once he is gone, the country will be in uncharted waters.

www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/3178731/Thailands-middle-classes-lead-unlikely-protest---against-democracy.html

 

 

 

Crisis, brinkmanship, stalemate _ what's next?

THAI POLITICS

Crisis, brinkmanship, stalemate _ what's next?

ATIYA ACHAKULWISUT

Thursday July 03, 2008 

They may not agree on the exact causes that have led Thailand to the stalemate it is in today. A few academics, however, concur that we are witnessing a kind of political deja vu. The confrontation between the Samak government and its outside-of-parliament opposition led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) mimicks the face-off before the Sept 19, 2006 coup, with but a few variations in terms of people involved and issues contested.

The similar tension and appearance of a political deadlock has led some people to ask: how will it be resolved? Will we witness a bloody clash? Are we heading down the same path which ends in the need for another military intervention?

Siripun Noksuan, from Thailand Democracy Watch project, Chulalongkorn University, points to the Sept coup itself as the start of this latest crisis.

''One crucial result of the coup was the dissolution of the Thai Rak Thai party, which was probably done with the hope that we would see a new batch of politicians instead of old veterans.

''Another was the drafting of the new rules _ the 2007 Constitution. Do these two acts serve the purpose they were intended for?

''No. We don't see new politicians. We see new parties, with the same old faces.''

Ms Siripun was one of the speakers at yesterday's panel discussion, ''Crisis, Brinkmanship, Stalemate: What is next for Thailand?'' organised by the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University.

She added that the lesson of the coup is that military intervention should not be allowed to happen again, as it would fail to tackle the problems the country is facing.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, traces the start of the stalemate to the birth of the first Thaksin Shinawatra government about 10 years ago.

''What ensued was continued economic expansion. The catch, however, was that the benefits of that growth were concentrated among a small group of people especially in Bangkok. The prosperity was never allowed to trickle down to people in the rural sector or in the lower echelons of society.''

Then, one day, a political party found a way to capitalise on the inequality, thus unlocking the key to almost sure-fire success at the polls.

The Thai Rak Thai party captured the hopes and dreams of the have-nots. It promised _ threatened _ to redistribute the wealth generated by the economic growth to those who have never tasted it, via its many populist projects.

The problem was, there were people _ the old money _ who stood to lose from Mr Thaksin's attempt at redistribution. And they fought against it.

They are still fighting, as they see the present government led by the People's Power party as nothing but a reincarnation of the now-defunct TRT.

According to Mr Thitinan, the conflict is structural. It has not been affected by the changes during the past one and a half years and has a tendency to drag on, as each camp seems to put in more effort and up the ante as the contest continues.

Supavud Saicheua, managing director and head of research, Phatra Securities PCL, sees a great deal of economic contention in the current political crisis.

Up until the financial collapse of 1997, the Thai ruling elite, business people, middle or working class had their interests more or less allied in the continued expansion of the economy.

The 1997 bursting of the financial bubble, which occurred after a financial deregulation allowed Thai capitalists to access foreign money to fund their ventures, marked a dissent in how members of the different groups in Thai society perceived the process of globalisation.

''The elite began to distrust it. They began to feel that partaking in the globalised economy caused them to lose their economic and probably political power too,'' Mr Supavud said.

Mr Thaksin, however, is arguably the most globalised politician Thailand has ever seen, Mr Supavud added. He is one of the few politicians who has an idea about how Thailand could link up with the globalised economy, in which areas and when. In short, he showed all eagerness to plunge fully into it.

The Establishment, with increasing doubts about what harm globalisation could cause them, could not accept this.

In this light, the stalemate is not only political in nature but also very much economic, said Mr Supavud.

So, what's next? Is there a solution or way out of this crisis?

Mr Thitinan believes the Samak government is nearing its end as it has not been able to perform its duties.

A cabinet reshuffle or House dissolution might be in order and it would actually serve as a good sign, a way for the country to move out of the current impasse within democratic means.

In the long run, the main actors in the current political stage must step back from the politics of possessiveness that they have engaged in.

''The future is about compromising and sharing,'' he said, meaning both economic benefits and power.

''If the 'old money' still refuses to distribute some of the economic benefits, the tension will rise and it might explode.

''The problem is that so far the agent of change, who understood what he had to do and who could do it quickly and effectively, is seen as being dishonest. So, society will need a new batch of agents of change who have both the necessary skills, legitimacy and moral integrity, too,'' Mr Thitinan said.

Ms Siripun says that while many people are calling for some form of reconciliation as a way out of the crisis, she thinks that is not what Thailand wants at this moment.

What the country needs _ and badly _ is a better, more stringent system of checks and balances.

She noted that the judicial branch has exerted power in this area quite a lot lately, as seen in the Administration Court nullifying a cabinet resolution that endorsed a joint communique between the Thai foreign minister and his Cambodian counterpart. There is a risk in relying on the judicial review as a solution to the political problems, though.

''In reality, a court's judgement does not always put an end to any dispute. A group of lecturers from Thammasat University, for example, are arguing that the Administrative Court does not have the power to issue an injunction against the joint communique.

''The problem is, what institution do we have left that could deal with disagreement with a court's ruling?

''Also, there is the classic question of who will watch the court? Who or what will the court be accountable to?''

Ms Siripun says that she sees another contest in the current crisis. It is between the ever-expanding need from civic groups to participate in public policy-making, and a government which does not want to stray away from its traditional way of operating in a closed, know-it-all manner.

''The 1997 and 2007 constitutions open the channels for the public to participate in the administration of the country. People know of their rights and they can't be stopped.

''All the cabinet resolutions or policies will increasingly be monitored and checked by the civil society groups. But the government has not been able to adjust itself to the new demand.''

There is an opportunity in this aspect of the crisis, however.

''The government must open up more channels for public participation. That way, they can reduce the tension as well as improve the efficiency of their work,'' she said.

''For example, had they consulted the public they wouldn't now have to waste time changing the cabinet resolution regarding the Preah Vihear joint communique,'' said Ms Siripun of Thailand Democracy Watch.

(http://www.bangkokpost.com/030708_News/03Jul2008_news22.php)   

 

The hijacking of Thai democracy

The hijacking of Thai democracy

STREET PROTESTS

By Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Monday June 23, 2008  

 

The anti-government People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) is going for the jugular. Now in its fourth week of street protests, PAD laid siege to Government House over the weekend, declaring victory but refusing to go home.

It now intends to prevent the People Power party-led government of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej from returning to its seat of power, as if such an act is sufficient for government resignation en masse.

Every step along the way since it retook the streets several weeks ago, PAD has provoked heavy-handed government responses in order to create the conditions for an extra-constitutional, extra-parliamentary intervention.

PAD has grossly distorted and manipulated news and events to its own ends, launching character assassinations and criticism of anyone who posits opposing and contrarian views, all in the name of ''rescuing the nation''.

In so doing, PAD has ironically morphed into the very object of condemnation on which it initially built its reputation. Prior to his ouster in a military coup in September 2006, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was roundly despised and rejected for his influence over and outright capture of political institutions and constitutional mechanisms. In other words, he monopolised Thai politics so completely that it engendered extra-parliamentary street demonstrations that paved the way for extra-constitutional change.

PAD is now hijacking Thai democracy in the same fashion that Mr Thaksin's authoritarian tendencies and political party machine monopolised it. The extremist movement tolerates no dissent. It is either PAD's way or the wrong way, which ranges from pro-Thaksin accusations and lack of loyalty to the throne to questions of patriotism.

To be sure, PAD is in a hurry to topple the Samak government because street demonstrations are expensive and at risk of exhaustion. If PAD cannot quickly force the issue and seal the game by pressuring Mr Samak to resign or by inviting outside intervention, it risks fizzling out.

For the government's part, Mr Samak and his key lieutenants have been just as belligerent and defiant in return, fanning PAD's flames. The brinkmanship game between PAD and the Samak government has now reached a crescendo. Something will soon have to give.

PAD would have to back off or Mr Samak would have to budge by resigning, alone or along with his ministers. Otherwise the escalating face-off between the two sides will increase pressure for outside intervention from the military.

As it now appears that PAD has political and financial backing from the highest corridors of power, the street demonstrations will continue far beyond PAD's eventful but indecisive ''D-Day'' on May 20.

And PAD's street noises are having their intended impact on Mr Samak. His tenure appears increasingly untenable. Few doubt that he could withstand PAD's maelstrom much longer without resorting to a hard-line response, which would spell his demise in any event. The endgame of his downfall is being played out against Mr Samak's will.

Yet what really plagues the Samak government is less PAD than growing economic hardships and standard-of-living issues. Many of the street demonstrators, numbering in five digits in peak periods, are disaffected by rising energy and food prices, and the lack of effective policy responses.

As a result, PAD has gained some foot soldiers from the farm sector and state enterprise unions. Some of the non-PAD protesters have also staged their own shows separate from PAD. Several large mobs have occupied areas near Government House. The air of anarchy and inevitable confrontation is palpable.

The Samak government has failed to respond by sticking to policy issues. This is because the majority of the Samak cabinet lacks policy experience and expertise. In the face of adversity and rising expectations, Mr Samak and his lieutenants, such as Interior Minister Chalerm Yubamrung, are more attuned to throwing the rhetoric back at the protesters and issuing counter threats.

The only policy hands are Commerce Minister Mingkwan Sangsuwan and Finance Minister Surapong Suebwonglee, but their voices and roles have been drowned out by Mr Samak's and Mr Chalerm's fiery political machinations.

Granted, the government is fighting for political survival, and thus has less time and energy to devote to addressing public grievances through adequate policy responses.

This precarious environment has called the military's role into question. Mr Samak is seen as close to Army chief Anupong Paochinda, who still insists on staying out of the fray. But his colleagues in the regional commands and elsewhere, especially the First Army Region with jurisdiction over Bangkok, are playing their cards closer to their chests.

In view of their lacklustre coup the last time, the army is unlikely to come out again unless there is unmanageable violence in the streets which the government and the police cannot handle.

Such a military intervention could come in two related ways. First, the army could simply impose limited martial law through the Samak cabinet's emergency decree in the affected areas of Bangkok. The other would be another outright seizure of power, resetting the democratic game all over again.

This is what PAD apparently has been egging the army to do. But even if violence spirals out of control, it will be confined to a few areas of Bangkok. A coup would be unnecessary. Gen Anupong is not seen as pro-coup but his immediate subordinates in key commands may have other ideas. Accordingly, Gen Anupong's role and the First Army Region commander's movements should be watched if violence flares and degenerates.

Mr Samak has himself to blame for not being more competent on policy fronts and for exacerbating the tit-for-tat battle between his government and PAD. His position is now shaky, and PAD will keep gnawing at his personal credibility and his administration's eroding legitimacy. His term will be shortened correspondingly. It will serve as a bad precedent and a blow to Thailand's topsy-turvy democracy.

Mr Samak's government deserves scrutiny in parliament and through constitutional channels and mechanisms, but not through PAD's rabid and reckless, rights-over-responsibilities street campaign. Indeed, PAD's success would be Thailand's setback.

The writer is Associate Professor and Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.

( www.bangkokpost.com )

 

It's the tyranny of a PAD-led minority

ANTI-GOVT PROTESTS

It's the tyranny of a PAD-led minority

THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK

Monday September 01, 2008

Over the past three years, Thai politics has degenerated from the tyranny of a majority under former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to that of a minority led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD).

Prior to the military coup in September 2006, Mr Thaksin exploited his Thai Rak Thai party's electoral successes to abuse power and monopolise political outcomes, reaping rents and rewards for businesses of his family and associates and lining pockets of his cronies. But now his erstwhile opponents have abused their unelected power from a different direction, holding the entire country hostage to their demands and revealing their distrust and disdain for the majority of the electorate.

The ongoing political crisis took a turn for the worst on August 26 when PAD demonstrators moved from their regular street protests to arbitrarily take over a state TV station, several ministries and Government House. They resorted to physical force by breaching and tearing down the fences and walls of these state agencies, and have since encamped at Government House. These unlawful efforts were an unprecedented provocation.

In other civilised countries, such a provocation and occupation of the seat of government would have been met with a swift and complete enforcement of the law to regain the state properties. Instead, the PAD's revolting rampage has been met with tamed official responses. Even at Makkhawan Bridge in an old and historic area of Bangkok where altercations between the authorities and protesters ensued following a police attempt to dismantle the three-months-old protest site, injuries were limited. More protesters were injured when they marched and confronted police at the gates of the Metropolitan Police Bureau. Stationed inside the gates with the PAD crowds massing outside, the police reportedly deployed several tear gas canisters.

The adverse public reactions to the authorities over these scuffles are understandable. State-perpetrated violence against the people is deeply etched in the Thai psyche, imprinted by the military's gruesome suppression of university students in October 1976 and middle-class demonstrators in May 1992. Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej's role in the October 1976 suppression also constrains him from being seen as trigger-happy. As a result, Mr Samak has allowed the PAD to rule the streets and illegally occupy Government House.

In addition, as the PAD bullies its way in a unilateral and anti-democratic effort to bring closure on the Samak government, its many sceptics and critics are cowed into silence. Dissent against the PAD brings personal attacks and character assassinations.

Yet this is the time for those myriad Thais _ the silent majority _ who never liked Mr Thaksin then and despise Mr Samak now _ to come out and condemn the PAD's blatant hijacking of Thailand's democratic system. They lack the PAD's voice, vehicle and organisation, but they must find a way to speak out. The white ribbon campaign, initiated by Thammasat University law professors, should be revived for those who are no fans of Mr Samak and his government but who oppose the PAD's methods and intentions. Other campaigns to give voice to the columns of people sandwiched between the PAD and the Samak government should also be considered and tried.

As fledging and fragile as it is, Thailand's democratic system is still in operation. It staged a general election just eight months ago. The voices of people who spoke at the polling booths then should still be respected. Moreover, these voices are now reinforced by a restoration of institutional checks and balances after the coup. Even the PAD leaders have not doubted the current integrity of the independent agencies such as the Election Commission, National Counter Corruption Commission and Constitution Court. Nor has anyone disputed the rulings of the Supreme Court and Criminal Court, which have taken Mr Thaksin to task and issued a conviction and three-year jail sentence on his wife. Mr Thaksin and his wife even had to flee from the law by their exile in England. This judicial process and its several critical verdicts to come on Mr Samak's conflicts of interest and the ruling People Power party's dissolution, among other cases involving government officials, should be respected and allowed to run their course.

But the PAD knows that in the end the majority of the electorate is likely to opt for a party with Thai Rak Thai and PPP's winning policy platform. As a result, it has nakedly revealed its hand. The PAD wants to bring Thai politics back to a bygone era of appointed representatives, of keeping Mr Thaksin, Mr Samak, Thai Rak Thai and PPP out of power for good through its own seizure of power.

The forces in cahoots with the PAD are now conspicuous. The Democrat party, which has lost the elections time and again and is still unable and unwilling to focus on appealing policies, has never categorically rejected the PAD methods and objectives. Leading Democrats have visited the PAD at Government House, and a Democrat MP has been a PAD organiser from the outset.

Democrat party canvassers and their networks are reportedly involved in the closure of Phuket and Krabi airports. If this is untrue, it is imperative on the Democrats' leadership to categorically deny their members' handiwork in the unrest in the southern provinces, their electoral stronghold.

Mr Samak now faces dire choices. The PAD leaders have staked their movement exclusively on Mr Samak's resignation. Caught between a rock and a hard place, Mr Samak cannot crack down on the illegal occupants of Government House for fear of what is perceived as his past sins and the potential for a broad-based confrontation and violence. But allowing the PAD's rampage to settle in makes the prime minister look lame duck and ineffectual.

The bicameral legislative meeting yesterday was a good way forward but unlikely to resolve the crisis. As Mr Samak's position becomes more untenable, his resignation and the PAD's blackmailed success would be an event of infamy in Thai political annals, a huge setback for Thai democracy. Even those who abhor Mr Samak but who want to see Thailand's longer-term political maturation would have to root for him to weather this round of PAD-instigated maelstrom.

The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University .

( http://www.bangkokpost.com/010908_News/01Sep2008_news20.php )

Singapore's insensitive miscalculation

Opinion by Thitinan Pongsudhirak ; 12 July 2008


The Singaporean government cannot feign ignorance and provide implicit recognition of Thaksin Shinawatra without serious consequences for bilateral relations between Thailand and the island state.


[The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University]

Singapore's recent misstep in unwittingly allowing deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra to use the island republic as a staging ground for media interviews on CNN and in the Asian Wall Street Journal that chastised the performance of the caretaker government of General Surayud Chulanont indicates a mind-boggling miscalculation.

Having become entangled in Thailand's political drama following the Shinawatra family's scandalous sale of Shin Corp to Singapore's government-linked Temasek Holdings early last year, Singapore's elite should have stayed on the sidelines and waited out the resolution of Thailand's deep-seated and ongoing confrontation and conflict.

But Singapore's leaders did not, and have not. They keep shooting themselves in the foot. They never got Thailand right. In view of their latest diplomatic blunder, perhaps they never will.

That Singapore's elite has persistently coddled Mr Thaksin prior to, and in the aftermath of, the military coup on Sept 19, 2006, is understandable.

Mr Thaksin's ties with Singapore's ruling Lee family run deep. The former premier was one of the first Lee Kuan Yew fellows back in 1994. The Singaporeans annually pick out up-and-coming young politicians from the region and treat them to red-carpet packages on the island in an effort to win over future regional leaders. In Mr Thaksin, the Singapore government picked a winner.

In addition, Mr Thaksin's and the Lees' common Hakka Chinese background further deepened their relationship. Like the Lees' one-party dominance of Singapore's democratic system, Mr Thaksin's authoritarian, decisive leadership style, and virtual monopoly in Thai politics during his nearly six-year rule also helped to solidify ties.
It was thus somewhat unsurprising that when it bought Shin Corp and allowed Mr Thaksin to cash out for 73.3 billion baht, Temasek was headed by none other than Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's wife, Madam Ho Ching.

During Thailand's prolonged political crisis and street protests against Mr Thaksin, the Singaporean government never flinched in the face of adverse Thai criticism of its role and connection to Temasek, as its embassy in Bangkok laid low in a vain attempt to ride out the storm.

Even after the Sept 19 coup, Prime Minister Lee stated unequivocally in an October speech to the Asian-European Editors Forum that the Thai putsch was a setback for the country's democracy. PM Lee justified his view of Mr Thaksin's electoral prowess, and completely missed the essence of the Thai crisis revolving around Mr Thaksin's erosion of legitimacy due to a long trail of constitutional violations, corruption, and abuses of power.

Unlike Singapore, winning elections in Thailand without accountability and effective checks-and-balances provided by institutions mandated under the constitution and by individuals from the media and NGOs, is not sufficient to retain a democratic mandate.

Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew followed up on his son's remark with the insistence that the Temasek-Shin Corp transaction was completely above board. Both father and son did what Mr Thaksin would have done by insisting on technical legality with a blind eye to legitimacy considerations and ethical and moral implications.

To be sure, the Thaksin visit would likely have transpired smoothly without the CNN and Asian Wall Street Journal interviews, despite Deputy Prime Minister S Jayakumar's odd unofficial reception of someone who had no official status. Kishore Mahbubani, an erudite diplomat who now heads the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, consequently criticised Mr Thaksin for putting Singapore in a tight spot with his media comments. It was the first public rebuke of Mr Thaksin from a member of the Singapore elite.

The Surayud government's measured response by withdrawing an invitation to Singapore's foreign minister to speak at a bilateral civil service exchange programme, and its cancellation of an informal summit meeting between the two countries, are moves in the right direction.

With these concrete diplomatic signals, the Singaporean government can no longer feign ignorance and provide implicit recognition of Mr Thaksin without serious consequences for the bilateral relationship.

To be fair, the primary responsibility for this debacle lies with the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, ultimately, with the Council for National Security and the Surayud government.

With Thaksin loyalists still in command, the Foreign Ministry has dragged its feet throughout the post-coup period in going after Mr Thaksin's passport status. Despite vocal calls from the anti-Thaksin coalition, the ministry took more than three months to revoke Mr Thaksin's diplomatic privileges. Rumours and anecdotal evidence of Thai embassy resources being used to facilitate Mr Thaksin's movements in London, China, Hong Kong, and Singapore have been rife.

Both the CNS and the Surayud government should clarify Mr Thaksin's status once and for all. This would enable foreign governments around the world to treat Mr Thaksin properly. To its credit, the Chinese government walked a balanced line by letting Mr Thaksin stay in China for weeks but not giving him any high-level recognition.

However, other foreign governments should not have to make this calculation on their own. They have the right to know how they should receive Mr Thaksin. The onus is thus on the CNS and the Surayud government. Mr Thaksin's murky status is yet another indication of the weak and indecisive post-coup management.

(http://www.bangkokpost.com/topstories.php?id=116105)