Monday, September 29, 2008

Sustainable Democracy

 

Public Lecture on "Sustainable Democracy" 

Former prime minister Anand Panyarachun gives a public lecture on "Sustainable Democracy" in Belgium.


Public Lecture on

Sustainable Democracy

By Anand Panyarachun

Former Prime Minister of Thailand

 

Brussels, 24 June 2008


Professor Amartya Sen,

Mr. Marc Bihain of the ING Bank,

Mr. Willem Van Der Geest,

Distinguished Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

 

It is a privilege to share with you some observations on sustainable democracy in a lecture series bearing the name of a great philosopher, thinker and a Nobel Laureate for economics. He won further plaudits for his work a few years ago  as co-chair of the United Nations Panel on Human Security.

Professor Sen has inspired us all with his seminal contributions that, among others, have given new meaning to the ethical dimensions of the pressing economic and social challenges of our times. One of Professor Senกฆs most influential contributions is the concept of capability which places human freedom in the centre of the discourse on development. 

On democracy, Professor Sen has observed that, กงNo substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. 

 Today, when the profit motive often prevails over considerations of justice, equity and rights, Professor Senกฆs message on development, linking it with human freedom, democracy and a free press, is refreshing indeed.

With the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama suggested that the end of history was upon us. Yet over a decade and a half later, the triumph of democracy has been less than absolute. Some countries have turned away from a liberal brand of democracy and embraced a more authoritarian one. A number of governments continue to be quite successful in keeping their political systems democracy-free while delivering the economic goods to their citizens. At the same time, some countries that have democratic systems seem to be struggling with issues of accountability and governance.

At first glance, this is somewhat surprising. Surely, democracy, with its obvious virtues, should have had no difficulty in taking root around the world. Yet for many countries, กงgovernment of the people, by the people and for the peopleกจ remains a tantalizing, elusive ideal.

The primary cause is in the struggle between those who govern and those who are governed. Aristotle proclaimed that, กงIf liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost.

In our own times, we face compelling questions:

     X Why does democracy seem so fragile?

     X What elements are required for a country to reach the threshold necessary to sustain democracy?

Let me share some insights from my experience as a prime minister committed to building democracy in Thailand, including through drafting a peopleกฆs constitution.

In doing so, I shall first turn to Mahatma Gandhi who articulated the organic nature of democracy, กงThe spirit of democracy cannot be imposed from without. It has to come from within.กจ Indeed, people have to want democracy.

In most of Europe, the evolution of democracy was slow and non-linear. European history is a chronicle of civil wars, revolutions and dictatorships. Yet democracy took root and today no rival political system challenges it in Europe.

If we take universal suffrage as the key event in western democracy, we find that the broad, inclusive participation of all citizens is little more than a hundred years old. 

In the course of political natural selection, we all adapt to new technologies, as well as problems such as climate change and natural disasters. Over time, a democratic system is best able to adapt in the evolutionary process if its basic pillars are strong enough.

A contemporary metaphor for democracy is that of a software algorithm that produces the best possible political outcomes for any society. The intellectual code for this political software stretches back centuries, with Britainกฆs Magna Carta of 1215 as a convenient starting point.

There is an implicit premise that democracy is inherently better, more stable, rational, beneficial and legitimate than other forms of government. Winston Churchill aptly states that, กงNo one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those others that have been tried from time to time.

The political process must be viewed along with the level of development. As development is uneven, so too is the state of democracy. Democracy and development are two sides of the same coin.

In my experience, there are a minimal number of pillars or key algorithmic modules that are needed to support the infrastructure needed for democracy. If you wish to build a bridge, there are principles of engineering that must be followed. Democracy, unlike bridge building, isnกฆt just science; it is also the art of the possible.


Education and Knowledge Sharing

Democracy starts with the wisdom of the voting public, however that wisdom is acquired. By that I mean a voting public that understands the issues it must deal with and the options it has. The voting public must also understand its responsibilities in a democracy and have access to the means to exercise choice in the democratic process.

The heart of democracy beats only with the participation of all citizens in exercising their rights --- first to raise for inclusion in the political agenda issues of concern to them and second to choose those whom they feel would best address their concerns in the political process.

In addition to responsible citizenship through participation in voting, democracy requires that citizens be well-informed of the issues that their communities and societies face in an increasingly globalizing and interconnected world.

A struggle in many developing countries is to channel resources to make education more relevant to the tasks of daily life, to change the emphasis from rote memorization to creativity and independent thinking and to extend the reach of education programmes, especially to girls and women in poverty. I am pleased to note the silver lining of progress in gender equality in the promotion of universal education. Such progress augurs well for creating the critical mass of informed voters needed to fuel democratic processes.

Asia has the distinction of being a region that has produced a significant number of democratically-elected women Heads of Government and State. An encouraging development in recent years is South Asiaกฆs efforts to ensure gender parity in the democratic process, with the requirement that a significant proportion of all elected functionaries must be women. We must now accelerate region-wide the advancement of girls and women for wider grass-root participation.

Education and the sharing of knowledge as a public good are important means of supporting the process for a strong countervailing force, to deter those who govern from abusing power. 

In Asia as in the West, democracy is won not just through the ballot box. The real struggle is fought out on the streets by students, farmers, workers and other ordinary citizens who come out en masse to express their dissatisfaction. It was in Asia that Mahatma Gandhi crafted non-violence as a movement for political change. Subsequently, there have been street protests over the course of five decades in the Republic of Korea, and peopleกฆs power has swept across Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, as well as other countries. The flame of democracy also continues to burn brightly in South Asia, which has the largest and most active voter populations.

For democracy to live, citizens must resist the temptation of being complacent. Each community, workplace and school needs programmes for promoting grass-root democracy. An apathetic electorate is easy prey for any organized group to seize power by force or fraud, giving rise to totalitarianism.

 In much of Asia where harmony is a core value and conflict avoidance a first response, our challenge is to embrace criticism, the weighing of pros and cons and disagreement, as  part of the maturation of the democratic process in the Asian context.


Pillars of Democracy

In my view, there are seven main pillars of the architecture of democracy, namely, elections, political tolerance, the rule of law, freedom of expression, accountability and transparency, decentralization and civil society.

Elections

First, free and fair elections lend legitimacy to democracy by preventing one person or a small group in society from imposing certain vested interests on the general population. No one person or group should exercise a monopoly of power over the election process.

Political parties constitute a major instrument of constitutional democracy in which fundamental norms govern the political community and determine relations between the legislature, the people and the interactions among the centres of power. In a democracy, political parties can be formed and can campaign without intimidation. Some countries require political parties to have a minimum level of popular support before they can participate in elections. All political parties must also have access to a free media and other means to broadcast their election manifestos. The electoral process is supervised, monitored and carried out by a neutral body, often an election commission.

However, elections may be rigged and votes bought. Politicians who only appear in their constituencies to enhance their patronage power, to be photographed and filmed distributing largesse are sadly a familiar phenomenon in many countries.

A political establishment that ceases to reflect the aspirations of the citizens loses its political legitimacy. Once that happens, the political establishment could call for new elections. However, it may instead resort to the use of force, fear and intimidation to cling to power. And elections may be suspended or subverted.

Although elections are necessary and may be the most visible aspect of a democracy, there are many examples of the manipulation of election processes to aid and abet autocracy and tyranny. In themselves, elections do not suffice to ensure democracy.


Political Tolerance

The second pillar is political tolerance. Free and fair elections do not give a mandate to oppress or sideline those who have voted against the government. It also does not mean that the majority have the right to rob the minority of its civil liberties, rights, property or life. Tolerance is required for democracy to be sustained over the long run. If minority groups do not benefit equitably from the election process, there can be no peace. That absence of peace would make a mockery of efforts to be democratic.

In many countries, there are examples of rewards being given only for those voters who supported the ruling party, with neglect or punishment for those who voted for the opposition. The distribution of food, water supplies and development resources has been used as a weapon of control to win elections.

 Post-election politics can be punitive on the losers. This happens when the elected government views the minorityกฆs participation in government as an obstacle, rather than finding a way to include the opposition in reasoned debate and, where appropriate, incorporate opposition positions into government policy.

Tolerance has to do with acceptance of diversity in society.  It begins with the way children and young people are brought up. If we teach the young to believe in the principle of winner takes all, we impede the development of democracy. Instead, young people must learn that in an election what the winner earns is an on-going duty to strike a balanced consensus in society. Striking that balance is an art. .

 

Rule of Law

The third pillar of democracy is the rule of law. There has been much debate on the meaning of this. What is clear, though, is the close connection between the rule of law and democracy.

When the political process is subject to laws and a regulatory framework, it enables citizens to judge the lawfulness of the government. They can find answers to some key questions:

    „X Does the government govern according to the law or does it take the position that it is exempt from some inconvenient rules?

    „X Are procedures of government stable and within the law or does government act in an arbitrary fashion, arresting people who challenge its policies and depriving them of their liberty without due process?

I mentioned in my opening remarks the importance of the Magna Carta. That historical document enshrined due process of law. Habeas Corpus is one of the most cherished concepts contained in the Magna Carta. Habeas Corpus prevents arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and execution, by requiring such government action to be justified under law and ensuring the right to due process of the person detained. A political class, which accepts that official actions must comply with the law, is more likely to embrace democracy. Proper application of the rule of law puts a brake on any attempt to destroy liberty, seize property, or violate human rights. It also means that such rules apply across the board to all citizens.

When application of the rule of law is weak, corruption flourishes. Bribery, kickbacks, bid rigging, policy favours for family and cronies are well known in many countries.  In these situations, those who seek enforcement of the law may face intimidation or reprisal.

Democracy becomes dysfunctional when the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the legislature, the private sector, the police and the military all use their power to enrich themselves and advance their own interests at the expense of civil society. Laws notwithstanding, corruption undermines the rule of law.

Judicial neutrality is a key premise of the rule of law. If judges apply one set of rules for those with wealth and influence and another set of rules for those without these assets, the entire political and judicial system falls into disrepute, eroding public trust in government institutions to deliver justice.

The rule of law is rooted in a system of moral values. In South Africa, for decades, the rule of law existed within an apartheid system. The law was based on the colour of oneกฆs skin. In a properly balanced political and legal system that protects the rights of citizens, those with a particular skin colour cannot use it to obstruct justice. Justice and equality are directly linked with the sustainability of democracy. Generally, once the rule of law is compromised, a regime, despite what it may otherwise profess, slips on its democratic credentials and loses its legitimacy.

The rule of law also has a final function. In a constitutional democracy like Thailand, the constitution defines the institutional arrangements that govern in a democracy. Democracy works best when its institutions and officials operate in a system with checks and balances. The rule of law defines the limits to political interference in decision-making processes. With the rule of law, the system is owned in common by all citizens who are subject to the same laws; those governing do not  the system.

 To ensure the functioning of the rule of law, it is vital that the integrity and independence of the judiciary and the entire justice system are not subject to undue influence and illegal intervention.

 

Freedom of Expression

The fourth pillar that sustains democracy is freedom of expression. What people in civil society are allowed to say, print, distribute and discuss is indicative of the democratic nature of a political system. A free press is a measure of the freedom of expression in a society. An Internet that is untrammeled by state control is another.

Few governments, democratic or otherwise, have a genuinely easy relationship with a free press. Yet, despite all its shortcomings, a free press, supported by open Internet access, is indispensable to keeping the public well informed as part of a functioning democracy. Even in an established democracy, government may seek to manipulate a free press into serving its own ends. Governments often conduct spin campaigns, to advance their agenda and dilute the power of independent media.

 New technology is unleashing powerful new forces through quantum expansion of information dissemination and space for public discourse. The Internet has revolutionized participation in political debate and action and fostered the formation of e-communities. Mobile phones serve as critical means of facilitating rapid communication.

In countries with authoritarian practices, freedom of information is high on the governmentกฆs danger list.  Such freedom, as represented by the new media, is a few clicks away on websites such as YouTube and on numerous subject-specific blogs. These new forces have made it much harder for governments to control the flow of information.

The fact remains that even democratically-elected governments will go to great lengths to manipulate public opinion whether on TV, in the print media or the Internet. State influence and control over the flow of information should give us pause. The trappings of democracy may appear healthy, but if freedom of information and press freedom are hollowed out, then democracy is compromised. Constant public vigilance remains instrumental in performing a check-and-balance role. This is not always easy, as the law in many developing democracies is neither supportive of freedom of information nor does it favour the press.

Freedom of expression was thought important enough to place in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides, กงEveryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.

Unless citizens have the right to express themselves in the political process, no government can be made accountable for its actions. However, no democracy has absolute freedom of speech.

The key is to balance national and societal interests to create and maintain the level of discussion required for participation in democracy to be meaningful, while drawing lines that take into account a countryกฆs history and cultural milieu. Each country places its own limitations on freedom of expression. What matters is that those limitations are not misused by political forces to limit public scrutiny of policies and actions that impact on the integrity of public goods. For example, if criminal libel laws effectively thwart whistle blowing on irregularities or corruption, democracy is diminished.

Democracy is about multiple voices. These may be contradictory; some may be more informed than others, while others may be personal opinion, gossip or speculation. That is a marketplace of ideas. As in all marketplaces, not everything is of equal value. So long as our institutions enable people to understand how to assess ideas in this marketplace, selecting the rigorous and rejecting the shoddy, democracy is not only sustained, it thrives.

With the Internet, globalization and mass communications, the marketplace of ideas draws from far beyond the borders of any single democracy. While such a marketplace can no longer be easily crafted and controlled by government, no single government can feel quite comfortable in invoking the means to silence dissent or whistle-blowers.


Accountability and Transparency

The fifth pillar of democracy is accountability and transparency. This means that institutions of government and individuals in those institutions must be held accountable for their actions. A government must be accountable to the people who elected it into power. Furthermore, it must be accountable to an independent judiciary or other impartial institutions established to check government action. Be it agricultural policy, fuel pricing or health care services, decisions must not advance the agendas of vested interest groups over the public interest.

Accountability and transparency essentially have the same purpose: to protect citizens against misguided policies or decisions that enrich a few at the expense of the many. When these two guardian angels are compromised, it is an alarm that good governance is at risk, and the democratic process has stalled.

 

Decentralization

The sixth pillar rests on local or provincial political empowerment. The closer the government is to the people governed, the more responsive the government is likely to be.  At the same time, for decentralized democracy to work, there must also be a decentralization of funding, material and human resources and institutional capability.

Decentralization of the political process is another way to curb the concentration of power and influence exercised by political forces. Citizens become more aware, interested and willing to participate in democracy when they see their officials as neighbours and what is at stake as something close to home.

It is at the local level that we see the best example of how democracy is connected with the daily lives of citizens. The physical proximity of the neighbourhood has the same benefits as the online community of practice in a knowledge economy: people with common interests and shared values express and exchange views and insights, influencing one another. Citizensกฆ right of assembly and participation at the local level nurture the longevity of democracy in a society.

The creation of political parties at the local level facilitates the building of a representative democracy. Local participation by voters and candidates drawn from the same district or province gives credibility and legitimacy to the democratic process.  The local administration becomes a training ground for future national leaders.

 

Civil Society

Civil society is the vital seventh pillar. An active civil society begins its engagement at the grassroots. Community forums, clubs, issue-focused activist groups, charities, cooperatives, unions, think tanks and associations fit under the broad umbrella of civil society. These groups are the participatory vehicles for sustaining grass-root democracy. There is a strong degree of volunteerism, shared interest and common values around which information is gathered, analyzed, views formed and advocacy pursued.

 The health of a democracy may be measured by the authenticity of its civil society and the extent of citizen participation in public policy making. Civil society provides an important source of information for intelligent debate on matters of public interest. Civil society also provides a mechanism whereby the collective views of citizens can shape and influence government policy. By bringing into the public domain arguments and information as a context for examining policy, a democratic government is forced to present counterarguments or to modify its position. Such exchange is healthy for democracy. Finally, it is clear that when the deliberative process within a political system accepts the role played by civil society, it also implicitly agrees that citizens have a role to play in checking government decision-making. A vibrant civil society thus makes for more thorough decision-making in a democracy.

In many countries, there is a history of political patronage. The head of a political entity builds up a personal following whose loyalty is to the individual rather than to a political party or creed. When that happens, democracy cannot be easily sustained.

 

Leadership Qualities

The pillars of democracy that Iกฆve outlined above are necessary but insufficient without leaders to build and maintain the pillars of democracy.

They qualities of leadership for sustainable democracy are to be found in those who act in an honest, transparent and accountable manner. They are consensus builders, open-minded and fair. They are committed to justice and to advancing the public interest. And they are tolerant of opposing positions. Of course, it is often said that democracy is a messy way of governing and that the human condition is flawed. There is truth in both statements. But in admitting our limitations, let us strive to avoid the mistakes of the past and look forward to a new generation of leaders who can build on the lessons of the struggles of ordinary citizens for democracy.

 

SUMMARY

I have shared my observations of pillars that hold up the architecture for sustaining democracy.

To foster a sustainable democracy, a nation must focus its efforts on building a system that empowers people not only through the right to vote, but also through norms, institutions and values that support that right and make it meaningful.

What will sustain democracy is the shared realization that although democracy is far from perfect, the alternatives are even further from perfection. Some societies come to this realization sooner, others later. Some are experimenting to see if only parts of democracy, such as good governance and accountability, can be enjoyed without the burden of full-fledged democracy.

I wish them well. As long as they demonstrate a commitment to the larger welfare and well-being of the people and deliver public services, the majority of their people may well be content with the status quo and not protest.

One point in their favour in some fledgling democracies may be a sense of disappointment with representative democracy. Elected officials, instead of serving and protecting the public interest, serve their own interests and those of their cronies. They arrogate the right to dictate in the name of the majority, while riding roughshod over the minority. They become กงthe public and are no longer representatives.

 For the past three decades or so, there has been a trend towards more direct, participatory democracy. In established democracies, this may be an incremental change. However, going from autocracy to mass participatory democracy is a big leap.

What is important is that the seeds of democracy must be homegrown, for it to be accepted and to function. Each society must work out its own contradictions, its own competing priorities.

Experience everywhere highlights the fragility of democracy.  Even when seemingly well established, democracy can be subject to tampering, especially in times of crisis. I do not believe there is a democracy so strong that it is invulnerable to the greed and ambitions of men. To nurture and sustain democracy, its beneficiaries must also serve as its guardians; the common people must be ever vigilant and wise.  For most of humanity, history has not ended. The struggle for and against democracy will continue far into the night.

 

* Amartya Sen Lecture Series on Sustainable Development

In association with the

Cambridge Society, Oxford Society and Harvard Club, of Belgium

 

(http://www.nationmultimedia.com/worldhotnews/read.php?newsid=30084391) 

 

 

เจรจานอกโต๊ะ

 

 วันที่ 29 กันยายน พ.ศ. 2551 ปีที่ 31 ฉบับที่ 11160 มติชนรายวัน

เจรจานอกโต๊ะ

โดย นิธิ เอียวศรีวงศ์

ทุกครั้งที่มีการ "เจรจา" ระหว่างกลุ่มที่อ้างว่าเป็นองค์กรเคลื่อนไหวด้วยกำลังอาวุธในภาคใต้ กับกลุ่มที่อ้างว่าสามารถเข้าถึงการวางนโยบายของฝ่ายไทย รัฐและสื่อจะทำสองอย่างเหมือนกัน คือ 1/ ไม่เชื่อว่า กลุ่มที่อ้างว่าเป็นองค์กรนั้น เป็นตัวแทนของความเคลื่อนไหวในภาคใต้จริง และ 2/ คนไทยที่ไปร่วมเจรจานั้น กระทำในฐานะเอกชน รัฐไม่เกี่ยว แล้วก็ไม่ได้แถลงอะไรหลังจากนั้นอีก

จะเจตนาหรือไม่ก็ตาม รัฐส่งสัญญาณแก่กลุ่มที่ทำการเคลื่อนไหวตัวจริงว่า รัฐยังไม่พร้อมจะปรับแก้นโยบายที่เกี่ยวกับภาคใต้ตอนล่าง ไม่ว่าจะเป็นนโยบายปกครองหรือนโยบายปราบปราม


การ "เจรจา" ถูกให้ความหมายที่แคบไป กล่าวคือหมายเฉพาะมีฝ่ายที่เกี่ยวข้องขึ้นนั่งโต๊ะ พบหน้ากันโดยตรง แล้วต่างฝ่ายต่างก็ตั้งเงื่อนไขต่างๆ ที่อาจนำไปสู่การหยุดยิงหรือสงบศึกได้ ฉะนั้นฝ่ายที่จะขึ้นไปนั่งโต๊ะได้ จึงต้องเป็นตัวแทนของอำนาจที่แท้จริง ตกลงอะไรกันไว้ ก็สามารถปฏิบัติได้จริงในภาคสนาม

ในสถานการณ์ความรุนแรงที่เกิดขึ้นในสามจังหวัดปัจจุบัน การ "เจรจา" ในความหมายนี้ อาจไม่มีวันเกิดขึ้นได้เลย ด้วยเหตุผลอย่างน้อยสองประการ

1/ คงปฏิเสธไม่ได้ว่า ปฏิบัติการด้วยกำลังอาวุธของฝ่ายเคลื่อนไหวในภาคใต้น่าจะมีองค์กรจัดตั้ง เพราะสามารถหาอาวุธจากแหล่งอื่นๆ ที่ไม่ใช่ปล้นปืนจากฝ่ายไทย ซ้ำเป็นอาวุธที่ร้ายแรงด้วย แสดงว่าต้องมีแหล่งเงินทุนซึ่งไม่ทราบชัดว่าได้จากที่ใด (เรี่ยไร, เก็บภาษี, แหล่งทุนภายในหรือนอกประเทศ, ค้ายาเสพติด, เก็บค่าคุ้มครอง, ฯลฯ หรือทุกอย่างรวมกัน) นอกจากนี้ยังมีเส้นสายพอที่จะส่งคนอย่างน้อยจำนวนหนึ่งออกไปฝึกการรบนอกประเทศ และสามารถประสานการปฏิบัติการในพื้นที่ระดับเมืองใหญ่ของจังหวัดได้

แต่องค์กรจัดตั้งอาจไม่ได้มีองค์กรเดียว และแม้องค์กรปฏิบัติการจะถูกแบ่งย่อยออกไปมากเท่าใดก็ตาม อาจเป็นได้ว่าไม่มีแม้แต่องค์กรรวมศูนย์ที่สามารถกำหนดยุทธศาสตร์ที่เป็นเอกภาพได้

มีเหตุผลที่จะสงสัยเช่นนี้ได้หลายทาง ความจำเป็นที่จะต้องปิดลับ ทำให้ต้องแยกหน่วยบังคับบัญชาให้เล็กมากๆ และเชื่อมโยงกันน้อยที่สุด ทำให้แต่ละหน่วยมีความเป็นอิสระต่อกันสูง จึงง่ายที่จะเกิดความแตกแยก เพราะแต่ละหน่วยต่างเป็นอำนาจสำเร็จในตัวเอง ประสบการณ์ของความเคลื่อนไหวชาวมุสลิมในตะวันออกกลาง ชี้ให้เห็นว่า หน่วยเคลื่อนไหว (ซึ่งมีชื่อกลุ่มที่หลากหลาย) ล้วนเป็นอิสระต่อกัน และปฏิบัติการตามแนวทางของตนเอง ดูเหมือนจะเกื้อกูลกันเอง แต่ก็ขัดแย้งกันในตัวด้วย เพราะปฏิบัติการหลายอย่างไม่เป็นผลดีแก่เป้าหมายระยะยาวของอีกกลุ่มหนึ่งเป็นต้น ซ้ำยังเกิดแตกแยกถึงจับอาวุธเข้าประหัตประหารกันเอง (เช่นในปาเลสไตน์) ก็มี แม้ในประเทศไทยเอง การเคลื่อนไหวของชาวมลายูมุสลิมในอดีต ก็เคยขัดแย้งถึงกับใช้อาวุธเข้าต่อสู้กันมาแล้ว

ที่จริงแล้ว กองทัพแห่งชาติที่งอกออกมาจากสงครามกองโจรในการปฏิวัติกู้ชาติของหลายประเทศ (นับตั้งแต่ไอร์แลนด์ถึงอุษาคเนย์) ก็มักมีขุนศึกครองอำนาจอยู่ในพื้นที่เฉพาะของตน แม้ยอมรวมตัวอยู่ในกองทัพแห่งชาติเดียวกันก็ตาม

ในกรณีของกองทัพแดงซึ่งสามารถรักษาเอกภาพไว้ได้สืบมา พรรคคอมมิวนิสต์จะเน้นความสำคัญของการประสานงานระหว่างหน่วยย่อยในท้องถิ่นอย่างมาก การประชุมสมัชชากระทำกันมาก่อนที่พรรคจะได้อำนาจรัฐ ยังไม่พูดถึงสมาชิกโปลิตบูโรซึ่งต้องเดินทางออกตรวจเยี่ยมหน่วยต่างๆ อยู่เสมอ และการอบรมเชิงอุดมการณ์ซึ่งทุกหน่วยต้องทำด้วยตำราที่พรรคเห็นชอบ

แน่นอนว่าการกระทำเช่นนี้ย่อมเป็นเหตุให้ฝ่ายรัฐสืบจับ และ/หรือทำลายสายโยงใยของพรรคได้ แต่ก็เป็นความจำเป็นอย่างหลีกเลี่ยงไม่ได้

ในกรณีของการเคลื่อนไหวในภาคใต้ 6-7 ปีที่ผ่านมา ฝ่ายรัฐไม่อาจตรวจจับสายโยงใยเหล่านี้ได้เลย... จะประชุมปรับเปลี่ยนยุทธศาสตร์กันโดยฝ่ายรัฐไม่ระแคะระคายเลยเป็นไปไม่ได้ เว้นแต่ว่าองค์กรจัดตั้งประกอบด้วยคนจำนวนน้อยมากๆ แต่หากเป็นเช่นนั้น จะบังคับบัญชาและดำเนินยุทธวิธีอย่างไรให้เป็นเอกภาพ

ฉะนั้นจึงหาตัวแทนของอำนาจที่เป็นเอกภาพไม่ได้ ไม่มีประโยชน์ที่จะกล่าวว่ากลุ่มที่ขอเจรจาหรือยอมเจรจาเป็นหรือไม่เป็นตัวแทนที่แท้จริง เพราะถึงเป็น ก็มิได้หมายความว่าจะสามารถแทนผู้ปฏิบัติการได้ทุกกลุ่ม

แท้ที่จริงแล้ว ความไม่พอใจรัฐไทยของกลุ่มต่างๆ ได้สั่งสมมานานแล้ว ไม่ว่ากลุ่มเหล่านั้นจะร่วมกับการเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองในปัจจุบันหรือไม่ (และร่วมอย่างสกรรมหรืออกรรม active-passive) ถ้าคนเหล่านั้น ได้บอกให้รู้ว่าเขาไม่พอใจเรื่องอะไรบ้าง ก็นับว่าเป็นประโยชน์แก่รัฐอย่างแน่นอน

2/ สถานการณ์จนถึงทุกวันนี้ ไม่สุกงอมให้แก่การเจรจาแบบนั่งโต๊ะ เพราะตามปกติแล้ว การ "เจรจา" จะเกิดขึ้น (ไม่ว่าจะมีคนกลางเป็นผู้เชื่อมประสานหรือไม่) ก็ต่อเมื่อทั้งสองฝ่ายคิดว่าตัวอยู่ในสถานการณ์ที่อาจต่อรองกันได้บนโต๊ะ ทั้งนี้ ตั้งอยู่บนสมมติฐานว่า ไม่มีใครอยากเสียเลือดเนื้อโดยไม่จำเป็น แต่สถานการณ์ในประเทศไทยขณะนี้ไม่อยู่ในสภาพดังกล่าว รัฐไทยไม่มีท่าทียอมรับการแยกดินแดนออกจากประเทศไทยได้ อันเป็นเงื่อนไขที่อาจไม่ใช่เป้าประสงค์แท้จริงของอีกฝ่ายหนึ่ง แต่ตั้งให้สูงไว้สำหรับการต่อรอง ในทางตรงกันข้าม ฝ่ายเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองในขณะนี้ ก็ยังไม่มีท่าทีว่าจำเป็นต้องร่นถอยจนปฏิบัติการไม่ได้

เราต่างคิดเหมือนกันว่า ในระยะยาวแล้ว จะจัดการให้ถือไพ่ใบเหนือกว่าได้ ฉะนั้นอย่าพึงหวังว่าจะมีการ "เจรจา" บนโต๊ะที่ใดในโลกนี้ ซึ่งสามารถยุติความรุนแรงลงได้ฉับพลัน

แต่การ "เจรจา" เป็นสิ่งจำเป็น และมีประโยชน์ หากเราไม่จำกัดความการ "เจรจา" ให้แคบเหลือเพียง การได้พบปะพูดคุยกันบนโต๊ะเท่านั้น

เป็นปรกติธรรมดาเช่นกันที่ ในความขัดแย้งใดๆ ทั้งสองฝ่ายต้องพยายามส่งสัญญาณแก่กัน ไม่โดยตรงก็โดยอ้อมหรือโดยท่าที แท้จริงแล้ว หากวิเคราะห์ปฏิบัติการของฝ่ายเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมือง ก็จะพบสัญญาณต่างๆ มากมาย ทั้งในใบปลิว, เป้าของการก่อความรุนแรง, และการโฆษณาเกลี้ยกล่อมหาสมาชิกใหม่ ฯลฯ รัฐไทยก็อาจทำอย่างเดียวกัน โดยทำให้อีกฝ่ายหนึ่งรู้ว่า รัฐไทยมีนโยบายจะแก้ไขปรับปรุงอะไรบ้าง   เพื่อทำให้ประชาชนในพื้นที่ยอมรับว่ารัฐมีความยุติธรรมต่อประชาชนทุกหมู่เหล่า เฉพาะในกรณีของสามจังหวัด รัฐอาจทำอะไรมากไปกว่านั้นอีกก็ได้ หากจำเป็น เช่นวางหลักสูตรการศึกษาที่มีลักษณะเฉพาะเพื่อเอื้อต่อวัฒนธรรมและระบบเศรษฐกิจที่แตกต่าง เป็นต้น

รัฐสามารถ "เจรจา" ผ่านช่องทางได้หลายทาง นับตั้งแต่การวางนโยบายให้ชัดและนำไปสู่การปฏิบัติจริงในพื้นที่ รวมถึงการนั่งโต๊ะเจรจากับกลุ่มต่างๆ ที่อ้างว่าเป็นตัวแทนของความเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมือง

เช่นกรณีการเจรจาที่โบกอร์ บนเกาะชวาเมื่อเร็วๆ นี้ มีข้อเรียกร้องที่ชัดเจน เช่นการใช้ภาษามลายูในพื้นที่ เป็นต้น รัฐไทยควรส่งสัญญาณตอบ อย่างน้อยก็รับไว้พิจารณา หากยอมรับก็ต้องเตรียมการอย่างเป็นรูปธรรมว่าจะเป็นไปได้ในลักษณะใดบ้าง

นี่คือการ "เจรจา" อย่างหนึ่ง คู่เจรจาอาจไม่ใช่คนที่นั่งรอบโต๊ะที่โบกอร์เท่ากับประชาชนจำนวนหนึ่งในภาคใต้ ซึ่งมีความคิดทำนองเดียวกัน สัญญาณสำคัญที่ให้แก่ทุกฝ่ายก็คือ รัฐไทยนั้นพร้อมจะปรับแก้สิ่งต่างๆ เพื่อบรรเทาความไม่พอใจที่ประชาชนมีต่อรัฐ การส่งสัญญาณให้รัฐรู้เป็นช่องทางที่จะแก้ปัญหาซึ่งผู้คนต้องเผชิญอยู่ในชีวิตของเขา ได้ดีกว่าและมีประสิทธิภาพกว่าการจับอาวุธขึ้นเรียกร้อง

ความรุนแรงที่เกิดในภาคใต้เป็นปัญหาของไทย เราจึงควรดำเนินการแก้ไขสิ่งที่ประชาชนเห็นว่าเป็นปัญหาอย่างฉับไว และถูกจุด การส่งสัญญาณของกลุ่มต่างๆ ไม่ว่าจะเป็นตัวแทนความเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองในพื้นที่หรือไม่ จึงมีความสำคัญ เพราะช่วยบอกให้เรารู้ว่าเราควรปรับแก้อะไร ในขณะเดียวกันก็ส่งสัญญาณกลับไปให้ได้รู้ว่า จุดสูงสุดที่เราจะโอนอ่อนผ่อนปรนนั้นแค่ไหนกันแน่

กลุ่มคนที่เข้าร่วมในการเคลื่อนไหวครั้งนี้ ควรได้รับสัญญาณจากการ "เจรจา" ทางอ้อมเช่นนี้ เขามีหน้าที่ตัดสินใจเองว่า ควรใช้วิธีต่อรองกับรัฐไทยอย่างไร จึงจะได้ผลที่เขาต้องการ ไม่มากก็น้อย

เราสามารถ "เจรจา" กับกลุ่มที่ร่วมในความเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองได้ตลอดเวลา โดยไม่ต้องขึ้นโต๊ะเลย แต่เขาสามารถรู้ได้ว่า เราพูดอะไร ขอเพียงให้เราฟังเขาก่อนเท่านั้น แทนที่จะรีบบอกปัดและปฏิเสธแต่ต้น

หน้า 6

(http://www.matichon.co.th/matichon/view_news.php?newsid=01act01290951&sectionid=0130&day=2008-09-29) 

 

 

 

Giving up on democracy for Thailand


By Chang Noi

Tue, December 12, 2006  


Over the past few days, Sondhi Limthongkul has made a mini-tour of the US, talking to audiences of Thais and interested observers.

His message was stark. The experience of Thaksin has shown that electoral democracy cannot work in Thailand. The mass of rural people who constitute the largest element in the electorate do not have the knowledge to participate properly. They sell their votes, either retail to the local canvasser, or wholesale to the populist who promises them goodies. This commercialism breeds a style of politician who is greedy and corrupt. The last few years have shown that a constitution, however well crafted, cannot impose any semblance of good governance.

What Sondhi says is important because he served as the lightning rod for the Bangkok middle class's emotional rejection of Thaksin. In many ways, he was a surprising candidate for this role. He had been one of Thaksin's most fervent supporters for five years. The two men are so similar that if you set out to clone Thaksin and made a tiny mistake you might finish up creating Sondhi. He became a key leader of the anti-Thaksin movement for two reasons: he had rare access to media outlets, and he changed his own tune to brilliantly articulate Bangkok middle-class opinion. We have to pay attention to him because he is undoubtedly still trying to channel this middle-class voice. 

What he is saying is not new, but as old as Thailand's first fragile experiments with democracy. Underlying his views is the city's fear of the countryside, the middle class's fear of the peasant.

In 1932, the pioneers of Thailand's middle-class politicians stopped short of ushering in a new democracy on the grounds the provinces were not yet ready. In the 1970s the middle class backed the military to thwart a pro-peasant insurgency. In the 1990s the middle class quietly cheered the Democrat governments for turning their backs on rural protesters, and occasionally beating them over the head. 

Underlying this fear is the huge divide in Thai society - not just the massive inequality in incomes, but the great imbalance in the distribution of social services and public goods, and also the cultural gap, which has widened as the city has grown richer, more confident and more dazzled by globalisation. Over a decade ago the political scientist Anek Laothammatas mused on the political consequences of having society divided into two virtual nations. The city people harboured dreams of a Western-style liberal democracy, but the villagers sent gangsters as MPs to the capital to wrest away whatever resources they could bring back to their constituencies while making some private benefit on the side. The constant clash of these two political cultures resulted in endemic political instability. Anek's answer was to educate the villagers in democracy, but also to put their needs on the national political agenda so that the gangsters would no longer have a role. 

To a very large extent, Thaksin was following that second part of Anek's agenda. The platform his advisers assembled before the 2001 election was simply a collection of measures that the rural electors said they wanted. The claim he made at the 2005 poll was that he alone could act as a channel for rural demands because other parties were not interested.

Thaksin's populism was sometimes crude, often extravagant, and always a cover for corruption, cronyism and profiteering. But what made this populism truly frightening for the middle class - and hence the focus of Sondhi's tirade - was its political implications. Thaksin was giving political legitimacy to rural demands. If this trend were followed to its logical conclusion, it would undermine the city's undue share of government spending and public goods. There would also be a bill, which the well-off might be asked to pay.

Sondhi is appealing to a deep vein of middle-class fear. Bangkokians no longer have to worry about rural revolution, and have even been spared the sight of rural protesters cluttering up the Bangkok pavements (an unappreciated benefit of the Thaksin era). But they understand that, deep down, electoral politics is a battle over the command of resources, and that Thaksin's populism showed the rural mass was starting to gain a larger share.

Seven years ago, on the eve of Thaksin's rise, Chang Noi wrote a piece on this same theme, joking that Bangkok would like to copy the Singapore Solution (giving away your rural hinterland, as Singapore did by splitting from Malaysia) or build a Great Wall round the city.  But Sondhi's solution is serious. He is turning his back on the last 75 years of Thailand's political history, saying that Thailand's social reality makes electoral democracy unworkable and constitutions futile.

Compared to Anek's proposals of a decade earlier, Sondhi's thinking represents a considerable hardening of attitudes. He claims he will continue to work for democracy, but only with the middle class because they alone understand that populist politicians abuse power. By implication, the rural masses do not qualify for this "democracy" so must be excluded or contained. 

This thinking may find its way into the drafting of the new constitution, in the form of measures designed to "upweight" the effective representation of Bangkok and "downweight" that of the countryside (for example, through a Senate partly appointed and partly elected as a single national constituency).

But this will fail. Thaksin became a populist not because he was born a populist but because he recognised there was a political demand which he could exploit to gain and retain power. Thaksin's populism does not show, as Sondhi claims, that the rural electorate is stupid, but rather that it is becoming more politicised and more astute in getting what it wants. Removing Thaksin from the political scene will not destroy the populism he came to represent. A constitutional solution that tries to ensure rural demands do not get the hearing they deserve in the formal politics of the nation will simply re-direct those demands elsewhere.

(http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/27/opinion/opinion_30020039.php) 

 

 

Sunday, September 28, 2008

Crisis, brinkmanship, stalemate _ what's next?



THAI POLITICS

Crisis, brinkmanship, stalemate _ what's next?

ATIYA ACHAKULWISUT

Thursday July 03, 2008 

They may not agree on the exact causes that have led Thailand to the stalemate it is in today. A few academics, however, concur that we are witnessing a kind of political deja vu. The confrontation between the Samak government and its outside-of-parliament opposition led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) mimicks the face-off before the Sept 19, 2006 coup, with but a few variations in terms of people involved and issues contested.

The similar tension and appearance of a political deadlock has led some people to ask: how will it be resolved? Will we witness a bloody clash? Are we heading down the same path which ends in the need for another military intervention?

Siripun Noksuan, from Thailand Democracy Watch project, Chulalongkorn University, points to the Sept coup itself as the start of this latest crisis.

''One crucial result of the coup was the dissolution of the Thai Rak Thai party, which was probably done with the hope that we would see a new batch of politicians instead of old veterans.

''Another was the drafting of the new rules _ the 2007 Constitution. Do these two acts serve the purpose they were intended for?

''No. We don't see new politicians. We see new parties, with the same old faces.''

Ms Siripun was one of the speakers at yesterday's panel discussion, ''Crisis, Brinkmanship, Stalemate: What is next for Thailand?'' organised by the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University.

She added that the lesson of the coup is that military intervention should not be allowed to happen again, as it would fail to tackle the problems the country is facing.

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University, traces the start of the stalemate to the birth of the first Thaksin Shinawatra government about 10 years ago.

''What ensued was continued economic expansion. The catch, however, was that the benefits of that growth were concentrated among a small group of people especially in Bangkok. The prosperity was never allowed to trickle down to people in the rural sector or in the lower echelons of society.''

Then, one day, a political party found a way to capitalise on the inequality, thus unlocking the key to almost sure-fire success at the polls.

The Thai Rak Thai party captured the hopes and dreams of the have-nots. It promised _ threatened _ to redistribute the wealth generated by the economic growth to those who have never tasted it, via its many populist projects.

The problem was, there were people _ the old money _ who stood to lose from Mr Thaksin's attempt at redistribution. And they fought against it.

They are still fighting, as they see the present government led by the People's Power party as nothing but a reincarnation of the now-defunct TRT.

According to Mr Thitinan, the conflict is structural. It has not been affected by the changes during the past one and a half years and has a tendency to drag on, as each camp seems to put in more effort and up the ante as the contest continues.

Supavud Saicheua, managing director and head of research, Phatra Securities PCL, sees a great deal of economic contention in the current political crisis.

Up until the financial collapse of 1997, the Thai ruling elite, business people, middle or working class had their interests more or less allied in the continued expansion of the economy.

The 1997 bursting of the financial bubble, which occurred after a financial deregulation allowed Thai capitalists to access foreign money to fund their ventures, marked a dissent in how members of the different groups in Thai society perceived the process of globalisation.

''The elite began to distrust it. They began to feel that partaking in the globalised economy caused them to lose their economic and probably political power too,'' Mr Supavud said.

Mr Thaksin, however, is arguably the most globalised politician Thailand has ever seen, Mr Supavud added. He is one of the few politicians who has an idea about how Thailand could link up with the globalised economy, in which areas and when. In short, he showed all eagerness to plunge fully into it.

The Establishment, with increasing doubts about what harm globalisation could cause them, could not accept this.

In this light, the stalemate is not only political in nature but also very much economic, said Mr Supavud.

So, what's next? Is there a solution or way out of this crisis?

Mr Thitinan believes the Samak government is nearing its end as it has not been able to perform its duties.

A cabinet reshuffle or House dissolution might be in order and it would actually serve as a good sign, a way for the country to move out of the current impasse within democratic means.

In the long run, the main actors in the current political stage must step back from the politics of possessiveness that they have engaged in.

''The future is about compromising and sharing,'' he said, meaning both economic benefits and power.

''If the 'old money' still refuses to distribute some of the economic benefits, the tension will rise and it might explode.

''The problem is that so far the agent of change, who understood what he had to do and who could do it quickly and effectively, is seen as being dishonest. So, society will need a new batch of agents of change who have both the necessary skills, legitimacy and moral integrity, too,'' Mr Thitinan said.

Ms Siripun says that while many people are calling for some form of reconciliation as a way out of the crisis, she thinks that is not what Thailand wants at this moment.

What the country needs _ and badly _ is a better, more stringent system of checks and balances.

She noted that the judicial branch has exerted power in this area quite a lot lately, as seen in the Administration Court nullifying a cabinet resolution that endorsed a joint communique between the Thai foreign minister and his Cambodian counterpart. There is a risk in relying on the judicial review as a solution to the political problems, though.

''In reality, a court's judgement does not always put an end to any dispute. A group of lecturers from Thammasat University, for example, are arguing that the Administrative Court does not have the power to issue an injunction against the joint communique.

''The problem is, what institution do we have left that could deal with disagreement with a court's ruling?

''Also, there is the classic question of who will watch the court? Who or what will the court be accountable to?''

Ms Siripun says that she sees another contest in the current crisis. It is between the ever-expanding need from civic groups to participate in public policy-making, and a government which does not want to stray away from its traditional way of operating in a closed, know-it-all manner.

''The 1997 and 2007 constitutions open the channels for the public to participate in the administration of the country. People know of their rights and they can't be stopped.

''All the cabinet resolutions or policies will increasingly be monitored and checked by the civil society groups. But the government has not been able to adjust itself to the new demand.''

There is an opportunity in this aspect of the crisis, however.

''The government must open up more channels for public participation. That way, they can reduce the tension as well as improve the efficiency of their work,'' she said.

''For example, had they consulted the public they wouldn't now have to waste time changing the cabinet resolution regarding the Preah Vihear joint communique,'' said Ms Siripun of Thailand Democracy Watch.

(http://www.bangkokpost.com/030708_News/03Jul2008_news22.php)   

 

In with the old, out with the new





By Peter Janssen, dpa

19 Aug 2008 


Bangkok (dpa) - Military coups d'etat are nothing new to Thailand.

Thailand's muddy road to democracy was kicked off with a coup d'etat in 1932, which ended the centuries-old absolute monarchy and replaced it by a pseudo-democray under a constitutional monarchy.

Seventy-four years and at least 17 coups later Thailand is still solving it political crises with military men mobilizing troops and tanks in the streets of Bangkok, the capital.

The 1991 coup was led by Army Commander-in-Chief Suchinda Kraphayoon to oust Thailand's first truly "elected" prime minister Chatchai Choonhavan to put an end to his "buffet cabinet."

Similarly, the military political blitzkrieg staged Tuesday night by Army chief Sonthi Boonyaratklin, was necessitated by rising corruption, a growing rift in national unity and prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's undermining of independent agencies and the monarchy.

Sonthi, in his first public address, insisted he was not interested in becoming a "substitute ruler" and pledged to return power to the people "as soon as possible."

What is new about this coup is it's target, Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) Party, or what some commentators term the "Thaksin Order."

Like him or not, Thaksin, a billionaire former telecommunications tycoon who first became premier in 2001 on a platform of populist policies designed to win over rural and urban poor, became a new phenomenon on Thailand's political landscape.

Not only was Thaksin the first political leader to fully appreciate that government handouts was a far more successful means of winning elections and securing followers than vote-buying - Thailand's traditional method - but he was also the first leader to benefit from the enhanced executive powers of the premiership under Thailand's new 1997 constitution.

Ironically, the "liberal" constitution was designed to strengthen the political party system over the military, while introducing new independent bodies such as an election commission, counter-corruption commission and constitutional court to assure checks and balances on the executive powers.

What the constitution did not foresee, was the emergence of a prime minister of Thaksin's tremendous spending power. Thaksin was one of Thailand's richest businessmen before becoming prime minister.

When his family sold off its 49 per cent share in the Thaksin-founded Shin Corp - Thailand's largest telecommunications conglomerate - to Temasek Holding of Singapore in January, this year, the clan earned another 1.9 billion dollars in tax-free gains.

While the sale may have been a smart business move (Thaksin pushed though legislation that hiked the maximum holding by foreigners to a 49 per cent in Thai telecommunication companies three days before the sale) it has proven his political downfall.

The sale sparked anti-Thaksin street protests in Bangkok that eventually forced the premier to dissolve parliament in February and call for a snap election on April 2.

Thailand's three main opposition parties boycotted the April 2 polls, which Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party won. The results, however, were annulled by the constitutional court in May after Thailand's much revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej said he had found the election undemocratic and urged the judiciary to act.

Thaksin's political fortunes were on the decline since, with the game finally coming to end with Tuesday's night coup in Bangkok while the caretaker premier was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly.

How Thaksin failed to see the coup coming remains a mystery.

"He underestimated the rift between his government and the military," said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political science professor at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University.

 

Thaksin has been pushing his luck with General Sonthi for weeks, first blaming an alleged assassination attempt against him on the military and then tampering with the military's annual reshuffle.

Now that the military is back in charge, most political observers believe they will stay there until they have succeeded in unravelling the "New Thaksin Order," roots and all.

"The order he has constructed over the past five years is something they have to get rid of, to exterminate, otherwise Thaksin's supporters and loyalists, who are widespread and entrenched, could make a comeback," said Thitinan.

Thitinan predicts that the military will first set up an interim civilian government this week and then launch the process of drafting a new anti-Thaksin constitution, with a new election not expected until late 2007 or early 2008.

In other words, returning power to the people may take more than a year, partly because the people in the past have shown a tendency to vote for Thaksin. His Thai Rak Thai Party has won the past three elections by landslides.

"I think we need an election within six months but the problem is I don't think it will be easy for the military to allow an election very soon, because they are afraid of the Thai Rak Thai Party, but if you restore democracy then obviously the TRT has the right to contest an election," said Jon Ungphakorn, a former senator.

 

http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=113046