In with the old, out with the new

By Peter Janssen, dpa

19 Aug 2008 

Bangkok (dpa) - Military coups d'etat are nothing new to Thailand.

Thailand's muddy road to democracy was kicked off with a coup d'etat in 1932, which ended the centuries-old absolute monarchy and replaced it by a pseudo-democray under a constitutional monarchy.

Seventy-four years and at least 17 coups later Thailand is still solving it political crises with military men mobilizing troops and tanks in the streets of Bangkok, the capital.

The 1991 coup was led by Army Commander-in-Chief Suchinda Kraphayoon to oust Thailand's first truly "elected" prime minister Chatchai Choonhavan to put an end to his "buffet cabinet."

Similarly, the military political blitzkrieg staged Tuesday night by Army chief Sonthi Boonyaratklin, was necessitated by rising corruption, a growing rift in national unity and prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra's undermining of independent agencies and the monarchy.

Sonthi, in his first public address, insisted he was not interested in becoming a "substitute ruler" and pledged to return power to the people "as soon as possible."

What is new about this coup is it's target, Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais) Party, or what some commentators term the "Thaksin Order."

Like him or not, Thaksin, a billionaire former telecommunications tycoon who first became premier in 2001 on a platform of populist policies designed to win over rural and urban poor, became a new phenomenon on Thailand's political landscape.

Not only was Thaksin the first political leader to fully appreciate that government handouts was a far more successful means of winning elections and securing followers than vote-buying - Thailand's traditional method - but he was also the first leader to benefit from the enhanced executive powers of the premiership under Thailand's new 1997 constitution.

Ironically, the "liberal" constitution was designed to strengthen the political party system over the military, while introducing new independent bodies such as an election commission, counter-corruption commission and constitutional court to assure checks and balances on the executive powers.

What the constitution did not foresee, was the emergence of a prime minister of Thaksin's tremendous spending power. Thaksin was one of Thailand's richest businessmen before becoming prime minister.

When his family sold off its 49 per cent share in the Thaksin-founded Shin Corp - Thailand's largest telecommunications conglomerate - to Temasek Holding of Singapore in January, this year, the clan earned another 1.9 billion dollars in tax-free gains.

While the sale may have been a smart business move (Thaksin pushed though legislation that hiked the maximum holding by foreigners to a 49 per cent in Thai telecommunication companies three days before the sale) it has proven his political downfall.

The sale sparked anti-Thaksin street protests in Bangkok that eventually forced the premier to dissolve parliament in February and call for a snap election on April 2.

Thailand's three main opposition parties boycotted the April 2 polls, which Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party won. The results, however, were annulled by the constitutional court in May after Thailand's much revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej said he had found the election undemocratic and urged the judiciary to act.

Thaksin's political fortunes were on the decline since, with the game finally coming to end with Tuesday's night coup in Bangkok while the caretaker premier was in New York to attend the UN General Assembly.

How Thaksin failed to see the coup coming remains a mystery.

"He underestimated the rift between his government and the military," said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political science professor at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University.

 

Thaksin has been pushing his luck with General Sonthi for weeks, first blaming an alleged assassination attempt against him on the military and then tampering with the military's annual reshuffle.

Now that the military is back in charge, most political observers believe they will stay there until they have succeeded in unravelling the "New Thaksin Order," roots and all.

"The order he has constructed over the past five years is something they have to get rid of, to exterminate, otherwise Thaksin's supporters and loyalists, who are widespread and entrenched, could make a comeback," said Thitinan.

Thitinan predicts that the military will first set up an interim civilian government this week and then launch the process of drafting a new anti-Thaksin constitution, with a new election not expected until late 2007 or early 2008.

In other words, returning power to the people may take more than a year, partly because the people in the past have shown a tendency to vote for Thaksin. His Thai Rak Thai Party has won the past three elections by landslides.

"I think we need an election within six months but the problem is I don't think it will be easy for the military to allow an election very soon, because they are afraid of the Thai Rak Thai Party, but if you restore democracy then obviously the TRT has the right to contest an election," said Jon Ungphakorn, a former senator.

 

http://www.bangkokpost.com/breaking_news/breakingnews.php?id=113046 

 

What has the junta achieved?

 

What has the junta achieved?    

2 Sep 2008 

When Thailand's military top brass take stock of their accomplishments in 2007, there may be some serious helmet scratching over whether their September 19, 2006, coup was worth the effort.

True, they raised the defence budget by a good 35 per cent, drew up a wish list of new weapons - including a submarine - worth 9.3 billion dollars to be purchased over the next decade, and got a few generals lucrative posts at state enterprises.

They also pushed through a new constitution that makes it a lot harder for anyone to monopolize Thailand's political scene the way coup-ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai party did from 2001 to 2006, upsetting the country's old elite.

And most likely a new Internal Security Act will be adopted before the general election on December 23, to institutionalize the army's lead role in security matters including future political crises, and re-establish the Internal Security Operations Command as a key player in the provinces.

But has the exercise really been worth it? From the start, even the coup makers have shown themselves to be reluctant dictators.

"This last coup was not normal," said Panitan Wattanayagorn, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn University who is considered Thailand's leading expert on the military matters.

"Their grip on power was not tight, the way they administered the coup was not well planned and once they took power they were quite reluctant to use power," he said.

Only in Thailand, which has experienced 18 military coups since 1932, when the absolute monarchy was overthrown by junior officers, can one make a distinction between a normal and an abnormal coup.

One thing is certain, the September 19 coup was a lot less successful on the economic front than the military's 1991 coup.

The 1991 coup put in place a team of technocrats led by the far-sighted former diplomat Anand Panyarachun, who pushed through more than 300 laws that put the country's economy well on the road to globalization.

It may have been a step back for democracy, but many Thais thought the sacrifice well worth it.

Things have been a lot different this time round. Thailand's appointed cabinet led by Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, a retired army general, has failed to stimulate the economy in 2007 and instead pushed legislation that has scared away private investment.

Thailand's economy is expected to grow only 4.3 per cent this year, the lowest in South-East Asia.

Most economists blame the poor performance on Thailand's political crisis, which started in early 2006 with protests against Thaksin, and is far from over.

The September 19 coup has kept Thaksin out of Thailand for the past year. He has been enjoying self-exile in England, where he purchased the Manchester City football club, but it has not kept him out of Thailand's political picture.

"They have taken back power but they can't subdue the forces that were released during Thaksin's time," said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies. Chief among those forces are higher expectations from Thailand's poor for a better deal from the state.

Thaksin's main contribution to Thai politics were populist policies that promised and delivered services to the rural and urban poor, and won his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party two elections in 2001 and 2005.

Although the party was disbanded by the Constitutional Court in May, and its 111 top members including Thaksin banned from politics over the next five years, his populist legacy lives on.

At least three of the political parties contesting the December 23 polls are offspring of the TRT. People Power Party's leader (PPP) Samak Sundaravej has openly declared himself a "nominee" for Thaksin.

Given Thaksin's ongoing popularity, especially in the north and north-eastern regions where the majority on the rural poor live, chances are high that the party will win the most seats in the general election.

Thailand's post-election stability hinges on how many seats PPP wins and whether Samak, an outspoken and brash politician, becomes the next prime minister.

"The worst case scenario is that Khun (Mr) Samak wins by a landslide, sets up a government and starts to prosecute the military and initiates an amnesty law to bring back Thaksin," said Panitan. "I'm sure that within days you will see the tanks on the street."

That is a scenario even the military may have mixed emotions about.

"The coup has become the easiest part now," said Thitinan. "What to do with Thailand is the hard part."

Thailand's political challenges ahead will test the credibility of any government, let alone another army-appointed one.

"We have a neo-feudal society in the 21st century, which is anachronistic and incompatible with the new trends, new expectations and new demands," Thitinan said. "It's going to give way." (dpa)

(http://www.bangkokpost.net/topstories/topstories.php?id=124358 )

 

 

 

 

 

Thailand's Political Crisis

A Coup for the Rich : Thailand's Political Crisis


A Coup for the Rich. Thailand's Political Crisis, Giles Ji Ungpakorn (Bangkok: Workers Democracy Publishing, 2007)

On 19 September 2006, the Thai military seized power from the government led by Thaksin Shinawatra. Fully armed troops using tanks and humvees occupied Bangkok's television stations and staked out a range of buildings, including the parliament. The military claimed that they were acting to restore democracy and to protect the monarchy.

Their claim to be restoring democracy was a reference to the widely held view amongst the middle classes that Thaksin had become an autocrat. Of course, the military's claims to be restoring democracy would have been a remarkable turnaround from their previous political involvement which had always been antidemocratic. In fact, the new "democratic" military acted no differently from their predecessors; they declared martial law (in March 2007, this continued in many provinces), revoked the 1997 Constitution, limited civil liberties, and controlled the media. Some daft foreigners accepted the military's claims about this putsch being a "good coup," getting rid of a government that was considered corrupt. For example, the Asia Foundation's Director in Bangkok, James Klein, claimed that this coup was "... probably ... the first time that there wasn't some political agenda." Even the military didn't make such an extraordinary declaration.

Following the coup, when troops were still on the streets, Ji Ungpakorn was one of the first Thais to publicly demand that the military withdraw from politics. He was involved with a small group of protesters that was the first to defy the military's ban on demonstrations, and has been bravely critical of the military, its government and the palace's role in making the coup.
The author's actions alone mean that A Coup For the Rich is a book that should make interesting reading. In fact, this is the first book in English to challenge the return to military rule. In Thailand, the book is controversial for it offers interpretations that challenge conventional understandings. Indeed, some bookshops have refused to carry it. The author is a professor of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University and it is scandalous that his own University's bookshop has refused to sell the book.

Ji Ungpakorn makes his political views clear throughout the book. As a Trotskyist, he brings that particular lens to this study of the 2006 coup, but that lens highlights many aspects of Thailand's politics that have been missing in the media coverage of the coup and in much of the growing debate on the role of the military and the palace.

The title--A Coup For the Rich--is interesting in itself. Many observers have neglected the class character of the coup. For example, there have been few reports of the military's continued threats against opponents in poor rural areas and the city's slums. The author makes it his task to reveal the class interests that have been involved in recent Thai politics and post-coup events. Unlike mainstream discussions, he goes beyond the ruling class and examines the role of social movements that claim to represent the working class and farmers. In examining the relationships between the elite and the oppressed and dispossessed, the author is able to pinpoint a number of conflicts that have been overlooked in other accounts of the coup. And, Ji Ungpakorn does this in an accessible style. While there are some problems of repetition and production, given the time and resources available to the author, A Coup For the Rich is quite an achievement.

The book is divided into four chapters. The first three of these are mainly about the coup, its aftermath and the author's assessment of the state of the people's movements. Chapter 1 begins with a brief account of the coup, the Thaksin government and its policies. Noting the business community's generalised support for Thaksin, Ji Ungpakorn devotes most attention to the "People's Movement" which, at least in the latter days of his government, was critical of Thaksin's corruption, authoritarianism and conflicts of interest. The core of the chapter is a critical examination of "tank liberals." The author uses this term to identify the way so-called democracy activists supported the overthrow of an elected government, repeatedly called for the extra-constitutional intervention of the monarchy and celebrated the palace-military coup. The author reveals the deeply held antidemocratic ideas and elitist affinities of those who have long been portrayed as liberals and democrats, and shows how they fear the empowerment of the masses.

Chapter 2 (Inventing Ancient Thai Traditions) is essentially a consideration of the role of the monarchy in contemporary Thailand. Ji Ungpakorn begins this chapter by noting that the role and position of the monarchy is much debated in Thailand. This may come as a surprise to many foreigners who seem to buy the propaganda that has it that the monarchy is above criticism and its role cannot be debated. Rather, the author explains how the current propaganda about the monarch is a manufactured image. In fact, the king's PR machine has pumped out so much syrupy material that it has created an image of a god-like monarch that is perhaps only matched for its hagiographic heights by North Korean treatments of Kim Jong-il. This book presents alternative images of King Bhumibol, reminding readers that the current image is manufactured. One criticism of this chapter--and much of the book's analysis--is the omission of a discussion of the source of the ruling class's power. For example, this chapter might have included a little more detail of the monarchy's fabulous wealth or the palace's re-emergence as one of Thailand's major capitalist business groups.

Chapter 3 takes up some of the issues raised in Chapter 1, with Ji Ungpakorn focusing on the "October Generation" of activists that developed from the October 1973 overthrow of a military dictatorship. This chapter looks more closely at the 1973-76 period and the development of a group of students who joined the Communist party, returning from the jungle to become intellectuals and politicians. This group was reasonably cohesive until Thaksin built his Thai Rak Thai party and brought a number of the October Generation into his circle. The author notes that this supposed cohesion had begun to dissipate before Thaksin came on the scene. Ji Ungpakorn is certainly correct to note the way that intellectual fashions like postmodernism and political and economic liberalism have had a deleterious impact on their political activism. His discussion of the influence of these leaders on people's movements is interesting, and his claim that their impact has been negative and depoliticising should not be ignored.

The fourth chapter is about the ongoing woes of the southernmost provinces. In my view, this chapter is the weakest. The predominantly Malay-Muslim provinces have seen increased violence and a rapidly developing insurgency. The author doesn't add a great deal to the existing literature on this topic. At the same time, it has to be said that the south has been a remarkably perplexing problem for a multitude of analysts.

There are a few problems with the book, some of which have been mentioned above. To nitpick, I also find the author's system of transliteration confusing. He insists on a system that results in some oddities, including changing the spelling of very well-known figures like Thaksin (Taksin in this book). Another difficulty for me is the tendency for the author to sheet home many of the problems of Thai politics to the now-defunct Communist party, which he sees as Maoist and Stalinist. That may be so, but many of the basic conflicts of Thai society have little to do with the party's doctrinal debates and its eventual failure. But these are merely distractions in a book that deserves serious consideration.

A Coup For the Rich should be required reading for anyone interested in contemporary Thai politics. While there will be analysts who will disagree with aspects of Ji Ungpakorn's short book, it has to be said that he has raised a range of issues that demand greater attention, not the least being the significance of class relationships in Thailand's recent political events.


Kevin Hewison [c] 2008

Carolina Asia Center

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Chapel Hill, USA


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